South Korea established a non-competitive natural gas market in order to have a stable and economical supply of natural gas. The allegation has been raised about the inefficiency of this non-competitive market structure, but reform attempts have failed because of protests. Proponents of this incumbent system argue that gas needs to be supplied by the public sector in a monopolized structure so as to have a stable supply of this essential good, natural gas, and to prevent market failures like exorbitant gas prices and a deficit in supply due to a natural monopoly. They also argue that the unified gas purchase endows purchasing power. However, the gas industry does not exactly meet the categorical characteristics of an essential good or a natural monopoly and the concept of purchasing power is hardly accepted. Moreover, according to agent theory and property theory, the current market and firms are likely to be inefficient; several events are proving this inefficiency to be true. However, people remain unsure about the necessity of gas market reform. Ironically, South Korea has a different policy and market approach to the oil market despite the similarity of these two fuels. The oil market in South Korea constitutes an effective competitive market via a liberalized market, and is supplying the fuel stably and economically, contrary to people’s expectations. This thesis contrasts different approaches in South Korea toward similar hydrocarbon fuels, oil and gas. The competitiveness of the oil market is examined through statistics, Lerner index, analyzing of the profit trend in the market, and price comparison by countries. Results support the validity of South Korean gas market reform if the oil market is effectively competitive through liberalization. / text

Le gaz naturel tient une place de plus en plus importante dans le bouquet énergétique de l'Union Européenne. Cependant, faute de ressources suffisantes sur son territoire, elle est fortement dépendante de ses importations pour satisfaire ses besoins gaziers. En parallèle, depuis 1998 l'UE cherche la création d'un marché gazier unique et libéralisé. L'objectif de cette thèse est de voir si la libéralisation du marché gazier européen ne constitue pas un risque pour le pouvoir de négociation des importateurs et plus largement pour la sécurité gazière de l'UE. Le premier chapitre propose un état des lieux du marché gazier européen. Il permet de constater l'état d'avancement du marché unique, la forte dépendance extérieure de l'UE et la faible diversification de ses approvisionnements. À partir de ces constats, le second chapitre propose un modèle issu de la théorie des jeux coopératifs permettant de mettre en évidence l'évolution du pouvoir de négociation des importateurs résultant du processus de libéralisation. Il montre alors que la libéralisation entraîne une détérioration du pouvoir de négociation des importateurs au profit des producteurs extérieurs à l'UE, au premier rang desquels la Russie. Par ailleurs, il montre également que la constitution d'une centrale d'achat européenne est en mesure de fournir un contre pouvoir permettant d'équilibrer les rapports de force entre l'amont et l'aval de la chaîne gazière. Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'évolution du GNL à travers le monde et plus particulièrement sur le marché de l'UE. Le développement du GNL en Europe permet l'entrée de nouveaux opérateurs sur l'amont de la chaîne, ce qui renforce la concurrence entre les fournisseurs de l'UE au bénéfice du pouvoir de négociation des importateurs. Enfin, le dernier chapitre aborde les conséquences du développement du gaz de schiste aux Etats-Unis sur le marché gazier européen. Il montre ainsi que ce développement s'accompagne d'une incertitude sur le futur de la demande gazière de l'UE et d'une remise en cause des contrats d'approvisionnement de long terme. / Natural gas has a growing importance in the European Union energy. However, because of the lack of resources in its territory, the EU is highly dependent on imports to meet its gas needs. In parallel, since 1998 the EU seeks the creation of a single and liberalized natural gas market. The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the gas market liberalization can create a risk for importers' bargaining power and more widely to the gas security of supply of the EU. The first chapter provides an overview of the European gas market. It deals with the implementation of the process of gas market liberalization, the external dependency of the EU and the weakness of gas supply diversity. Using findings from the previous chapter, the second one proposes a model from the cooperative game theory to analyze the effects of the EU natural gas market liberalization on importers' bargaining power. It shows that the liberalization weakens importers' bargaining power vis-à-vis external suppliers, where Russia is the leader. It also shows that the implementation of a European gas purchasing agency offers a counter-power to the EU that balances bargaining power. The third chapter focuses on the development of LNG in the world and more specifically in the EU market. The development of LNG in Europe allows the entry of new operators on the upstream and, thus, increases competition among the EU's suppliers for the benefit of importers' bargaining power. The last chapter analyzes the impact of US shale gas development on the EU gas market. Thus, it shows that development is accompanied by an uncertainty about the future gas demand in the EU and by a reconsideration of the EU's long-term contracts.

