The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind. We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing. In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism. In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke's causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke's position suffers from the omission of concepts.

Orientador: Eduardo Roberto Junqueira Guimarães / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-24T23:22:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_DaniloRicardode_M.pdf: 11393359 bytes, checksum: d77903f0e95a1653fc289574dc77cf50 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: Este trabalho tem por objetivo fazer uma história das ideias linguísticas nas relações internacionais do Estado brasileiro. Na constituição dessa história, espera-se dar visibilidade específica à categoria interpretativa "espaço de enunciação", sobretudo pela análise de um corpus constituído a partir do Arquivo Histórico e Diplomático do Itamaraty, com documentos do período entre 1930-1950, momentos em que a designação da língua oficial esteve no centro das discussões no Brasil. É nosso objetivo analisar as possíveis implicações que a polêmica quanto ao nome da língua do Brasil teria nas políticas de línguas no cenário internacional. Grosso modo, considera-se o cruzamento das discursividades sobre o nome da língua e sobre a expansão dessa língua como objeto de especial interesse para compreender como, historicamente, o Estado pôde constituir uma política de sua língua justamente quando a identidade dessa língua estava, então, se construindo. Dar visibilidade a esse impasse histórico abre terreno para uma leitura particular quanto aos meios e objetivos da "expansão do idioma", permitindo interpretar uma história de sentidos para a língua nacional do Brasil e uma história das políticas de língua enquanto políticas do Estado brasileiro nas relações internacionais. Os materiais de pesquisa são aqui tomados enquanto textos e analisados com base no quadro teórico-metodológico do programa História das Ideias Linguísticas e da Semântica do Acontecimento. Nosso procedimento de análise de textos fundamenta-se em recortes dos materiais de pesquisa, recortes esses que respondem a dois interesses: de um lado, constituir uma história pelos sentidos que o texto tem sobre um objeto específico, a língua; de outro, marcar decisiva e explicitamente essa pesquisa e leitura do corpus enquanto prática política e, consequentemente, constituir uma história que, ao admitir seu caráter interpretativo, realça uma posição ética na pesquisa linguística. O interesse pela história das políticas de língua, na sua relação com o conceito de espaço de enunciação, e os dispositivos de análise do corpus posicionam este trabalho de modo especial entre os estudos da língua e da linguagem. Confiamos, porém, que o diálogo com as relações exteriores e com a própria história possa indicar também outros domínios disciplinares nos quais este trabalho venha potencialmente a se constituir enquanto objeto de interesse acadêmico / Abstract: This paper aims to make a history of linguistic ideas in international relations from Brazilian State. In that history, it is expected to give special visibility to the linguistic concept of "space of enunciation". We analyze a corpus, constituted from Itamaraty¿s Historic and Diplomatic Archive, with documents from the period between 1930-1950, moment in which the name of official language was at the center of discussions in Brazil. It is our aim analyzing the possible implications that the controversy about the name of the language would have on language policies in the international scenario. In short, we consider the intersection of discourses on the name of the language and on the expansion of the language as a subject of special interest to understand how the State could elaborate a policy of one language whose identity was being built. Giving visibility to this historical stalemate allows a particular reading on the means and objectives of the "expansion of language", allowing to interpret a history of senses to the national language of Brazil and a history of language policies as policies of Brazilian State in the international relations. In this work, the research materials are taken as texts and analyzed based on the theoretical and methodological framework of the program History of Linguistic Ideas and of the Semântica do Acontecimento (Semantics of the Utterance Event). Our procedure of analysis of text is based on clippings of research materials. These clippings correspond to two interests: on one hand, to constitute a history by the meanings of a text about a specific object, the language; on the other hand, to define decisive and explicitly this research and reading as political practice. By this procedure we are highlighting an ethical position in linguistic research. The interest in the history of language policies, in its relation to the concept of space of enunciation, as well as the device of analysis, position this job especially between studies of language. We trust, however, that the dialogue with the international relations and with history itself can also indicate other subject areas in which this work will potentially be constituted as an object of academic interest / Mestrado / Linguistica / Mestre em Linguística