Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:31:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Juliana Meirelles de Lima.pdf: 1508176 bytes, checksum: 03ce0b2d7b02fe88e224e3ef0b6bef40 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-17 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This dissertation aims to investigate the discursive dimension of scientific databases. We understand that these tools are discursive practices and not merely repositories of scientific literature. Whilst the way in which articles are added to databases broadens the access researchers have to information, it also restricts the choice of articles available for access and the order in which they are accessed. Therefore, as search tools, databases have an impact on scientific practice. We have followed the argumentation presented by Hacking (1999; 2001; 2007) in order to investigate how the discursive dimension of scientific databases makes up kinds of people, more specifically, we attempt to ascertain the role databases play in determining the concept of vulnerable adolescents. We studied the history behind the use and crystallization of the notion of vulnerability as an organizing concept in the various areas of knowledge and more specifically in Psychology. To this intent, we gathered quantitative information on periodicals from the CAPES portal through a software developed exclusively for this purpose. Subsequently, we gathered information on publications from the PsycINFO database, analyzing discursively the vulnerability and vulnerable adolescents versions performed in publications from subfields of Psychology. Lastly, we focused on publications from the SciELO and BVS databases indexed by Qualis Psychology, evaluating the association between vulnerability and adolescence in national scientific publications in Brazil / Esta dissertação tem por objetivo investigar a dimensão discursiva dos bancos de dados científicos. Entendemos que tais ferramentas são práticas discursivas e não meros repositórios de publicações científicas. A maneira como as publicações são neles inseridas amplia, por um lado, o acesso dos pesquisadores às informações, mas, por outro, restringe o número de produções acessadas e impõe uma ordem. Portanto, como ferramentas de busca, os bancos produzem efeitos nas práticas científicas. Seguimos a argumentação de Hacking (1999, 2001, 2007) a fim de investigar como essa dimensão discursiva cria tipos de pessoas, mais especificamente, buscamos entender que papel os bancos de dados exercem na construção do conceito de adolescência vulnerável. Percorremos o trajeto histórico do uso e da cristalização da noção de vulnerabilidade como conceito organizador nas diversas áreas do saber e, com maior especificidade, na Psicologia. Para isso, um levantamento quantitativo foi realizado no portal de periódicos da CAPES através de um software desenvolvido especificamente para esse propósito. Posteriormente realizamos um levantamento das publicações na PsycINFO, analisando discursivamente as versões de vulnerabilidade e de adolescência vulnerável performadas nas publicações de subáreas da Psicologia. Por fim, no banco SciELO e BVS, estudamos publicações indexadas no Qualis de Psicologia, estudando a associação entre vulnerabilidade e adolescência em publicações científicas nacionais

Ma recherche a pour but de faire le point sur les derniers développements de l’historical epistemology, modalité d’enquête de la connaissance qui a émergée au cours du XX siècle au sein de l’épistémologie française et qui reste actuellement active dans une variété de formes. En dépit de son succès auprès de nombreux auteurs contemporains, l’épistémologie historique ne bénéficie encore d’aucune systématisation ni d’aucune liste d’auteurs et d’ouvrages canoniques. Mon travail de thèse se propose de traiter directement la question même de la légitimité et de l’originalité de ce type d’épistémologie en discutant sa nature, sa méthodologie et son unité. En analysant les ouvrages les plus importants dans ce domaine, j’accorderai un rôle central d’un coté à Michel Foucault et de l’autre à Ian Hacking, qui, à maintes égards, ont entretenu des rapports complexes, controversés, et pourtant révélateurs, avec l’épistémologie historique. Les deux phases de l’épistémologie historique, l’une « originaire » et l’autre « contemporaine », seront analysées dans un rapport biunivoque, dans un souci de clarification réciproque. Le développement à l’étranger de l’épistémologie historique dans sa phase contemporaine a créé une sorte de vide et une perte d’intérêt étonnante dans son lieu de naissance. La reconnexion de ce type d’épistémologie au cadre philosophique originel de son émergence représente l’occasion de ré-ouvrir le débat en France. / What is historical epistemology? Why does this field, despite its current proliferation,seem to be permanently haunted by questions relative to its nature, limits and ultimatetasks? What kind of historicization is at stake in this sort of inquiry? What is the relationbetween contemporary historical epistemology, as it is practiced by a growing number ofEnglish-speaking historians and philosophers of science, and the French “tradition” ofépistémologie historique? To address these questions, my research aims to provide arecursive analysis demonstrating how the two phases of historical epistemology, the“classical” and the “contemporary”, can clarify each other. In this process, the“archaeological method” of Michel Foucault, which draws on and transforms fundamentalinsights by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, will be shown to exert an enduringinfluence on the field, especially through Ian Hacking and his philosophical cum historicalanalyses of probability. / Che cos’è l’epistemologia storica? Perchè questo campo, nonostante la sua proliferazione attuale, sembra essere permanentemente minacciato da questioni relative alla sua natura, ai suoi limiti e ai suoi obiettivi ultimi? Che tipo di storicizzazione caratterizza questo tipo di indagine? Qual è la relazione tra l’epistemologia storica contemporanea, come è praticata da un numero crescente di storici e filosofi della scienza di lingua inglese, e la tradizione francese dell’épistémologie historique? Per affrontare tali questioni, la mia ricerca intende fornire un’analisi ricorsiva che dimostri come le due fasi dell’epistemologia storica, quella “classica” e quella “contemporanea”, possono chiarificarsi reciprocamente. In questo processo, il “metodo archeologico” di Foucault, che trae spunto da e trasforma intuizioni fondamentali di Gaston Bachelard e Georges Canguilhem, sarà mostrato nella sua influenza su questo campo di indagine, specialmente attraverso Ian Hacking e le sue analisi storico-filosofiche della probabilità.

History is descriptive. Epistemology is conceived as normative. It appears, then, that a historical approach to epistemology, like historical epistemology, might not be epistemically normative. In our context here, epistemology is not a systematic theory of knowledge, truth, or justification. In this thesis I approach epistemic justification through the vantage point of practice of science. Practice is about reasoning. Reasoning, conceived as the human propensity to order perceptions, beliefs, memories, etc., in ways that permit us to have understanding, is not only about thinking. Reasoning has to do with our actions, too: In the ordering of reasoning we take into account the desires of ourselves and others. Reasoning has to do with tinkering with stuff, physical or abstract. Practice is primarily about skills. Practices are not mere groping. They have a form. Performing according to a practice is an activity with a lot of plasticity. The skilled performer retains the form of the practice in many different situations. Finally, practices are not static in time. Practices develop. People try new things, some of which may work out, others not. The technology involved in how to go about doing things in a particular practice changes, and the concepts concerning understanding what one is doing also may change. This is the point where history enters the picture. In this thesis I explore the interactions between history, reasoning, and skills from the viewpoint of a particular type of epistemic justification: a priori justification. An a priori justified proposition is a proposition which is evident independent of experience. Such propositions are self-evident. We will make sense of a priori justification in a context of regarding science as practice, so that we will be able to demonstrate that the latter accommodates the normative character of science.