The master thesis analyzes the current situation in the Russian gas industry and outlines the outlook for 2020 with regard to the interaction of internal and external factors. Efforts were made to determine the extent of global financial crisis on Russian gas industry. Master thesis also focuses on the question whether the Russian economy will be deepen on revenues from oil and natural gas export in 2020 more than at the beginning of 21st century. The aim of this thesis is to highlight the close link between economic and political interests of Russia in energy cooperation.

The thesis deals with the position of company RWE on the market of natural gas as a method used for heating in the Czech Republic and the marketing tools which will help to maintain this position. For this purpose the analysis of natural gas market in the Czech Republic is made as a part of the marketing plan followed by suggested steps that should prevent the household customers from leaving. Alternative ways of heating are also covered briefly, and some of them are advised to be focused on by RWE in future. The goal of the thesis is to propose a solution which would inspire the marketing team of RWE in their own marketing planning.

With the increasing share of variable renewable generation, balancing electric powersystems could become a major concern for system operators because of their variableand hardly predictable nature. However, gas technologies appear as a solutionto provide this flexibility, but the impacts on the gas power system have hardly beeninvestigated. In this thesis, consulting reports on the subject matter, regulator suggestions andgas-electricity interaction models in scientific literature are studied and four sourcesare identified to be used for balancing: linepack, storage facilities, liquefied natural gasand intraday gas supply from adjacent areas. Then, a gas-electricity model for flexibility supply is designed and three case studies are simulated in order to analyze bothgas and electric power systems’ behaviors. In these case studies, electricity generation,contribution of gas sources and costs are analysed. The study concludes that critical situations on gas market that can occur, e.g. incases of large variation in the net electricity demand and limited availability of linepackand storage facilities, the need of intraday modulation can exceed the possibilities toprovide for it. Then, gas cannot be supplied to power plants during peak periods, andmore gas than necessary is used during off-peak periods. The case studies also showthat day-ahead forecast errors in variable renewable generation can be handled mucheasier than variations by the gas system but leads to higher costs.

Regulation of border and behind-the-border measures in the oil and gas sectors presents the ‘resource access’ challenge with immense economic ramifications for export markets, yet their status under the multilateral trading regime remains obscure. Recent developments that could reshape the trading regime and market dynamics for oil and gas have seen the call for a global energy governance gain momentum in recent years. But the complex relationships between national laws, institutional norms, and the multilateral trading regime regulating energy presents an ideological ‘conflict in applicable law’. They reveal a conflict between regulatory privileges enshrined in energy resource-focused institutions namely: OPEC as a producer-only treaty, the ECT as a sector-specific multilateral energy treaty, national energy laws on the heel of the PSNR principle as a customary international law; versus international obligations under the GATT rules relevant to energy. These regimes have the trappings of nationalism, regionalism, and institutionalism in energy regulation, thereby creating an ambiguous path to global energy governance. This research revisits the institutional and regulatory architecture of oil and gas regimes from the perspective of quota measures and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) implemented through the instrumentality of national laws, acts of NOCs (in the oil sector) and acts of non-state undertakings (in the gas sector). It therefore charts an uncommon territory and brings a new dimension to the discipline of energy and trade, with a robust examination of how regulation of quota measures and trade-related investment in the oil sector (with export restriction issues) differs from their regulation in the gas sector (with underlying competition issues) and how their varying trade effects shape their future in international economic law. Given the inherent conflicts between the legal, policy, and regulatory design of these regimes governing energy, this research first explores and applies the principle of conflict of norms to energy governance. This paves way for a hands-on approach to examining the applications of these measures under the auspices of these regimes aimed at a ‘co-operative energy governance’ between the resource-focused regimes and the GATT rules relevant to energy on the basis of their trade effects. I argue that an understanding of ‘quota measures’ and ‘TRIMs’ in the oil sector compared to their implementations in the gas sector is compelling in making a case for a systemic energy cooperation that would serve economic interests of all affected states without diminishing the normative value of each regime in each sector.

