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No / The aim of this article is to describe a dialogical approach to inquiry that differs somewhat from those that are now influential in psychology, including Shotter's, Wertsch's, Hermans's and Hicks¿s. Although these authors have very usefully drawn attention to dialogical approaches to understanding experience, the academic style of their writing underplays their own responsivity as participants in these dialogues. Whereas some adopt an authoritative or Magistral genre in reporting dialogue with participants, others adopt an explicitly Socratic dialogue that nonetheless tends towards monologue. We suggest that these ambiguities and paradoxes can be traced to Dilthey and Gadamer and the debate associated with their work about the relative weight to be given to content and experience in interpreting dialogue. Furthermore, we use Bakhtin's classification of genres of dialogue to argue for the benefits of a Menippean genre of dialogue, based on imagination and ethics, both as a corrective to the tendency to monologue in Socratic and Magistral dialogues and as a contribution to our understanding of the possibilities inherent in dialogical inquiry. In particular, Menippean dialogue points us in the direction of inquiry as a personal and creative act that places voices (including the authorial voice) in contact with each other with the capacity to enrich and change each other.

Yes / Young children often struggle with referential communications because they fail to compare all valid referents. In two studies, we investigated this comparison process. In Study 1, 4- to 7-year-olds (N=114) were asked to categorize pairs of objects according to their similarities or differences, and then identified a unique quality of one of the objects by responding to a referential question. Children found it easier to judge the differences between objects than similarities. Correct judgments of differences predicted accurate identifications. In Study 2, 4- to 5-year-olds (N=36) again categorized according to similarities or differences, but this time were asked for verbal explanations of their decisions. Recognition of differences was easier than recognition of similarities. Explanations of errors were either: a) ambiguous; b) color error: c) thematic (creative imaginative explanations). Children offered thematic explanations when they failed to recognize similarities between objects, but not for errors of difference.

« Socrate, dit-on, n’allait pas à la tragédie », écrit Clément Rosset dans son livre Philosophie tragique. Selon la philosophe américaine Martha C. Nussbaum, c’est spécifiquement cette pulsion anti-tragique qui caractériserait la philosophie dès Platon. Au XIXe siècle, le Nietzsche de La naissance de la tragédie avait déjà déclaré le meurtre de la tragédie par la philosophie ; bien que Nussbaum soit généralement en accord avec le diagnostic du philosophe allemand, elle y apporte un élément novateur. De fait, elle voit dans la philosophie aristotélicienne une brèche dans la tradition : un contre-argument à la théorie platonicienne ainsi qu’une continuité de la pensée tragique. Premier penseur de la tragédie, Aristote accordait déjà une part importante à la fortune (tuchè) dans sa théorie éthique. Or, cette vulnérabilité ontologique, c’est-à-dire le fait que l’être humain soit jusqu’à un certain point à la merci de forces qui le dépassent, phénomène que nous tenterons de penser sous le mode de la teneur tragique de l’existence, serait précisément ce qui permettrait, selon notre auteure, de fonder une philosophie contemporaine « pleinement humaine ». Cependant, pour appréhender le tragique, l’être percevant doit présenter une organisation du monde lui permettant de le voir comme tel. Pour Nussbaum, cette reconfiguration du vécu serait possible par l’imagination ; plus spécifiquement, par la littérature. Plus encore, l’imagination morale ici proposée par notre auteur serait à proprement parler cette rencontre avec la composante fondamentalement tragique de la vie. Nous pouvons donc dire que, en s’appuyant sur la méthode aristotélicienne ainsi que sur l’expérience tragique, l’auteure se situe dans la tradition d’un questionnement sur la notion d’imagination morale, et y apporte une contribution riche et particulière. / “Socrates, it is said, did not attend to tragedies,” wrote Clement Rosset in his book Tragic Philosophy. According to the American philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum, it is specifically this anti-tragic impulse that has characterized philosophy since Plato. In the nineteenth century, the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy had already declared the murder of tragedy by philosophy; although Nussbaum generally agrees with the diagnosis of the German philosopher, she adds an innovative element to it. Indeed, she sees in Aristotelian philosophy a breach in tradition: a counterargument to Platonist theory as well as a continuity of tragic thought. Aristotle, the first great thinker of tragedy, had already given an important role to fortune (tuchè) in his ethical theory. However, this ontological vulnerability, that is the fact that human beings are to a certain extent at the mercy of forces beyond their control, a phenomenon that we will try to think of as the tragic content of existence, would be precisely what, according to our author, would make it possible to found a contemporary philosophy that is “fully human”. However, in order to apprehend this tragic component, the perceiving being must present an organization of the world that allows him to see it as such. For Nussbaum, this reconfiguration of experience would be possible through imagination; more specifically, through literature. Moreover, the moral imagination hereby proposed by our author is, specifically, the encounter with life’s fundamentally tragic components. We can therefore say that, by relying on the Aristotelian method as well as on tragic experience, Nussbaum belongs to a tradition that addresses the notion of moral imagination and makes a rich and particular contribution to it.

