<p>Denna studie undersöker omsättningstillväxten i svenska företag i samband med börsintroduktionen (IPO). Studien undersöker detta genom att undersöka företagens omsättningstillväxt tre år före och tre år efter IPO:n, detta för att se när tillväxten sker i förhållande till IPO:n. Detta har gjorts genom att undersöka de 57 bolag som genomförde en IPO på Stockholmsbörsen under perioden 1999 till 2003 som klarade de utsatta kriterierna. Resultatet visar att företagen har en signifikant högre tillväxt före IPO än efter. Detta styrker teorin om att företagens ”window-dressing” i samband med börsintroduktionen för att ägarna ska få maximalt betalt. Det skall även nämnas att 21 observationer bland 16 företag har en tillväxt på över 100 % på ett år.</p> / <p>This paper provides evidence that sales growth decreases after the time of companies initial public offerings (IPOs). The data is from Stockholm stock exchange (OMX) and contains all companies that were introduced between 1999 and 2003. It shows that IPO pays for the growth in sales that was gained before the IPO rather than for growth after the IPO. This shows that ”window-dressing” in connection with IPOs is more of a rule than an exception.</p>

Denna studie undersöker omsättningstillväxten i svenska företag i samband med börsintroduktionen (IPO). Studien undersöker detta genom att undersöka företagens omsättningstillväxt tre år före och tre år efter IPO:n, detta för att se när tillväxten sker i förhållande till IPO:n. Detta har gjorts genom att undersöka de 57 bolag som genomförde en IPO på Stockholmsbörsen under perioden 1999 till 2003 som klarade de utsatta kriterierna. Resultatet visar att företagen har en signifikant högre tillväxt före IPO än efter. Detta styrker teorin om att företagens ”window-dressing” i samband med börsintroduktionen för att ägarna ska få maximalt betalt. Det skall även nämnas att 21 observationer bland 16 företag har en tillväxt på över 100 % på ett år. / This paper provides evidence that sales growth decreases after the time of companies initial public offerings (IPOs). The data is from Stockholm stock exchange (OMX) and contains all companies that were introduced between 1999 and 2003. It shows that IPO pays for the growth in sales that was gained before the IPO rather than for growth after the IPO. This shows that ”window-dressing” in connection with IPOs is more of a rule than an exception.

First North är en alternativ handelsplats för aktier, som är till för att små bolag med stor tillväxtspotential ska kunna plocka in externt kapital för att möjliggöra en snabbare expansion än om de varit privatägda aktiebolag. First North ställer dock inte samma formella krav på de listade bolagen som det ställs på företag som är noterade på Stockholmsbörsen då dessa är betydligt mycket större. Under år 2007 har de växt fram en stark förtroendekritik mot bolag som är listade på First North. Analytiker och media har framfört stark kritik och menar att bolagen är alldeles för kortsiktiga i sitt tänkande och att de blygsamma krav som ställs på bolagen inte garanterar en trovärdig förvaltning. Kritikerna menar att detta tillsammans med ledningens girighet leder till att företagen vill lura externa intressenter på kapital. För att undersöka om de finns någon sanning i dessa påståenden har vi undersökt hur strategierna ser ut för bolag som nyligen listats på First North. Detta har möjliggjorts genom fem stycken intervjuer med listade bolag på First North. Under intervjuernas gång har vi frågat antingen verkställande direktör eller styrelseordförande på hur de ser på strategierna för bolaget. Med hjälp av olika teorier om strategier samt institutionell teori har vi försökt söka svar i hur ledningen ser på strategier samt försöka förklara varför de valt de strategier som de gjort. De resultat som vi kommit fram till är att den kritik som riktats mot bolag listade på First North är befogad gällande kortsiktighet. Men till vår förvåning är att det inte ledningen som i första hand ska ställas till ansvar för valen av strategier, även om dessa såklart är de som genomfört strategibyten, utan att de är analytikerna själva som bär störst skuld i detta. Mycket beroende för att analytikerna har ett väldigt stort inflytande över vad som anses vara de bästa för bolagen och att de är svårt för ett enskilt nyligen listat bolag att stå emot de externa påtryckningar som de finansiella institutionerna har.

This paper presents an empirical study of the determinants that drive the investment performance of China’s venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) funds. Using data on VC/PE funds backed initial public offerings (IPOs) from ChiNext between October 2009 to October 2011 and the internal rate of return (IRR) as the measurement for investment performance, this paper finds that fund experience has a positive influence on investment performance whereas investment scale and investment duration have a negative influence on investment performance.

In the past, most scholars emphasized the cause of the short-term and long-term abnormality, but often neglected the influence of measure method. As a result, seldom scholars explained the measure method completely. Most scholars think market factor can explain asset return completely, so they use CAPM to evaluate the short-run and long-run performance of IPOs. They find IPOs have initial abnormal return, but they are underperformance in the long run. But if market factors cannot explain IPOs performance completely, short-run and long-run performance does exist or just the model cannot explain? We think it is necessary to modify three-factor model to improve its explanatory power. We utilize Fama-French three- factor model and momentum factor to assemble into four-factor model to revaluate IPOs performance, explore the reasons which influence abnormal return of IPOs in Taiwan, and discuss market efficiency to understand the tendency and the variation of IPOs performance. We conclude that there is no underperformance in Taiwan and Taiwan¡¦s stock market is market efficient. In addition, the empirical result is the same with Loughran and Ritter¡]2000¡^that it will increase explanatory power to use purging benchmark.