This study discusses how the World Trade Organization could promote the development of an international gas market by playing a more prominent role in regulating rights essential to effective pipeline gas transit. Gas transit is network-dependent in the sense that it cannot be established without the existence of pipeline infrastructure in the territory of a transit State and the ability to access this infrastructure. Nevertheless, at an inter-regional level, there are no sufficient pipeline networks that would allow gas to travel freely from a supplier to the most lucrative markets. The existing networks are often operated by either private or State-controlled vertically-integrated monopolies that are usually reluctant to release unused pipeline capacity to their potential competitors. These obstacles diminish the gains from trade for States endowed with scarce and relatively immobile natural resources, such as gas, including developing land-locked countries that rely on revenues from gas exports. These obstacles can also undermine Members’ energy security and their sustainable development achieved by shifting domestic production from dirty fuels to cleaner energy sources – namely gas. From a technical perspective, gas transit can be established by invoking what is referred to in this study as ‘third-party access’ and/or ‘capacity establishment’ rights. The first main question that this thesis analyses is, therefore, whether, and, if so, how these rights are regulated by WTO rules relevant to transit, including: GATT Article V:2 (first and second sentences) establishing the principles of freedom of transit and non-discrimination, the ‘non-violation complaint’ provision under GATT Article XXIII:1(b), and the GATS. This question has not been answered by WTO panels or examined sufficiently by scholars. The key contribution of this study to the existing academic literature on energy transit lies in the fact that this study analyses the above rules through the prism of systemic integration of WTO law sources with other relevant rules of public international law, including principles of general international law and treaties regulating transit. By contrast, previous researchers discussed the regulation of third-party access and capacity establishment rights from a limited perspective of WTO law. The second main question examined in this study is how WTO transit rules could be improved through a legislative reform to regulate particular aspects of trade in pipeline gas better – namely third-party access and capacity establishment rights. This question is answered by exploring two options: the codification of the existing principles of general international law relevant to these rights in the WTO legal system and the progressive development of WTO transit rules through the expansion of additional commitments of Members on energy services under the GATS. While this study analyses the relationship between WTO transit obligations and inherent ancillary rights (namely third-party access and capacity establishment rights) implied in these obligations in the context of trade in pipeline gas, the conclusions reached here may have practical application in other areas of network-bound trade, such as trade in electric power.

The European natural gas market is characterised by higher demand than available supply from own resources. Therefore Europe is a gas net-importing region. The costs of potential problems or disruptions establish the need for an environment which stimulates sufficient investments in transmission line capacities. We examine the effects of the introduction of the recently developed Hogan, Rosellón and Vogelsang (HRV) incentive mechanism into the European natural gas market. In the simulations with GAMS we can confirm all results expected from theory. The validity of these simulation results is confirmed in a structural analysis, which comprised the variation of different exogenous input parameters. Therefore we conclude that the HRV incentive mechanism as a regulatory regime for the European natural gas market would be an advisable alternative, which should be considered in future discussions. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