In light of its title, ""The Petting Zoo,""? many of the poems in this collection exist on the page as animals, domestic ones mostly like cats and dogs and birds. Animals that have been tamed and trained to eat out of bowl or Petri dish, shit in certain places, and animals that have grown accustomed to the habitual pet and good good bird affirmation of owner. Katy wanna cracker? To be looked at. To be fed. To be loved. These poems are personal. They are an attempt to articulate the desires of a speaker who is in a constant state of trying to understand the world and the obsessive concerns that decorate her life: think memory, think past, think brother, think sex, think nature, empathy, imagination, abortion, old dog, abortion, love, all of which show up time and time and again throughout the collection. Touch and to be touched, to be whole and yet to break. These poems, perhaps, approach what it means to be alive, and even more specific, what it means to be alive and working through the aftermath of the past and day-to-day that for the speaker often feels broken and incomplete. / Master of Fine Arts

My thesis started with drawing as a means to explore architecture. In pursuit of a vision in the seascape, initial drawings were made holding the notion of light and water. Later development of spaces was informed by these drawings. Pure drawing helps me not only with directly expressing what I imagine, but also furthering the design by observing and valuing the object rather than representing what was preconceived, which reveals my intuition, judgement and the unknown. / Master of Architecture

Psychology of Education / M. Ed. (Sielkundige Opvoedkunde)

IMAGINATION AND DEFORMATION: MONSTROUS MATERNAL PERVERSIONS OF NATURAL REPRODUCTION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND examines the creation in early modern English reproductive, teratological, wonder, and fictional literature of the "monstrous mother"--a female reproductive figure capable of generating both fetal and non-fetal forms of offspring through the power of her imagination. While earlier critics have identified monstrous mothers in early modern English literature--figures who produce grotesque and/or excessive offspring, deny or obstruct nurture, commit infanticide, and sometimes exhibit their own physical deformities--such mothers require offspring to expose their monstrosity. That is, deformed, numerous, starving, sickly, or slain bodies testify to their mothers' monstrous desires, reproductive natures, and parenting practices. In contrast, I argue that monstrous maternity develops independently of the birth of offspring, and specifically, manifests during conception and pregnancy, before women deliver issue that exposes their monstrous maternal inclinations. While monstrous maternal power primarily develops from women's desires, it also remains embodied within conceiving and pregnant women, and thus permits women to generate not only deformed offspring and power, but also new, monstrous forms of generation.While monstrous mothers exercise powerful imaginative force that permits them to produce numerous types of "monstrous births," they also face antagonistic attempts to suppress their monstrous tendencies. Yet the authors of regulatory imagination texts, particularly sixteenth- and seventeenth-century obstetrical manuals, are repeatedly confounded by the monstrous mother's ability to innovate her imaginative influence when confronted with attempts to limit it. Thus, antagonism actually augments monstrous maternal power. Early modern fictional literature depicts the growth and innovation of monstrous maternity even as practitioners, husbands, and communities attempt to suppress it. Fictional works therefore re-theorize regulatory imagination theory, as they persistently underscore the uncontrollable nature of monstrous mothers and monstrous maternal reproduction.

Consumers consistently set goals for themselves. Despite good intentions, consumers often deviate from their goals. If consumers understand the benefits that arise from goal success, then why do most consumers fail to accomplish goals? Often, temptations are more appealing than achievement of goals; temptations are tangible while the benefits of a goal are difficult to grasp. An individual who uses his/her imagination to visualize goal success makes the goal more present-minded and attainable (Oettingen 2000). Thus, imagination facilitates self-efficacy, the belief in one’s ability to reach a goal. Higher self-efficacy, then, provides an individual with the willpower to achieve a goal (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, and Armor 1998). Whereas previous work has examined temptations’ relationship with goals (e.g. Fedorikhin and Patrick 2010; Wilcox, Vallen, Block, and Fitzsimons 2009; Zhang, Huang, and Broniarczyk 2010; etc.), the scope of this dissertation study differs. Rather, the research aim is to identify how consumers can overcome visceral temptations. Thus, the main objectives include: contributing new perspectives on goal research by merging the literatures on imagination and visceral cues, outlining how imagination regulates the impact of visceral temptations, and identifying the underlying mechanism that explains how imagination regulates the relationship between visceral cues and ad-evoked thoughts, through self-efficacy.

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