Abstract By using Tobit model to remove price limit regulation from the limited price data, this study analyzes the IPO aftermarket¡¦s rationality using a sample of 362 stocks which conducted IPO between 1991 and 1998 in Taiwan stock markets. Two market efficiency hypotheses were examined: the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and the hypothesis of efficiently learning market (ELM). The later relaxed EMH by letting prior beliefs to be unspecified. Risk was valued by market portfolio return, market model, and an alteration of Fama-French three-factor model. Tobit model is used to remove price limits in case of limit-move day. In addition to examining the hypotheses of market efficiency, this study also explores cross-section and time-series return patterns. We are interested in the effect of competitive bidding on market efficiency, the role of SEO on IPOs long-run performance, the implication of heavy issuance return pattern, and momentum and mean reversion. The results show that our IPO sample does learn rationally from information in the sense of ELM in conjunction with market model or thee-factor model. The cross-section and time-series results indicate that market is not ¡¥overreaction¡¦ or ¡¥fad¡¦, but learning sequentially and cautiously. Thus, the IPOs long-run anomalies disappear in our sample if model is properly defined.

Despite an abundance of executive turnover research in the context of large public firms, little has focused on top executive change in entrepreneurial settings. This study attempts to develop a foundation of theory and evidence on management team restructuring and executive exit in new venture firms, especially for ventures which eventually go public. Taking a political perspective, the study develops and empirically tests a power model of management team restructuring and executive exit in the pre- and post-IPO periods. A central thesis of this study is that the relative power of the executive cadre shifts as an entrepreneurial firm converts from a private venture to a public company, due to the drastic change in firm political coalition structure and the skill requirements for executives. The change of power distribution among the top executives affects the likelihood of management team restructuring and executive exit. Both firm level and individual level factors were examined. The study also investigates the performance implications of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit. Empirical results support the major propositions of the power model. VC prestige was found to have a positive impact on management team restructuring and new executive entry before the IPO. Technical skills are negatively associated with pre-IPO executive exit but positively associated with post-IPO executive exit. The addition of new senior executives in the post-IPO period increases the likelihood of executive exit. In addition, when firm performance is low, adding new outside directors tends to increase the probability of executive exit in the post-IPO stage. The study found that firms that had restructured management teams before the IPO tend to have lower likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO period. In the post-IPO stage, executives with prior public company managerial experience have a significantly lower likelihood of exit than non-managerial executives. Further, the study found that pre-IPO management team restructuring improves the firm??s pre-money market valuation at the IPO. The exits of managerial executives in the post-IPO period have negative effects on subsequent average ROA. The exits of financial executives negatively affect average shareholder return in the years following the exit events.

The dissertation examines IPO underpricing and long-term performance to assess the use of industry specialization as a differentiation strategy by audit firms and underwriters. Prior studies indicate that prestigious auditors or underwriters (e.g., Big 6 auditors) are associated with IPO underpricing. I extend existing literature by incorporating market share as a refined measure of auditor (underwriter) reputation. In particular, I define a differentiated auditor (underwriter) as the market leader that possesses significantly higher market share than their competitors in the client industry. I hypothesize that the impact of auditor (underwriter) reputation in the IPO setting depends on whether the audit firm (underwriter) has successfully differentiated itself from competitors within client industries. My results show that as audit firm (underwriter) industry market share increases without differentiation, the IPO underpricing increases. It appears that this group of auditors (underwriters) intentionally engages in high-risk IPOs in order to gain fee advantages. In contrast, differentiated auditors (underwriters) are related to lower IPO underpricing because their reputation assist in reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors. My study is important because it shows that the benefits previously thought to be attributable to a very large set of auditors and underwriters stems primary

Since London Stock Exchange introduced bookbuilding in IPO in 1992, more and more countries also allowed companies to go IPO through bookbuilding or bookbuilding hybrid with other IPO mechanism. About 90% of the countries in the world allow bookbuilding, and it has formed a potential trend. There were about 60% of IPOs using bookbuilding in LSE, and almost 90% of the investors in the market were institutional investors. Under the main board is Alternative Investment Market (AIM) without any listing criteria, companies are qualified for listing just by designating a nominated advisor (NOMAD), and about 40%-50% of the investors on AIM are institutional investors. The growth of AIM were so amazing in recent years, especially, the number of IPOs has maintained above 150 issues per year during past five years, and 90% of them were through bookbuiling. The main purpose of this study is to figure out why companies tend to use bookbuilding. From the evidence of LSE, we found that the smaller company or issue is, the more possible that they would choose bookbuilding. When the market is less liquid, bookbuilding would likely be used, and stocks that sold through bookbuilding are usually less liquid. Companies listed on AIM are usually small and mediun ones, and choosing bookbuiling sometimes signals a good sign about the quality of a company for getting through with the examination from institutional investors. In addition, companies can designated a NOMAD as an underwriter, too. From the view point of maximizing underwriting profit and maintaining the relationship with institutional clients, the underwriter would also tend to use bookbuilding. Besides, we proposed that after-market cumulative abnormal return would be one of the reasons that company chooses bookbuilding, and we found evidence showing after-market cumulative abnormal return under bookbuilding is higher than under offer for subscription.

In this thesis we analyze the financial performance of Football clubs following an initial public offering (IPO). We conduct several analyses using time series stock data with a focus on finding evidence of long-run underperformance and IPO over/underpricing. To this end, we estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and Jensen’s Alpha. We also analyze coefficients such as beta to describe the volatility and the link football clubs’ stocks have to the general market. We look at historical events that may have affected the movement of stock prices and confirm this by benchmarking an index (STOXX index) compiled of a number of European football teams. Our results show that football clubs do in fact follow the clear pattern of other entities and sectors and previous research with regard to underperformance in the long run. We find that football clubs’ stocks are less volatile than the general market and have a low beta. With regards to over/underpricing, we only obtain data for a few football clubs. We find small signs of underpricing but are not able to confirm that this is statistical significant due to the size of our sample.