L'Iran est depuis longtemps considéré comme un État paria sur la scène internationale en raison de son programme nucléaire. Pourtant, les mêmes États qui ont publiquement dénoncé les ambitions nucléaires de l'Iran ont collaboré avec les autorités iraniennes à la lutte anti-drogue. Cette recherche explore comment les membres de la communauté internationale ont formulé leur discours public sur l'Iran afin de justifier à la fois leur coopération avec l’Iran contre les stupéfiants et leur dénonciation du programme nucléaire. Les déclarations politiques de sept gouvernements ayant fourni une assistance à la lutte anti-drogue de l’Iran de 2007 à 2011 ont été systématiquement analysées à l'aide de l'analyse de contenu qualitative et de l'analyse de discours. Notre analyse a révélé que ces pays ont entretenu des représentations contradictoires, construisant l’Iran simultanément comme un ennemi et un partenaire. Ces résultats suggèrent que la confrontation nucléaire avec l'Iran résulte des pratiques discursives d’acteurs internationaux. / Iran has long been considered as a pariah state in international affairs due to the development of the country’s nuclear program. Yet, the very same states that have denounced Iran’s nuclear ambitions and pushed for the imposition of international sanctions have collaborated with Iranian authorities on counter-narcotics issues. This research explores how members of the international community framed their public discourse on Iran in order to justify both counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran and denunciation of the country’s nuclear program. The political statements of seven governments that provided assistance to Iran’s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011 were systematically analysed with the help of Qualitative Content and Discourse analyses. Our analysis revealed that these donor countries held contradictory representations of Iran, constructing it simultaneously as an enemy and a partner. These findings suggest that nuclear confrontation with Iran is not inevitable but rather results from the discursive practices of international actors.

L’islamisme fait craindre l’Occident. Une analyse historique révèle pourtant que ce phénomène politico-religieux se limite aux œuvres de groupes marginaux sans pouvoir séduire l’Islam entier. Freiné par la complexité des échanges avec le monde extérieur, le rejet de l’Occidental relève davantage de la symbolique comme des circonstances aux causalités multiples. Malgré son parcours, l’ayatollah Khomeyni, l’un des pères de l’islamisme moderne, ne peut contourner longtemps cette réalité : en Iran, peu de gens adhèrent à son utopie. Toutefois, l’anti-américanisme développé dans la rhétorique de ce théocrate acharné finit par compenser momentanément. L’étude montre que le mépris de l’étranger lui sert de principe mobilisateur auprès d’une société exaspérée par l’incompétence d’un shah autoritaire et pro-américain. Le succès du khomeynisme s’achève peu après l’inauguration de la République islamique en février 1979. Encourageant le totalitarisme religieux, l’Imam empire le désastre existant, réduisant l’attrait de la haine de l’Amérique au profit d’un contraire associé à la liberté.

This study analyzes recent developments in U. S.- Iranian relations during the Nixon administration and attempts to portray the principal objectives of the United States and Iran vis-a-vis each other. Complex Interdependence is the model for development of the arguments. Due to the circumstances, however, the study substantially draws on Realism as well. Chapter I discusses methodology. Chapter II focuses on the Nixon Doctrine and its impact on U. S.-Iranian relations. Chapter III discusses the evolution of mutual interests between the two nations in the Gulf area. Chapter IV drawing on the previous chapters, concludes that an interdependent relation between the two nations has developed to the extent that in some areas policy of one nation would have an impact on the other, i.e., increase in the price of oil.

This study is a comparative analysis of the marginalizarion of the Baha'is in Iran and the Ahmadis in Pakistan over the last forty years. It explores the relationship between Islam, the ulama and the state as explanatory variables. In particular, the increasing political influence of fundamentalist ulama and their closer association with state mechanisms, accompanied by the creation of a "purist," "Islamic" state ideology in Iran and Pakistan, leads to greater discrimination against these two heterodox Muslim minorities. The outcome is continuing institutionalized, state-sponsored discrimination that denies substantial legal, political and social rights to the Baha'is and the Ahmadis.

Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2009

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Sc. pol.--North York (Ont.)--York university, 1991. / Notes bibliogr. à la fin de chaque chapitre. Index.

This thesis is a study of the attempts made in the last four decades of Naser ad-Din shah's reign to reform the government and the administration in Persia.