Les problématiques de l’énergie et de l’environnement sont un des principaux défis pour l’humanité au XXIème siècle. La croissance mondiale de la demande d’énergie est confrontée aux préoccupations environnementales (y compris la pollution, le réchauffement climatique et la réduction des émissions de CO2), en particulier dans les régions en croissance économique rapide comme l’Asie. Le transfert de l’utilisation des sources d’énergies traditionnelles comme le charbon, le pétrole, vers les sources d’énergie plus propres et des énergies renouvelables est une tendance inévitable à l’avenir. Dans le contexte actuel, le gaz naturel est considéré comme une source d’énergie propre qui jouera un rôle important dans le processus de transition énergétique vers une économie bas-carbone. Les conséquences pour les marchés de gaz naturel peuvent être considérables. La condition d’une telle évolution est de disposer d’une offre en gaz naturel importante. Le développement du gaz non conventionnel, en particulier le gaz de schiste, fournit une opportunité d’expansion de l’approvisionnement gazier mondial comme le montre la « révolution du gaz de schiste » aux États- Unis. Celle-ci a profondément modifié les marchés gaziers régionaux. Toutefois, cette « révolution » n’est guère reproductible à d’autres régions du monde. Cette thèse démontre en particulier qu’en dehors des facteurs géologiques, des conditions institutionnelles (fiscalité, droits de propriété), économiques (prix, technologies) et organisationnelles (libéralisation des marchés) sont nécessaires pour assurer un développement à grande échelle des ressources non conventionnelles. Cette thèse montre que ces conditions ne sont pour la plupart pas réunies ni en Europe ni en Asie (notamment en Chine). Dès lors, une transition par le gaz pour répondre aux enjeux climatiques en Asie se fera par la voie des importations et non par une production propre à la région. A partir de trois scénarios du modèle POLES basés sur des hypothèses de politique climatique, de développement du gaz de schiste et d’augmentation rapide de la demande de gaz dans le mix énergétique, en particulier en Asie, deux principales conclusions émergent. Tout d’abord, l’importance du développement des gaz de schistes aux USA, leur bas coût de production induisent au niveau mondial une offre de gaz abondante et compétitive par rapport à d’autres énergies notamment par rapport au charbon. Par conséquent, même sans politique climatique, les conditions sont réunies pour que la part du gaz naturel puisse croître dans le mix énergétique. Deuxièmement, une politique climatique affirmée a des effets contradictoires quant à l’importance du gaz naturel dans les mix énergétiques des pays asiatiques. D’un côté elle permet une pénétration plus importante du gaz naturel dans leur mix énergétique. Mais dans le même temps, limitant la demande d’énergie, les volumes de gaz naturel demandés ne sont que légèrement plus importants que dans des scénarios sans politique climatique. / Energy and environmental issues are one of the main challenges for humanity in the 21st century. Global growth in energy demand links to environmental concerns including pollution, global warming and reduction of CO2 emissions. In particular, it is an urgent request in rapidly growing developing regions such as Asian countries. Using cleaner energy sources, renewable energy instead of traditional energy sources like coal and oil is an inevitable option in the future. In the current context, natural gas is seen as a clean energy source which plays a major role in the energy transition process towards a low-carbon economy. The consequences for natural gas markets are significant and the condition of this change is an abundant supply of natural gas. The development of unconventional gas, particularly shale gas, provides an opportunity to expand the global gas supply. This is illustrated by the “shale gas revolution” in US which has profoundly changed the regional gas markets. However, this "revolution" is hardly reproducible in other regions of the world. This thesis demonstrates particularly that apart from geological, institutional conditions (taxation, property rights), economic (prices, technologies) and organizational (free markets) are necessary for a large scale development of unconventional resources. This research also shows that most of these conditions are not met in Europe or Asia (especially in China). Therefore, an energy transition by natural gas to meet climate challenges in Asia will be solved through imports, rather than through regional production. From three scenarios of the POLES model based on assumptions about climate policy, shale gas development and rapid increase of demand for gas in the energy mix (particularly in Asia), two main conclusions emerge. The developments of shale gas with low cost in the USA make the global gas supply abundant and more competitive than other energies, particularly coal. Therefore, even without climate policy, the conditions are ripe for the increaseof natural gas proportion in the energy mix. Secondly, a strong climate policy has contradictory effects on the relative share of natural gas in the Asian energy mix. On the one hand, it allows natural gas larger penetration into the energy mix of Asia. But at the same time, with limitation of energy demand, requested natural gas volumes are only slightly higher than in scenarios without climate policy.