No description available.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: From 628 CE to 632 CE, in the late Sassanian period, there were possibly eleven royal successors to the Sassanian throne. This indicates instability and that the Sassanian dynasty was politically weakened. A succession crisis had developed. This study presents an attempt to understand one aspect of the political milieu of the succession crisis period, namely the legitimisation practices of the late Sassanian rulers. Therefore, the tools that were used for legitimisation by the Sassanian monarchs from the succession crisis period, and how they were used, are investigated. To better understand how the legitimisation tools available to Sassanian monarchs developed the political techniques used by the succession crisis monarchs will be compared with the early Sassanian monarchs of 224 CE to 302 CE (Ardashir 1, Shapur I, Hormizd I, Wahram I, Wahram II, Wahram III and Narseh). The comparison contributes to an improved understanding of the 7th century Sassanian succession struggles by tracking the changes in the techniques and practices Sassanian rulers utilised in the Empire to legitimise their rule. Such changes are rooted in the wider politico-historical contexts within which the Sassanian monarchs excercised their authority. The study will open with an investigation of the major political events of the 7th century CE that had an effect on the succession struggles and political events in the Sassanian Empire. One of the primary sources that are used is The History of Prophets and Kings by the 10th century CE Arabic historian Jarir al-Tabari. Physical evidence of the Sassanian monarchs like coinage, rock reliefs and silver bowls will also be used as primary sources and analysed to better understand the propaganda used by the Sassanian monarchs. The material propaganda techniques used by Sassanian monarchs from the early period and late period changed. The reasons behind the changes are highlighted and these reasons are furthermore explained. The study concludes that the Sassanian monarchs from the succession crisis period had a shrinking pool of legitimisation resources and that they had to legitimise their rule in a short period of time in view of internal opposition. As a result, the Sassanian monarchs from the period focused on legitimisation techniques that were not a drain on resources and could quickly influence the perception of people. The political legitimisation of the last Sassanian monarchs ultimately failed though as the Sassanian dynasty only continued to reign for another 23 years after 628 CE. The failure of the legitimisation of the Sassanian dynasty could be largely attributed to the internal opposition and the damaging war against the Byzantine Empire. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die tydperk tussen 628 tot 632 n.C was daar na bewering elf troonopvolgers in die Sassaniede Ryk. Dit illustreer die politieke onstabiliteit in die Sassaniede Ryk op daardie tydstip, n troonopvolgingskrisis het ontwikkel. In die studie word n poging van stapel gestuur om een aspek van die politieke milieu van die tydperk te verstaan, die legitimasiepraktyke van die laat Sassaniede heersers. Die hulpbronne tot die beskikking van die Sassaniede konings wat ingespan is om hulle regerings populariteit te gee word daarom ondersoek. Om die ontwikkeling van die legitimeringspraktyke beter te verstaan word die praktyke van die troonopvolgingskrisis konings vergelyk met die tegnieke van die vroeë Sassaniede konings van die tydperk 224 n.C. tot 302 n.C. (Ardashir I, Shapur I, Hormizd I, Wahram I, Wahram II, Wahram III and Narseh). Die vergelyking dien as n beginpunt om die Sassanied troonopvolgingskrisis beter te verstaan en om die veranderings van die legitimeringspraktyke te identifiseer. Sulke veranderings is gegrond in die wyer politieshistoriese konteks waarin die Sassanied konings hul mag uitgeoefen het. Die studie ondersoek eerstens die belangrike politieke gebeure van die 7de eeu n.C. wat n effek op die troonopvolgingskrisis en politieke aspekte van die Sassaniede Ryk gehad het. Een van die primêre bronne waarvan die studie gebruik maak, is The History of Prophets and Kings van die 10de eeuse n.C. Arabiese geskiedkundige Jarir al-Tabari. Ander primêre bronne wat gebruik word, sluit in muntstukke, rotsreliëfs en silwer bakke wat analiseer word om beter te verstaan hoe die produkte gebruik is as propaganda. Die legitimeringspraktyke en propaganda het n verandering ondergaan van die vroeë typerk tot die laat tydperk. Die redes vir die verandering word identifiseer en ‘n verduideliking vir die redes word aangebied. Die studie maak die gevolgtrekking dat die Sassaniede konings van die troonopvolgingskrisis tydperk minder hulpbronne tot hul beskikking gehad het en dat hulle hul blitsig moes regverdig vanweë interne teenkanting. As gevolg van hierdie faktore het die Sassaniede konings propaganda verkies wat nie te veel van hul hulpbronne gebruik het nie en ook mense baie vininig beïnvloed het. Die politieke programme van die laat Sassaniede het uiteindelik misluk. Die Sassanidiese dinastie het net vir nog 23 jaar na 628 n.C. geheers. Die uiteindelike mislukking van die politieke regverdigings programme van die laat Sassaniede kan grootliks verbind word aan die sterk interne teenstand en die effek wat die oorlog teen die Bisantynse Ryk gehad het.

This thesis expands the discussion on Iranian national identity into the period of Khatami’s presidency. Within the theoretical and methodological framework of discourse analysis this thesis contends that the multiple constructions of Iranian national identity, which coexist and compete with each other, can be better understood as discourses. The detailed analysis of five discourses of national identity illustrates a complex set of relationships based on the meanings attached to Iran’s Islamic and pre-Islamic identities and how the West is dealt with in the construction of national identity. The first discourse addressed is the Islamist discourse of national identity, which prioritises Iran’s Islamic culture. At the opposite end of the spectrum the Iranist discourse, which is based on the prioritisation of Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, is deconstructed. It is contended that this represents a new indigenous Iranism that is based on a rediscovery of Sasanian Iran as opposed to Achaemenid Iran. Khatami’s discourse is presented as an attempt at a dialogue between Islamism and Iranism. It is argued that the Khatami period is unique in terms of the articulation of national identity because Khatami has combined for the first time ideas, which together form the Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity, as an official state discourse. These are the combination of Islamic and pre-Islamic culture, the notion of ‘dialogue among civilisations’ and the idea of Islamic democracy. While these three discourses are based on the politicisation of culture, two additional discourses are presented that reject this politicisation. The first is a discourse of civic Iranian national identity and the second is a discourse of cosmopolitan Iranian national identity. It is contended that Khatami and his Islamist-Iranian discourse have allowed the more open articulation, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, of these constructions of Iranian national identity.