Denna rapport syftar till att utvärdera de för- och nackdelar den svenska gasmarknadsmodellen har relativt de shippermodeller som finns i Europa, där modellernas lämplighet att stimulera ökad konkurrens i synnerhet beaktas. Därtill behandlas de krav som nuvarande och kommande EU-lagstiftning ställer och vilka konsekvenser detta får för Sveriges del. Studien ska ge underlag för en bedömning om den svenska modellen är välfungerande eller om en förändring kan motiveras, och i så fall i vilken riktning. Till fördel för nuvarande svenska modell lyfts lättförståelighet och lägre motpartsrisk vid kapacitetsbokning fram. Även pristransparensen bedöms vara bättre till följd av att gas och transport faktureras separat. Transportkostnad fram till den svenska gränsen ingår likväl fortfarande i gaspriset. En shippermodell å andra sidan, bedöms skapa bättre förutsättningar för konkurrens och därmed öka incitamenten för utländska aktörer att ta sig in på den svenska marknaden. Dels ges aktörerna möjlighet att konkurrera om transport, dels skulle modellen överenstämma med de modeller utländska aktörer har på sina hemmamarknader. Många aktörer menar att den svenska modellen fungerar tillfredsställande i sin nuvarande utformning och att val av marknadsmodell inte är viktigast för utvecklandet av naturgasmarknaden. Mot bakgrund av detta samt de fördelar modellen har och den svenska marknadens ringa storlek, så framstår det som ett rimligt alternativ att behålla den. Vad gäller EU:s harmoniseringsarbete är det två nätkoder som i nuläget är mest aktuella, CMP och CAM, där CAM får konsekvenser för kapacitetsbokning i gränspunkter ellanentry/exit-zoner. Gränspunkten mellan Sverige och Danmark är i nuläget undantaget från CAM men åsikterna om huruvida detta är möjligt framöver eller inte går isär, ytterligare införselpunkter kan komma att skapa problem. Därtill vet vi inte i nuläget vilka konsekvenser kommande lagstiftning kan få för Sverige. Ett modellbyte kan således bli oundvikligt i slutändan. Vid ett byte är vår rekommendation är att undersöka möjligheten att övergå till en hel shippermodell, där både transmissions- och distributionsnät inkluderas i entry/exitzonen. Att ha en avvikande modell är tidskrävande, primärt för Energimarknadsinspektionen och Swedegas, till följd av EU:s harmoniseringsarbete som utarbetas för en shippermodell då detta är den vanligaste lösningen i Europa i allmänhet. Vi tror dessutom att en sådan lösning skulle gynna konkurrensen på marknaden, inte minst på hushållsmarknaden till följd av att kunden enbart får en kontaktpunkt oavsett om gasleverantör och distributionsbolag befinner sig inom samma koncern eller inte. / This report aims to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the Swedish gas market model in comparision to shipper models, which are common in the EU in general. The models’ suitability to stimulate competition is especially considered. In addition, the requirements of present and future EU legislation sets and the resulting consequences for Sweden are covered in the report. The study will provide a basis for assessing whether the Swedish model is well functioning or if a change is needed, and if so in which direction. Advantages of the Swedish model are that it is easy to understand and that it has a lower counterparty risk when it comes to capacity reservation. Also, the price transparency is considered to be better since the gas and transport charges are invoiced separately. Transportation cost to the Swedish border is nevertheless still included in the gas price. A shipper model on the other hand, is expected to create a more competitive market and to increase incentives for foreign players to enter it. The players are given the opportunity to compete for transportation and the model would also match the models foreign players face in their home markets, thus lowering the entry barriers. Many respondents think that the Swedish model works well in its present form and that the choice of market model is not of highest importance for the development of the natural gas market. In light of this, the benefits of the current model and the Swedish market's small size, it seems like a reasonable option to keep it. As for the EU harmonization, there are two network codes that are currently most relevant, CMP and CAM. The CAM network code has implications for capacity reservation in the cross-border points between different entry/exit-zones. The point between Sweden and Denmark is currently excluded from CAM, but opinions regarding whether this is possible in the future or  not differ. Additional entry points might create problems. In addition, at this point we do not know what impact future legislation may have. A model change can thus be inevitable in the  end.   If changing, our recommendation is to investigate the possibility of switching to a full shipper model where both the transmission and distribution networks are included in the entry/exit-zone. Having a model that differs from the rest of EU is time consuming, primarily for EI and Swedegas, since the harmonization efforts made by the EU are tailored for a shipper model since this is the prevailing system in Europe in general. We also believe that such a solution would benefit market competition. This is particularly true for the residential market because the customer only gets one contact point, whether gas suppliers and distribution companies are in the same Group or not.