These - Faculté des lettres de Paris. / "Bibliographie": p. [609]-616.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-228). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

What is the fundamental justification of the idea of human rights? In this dissertation I argue that human rights are justified in virtue of the special role they play in practical thought: they function as the constitutive conditions of the relationship of right. This answer has two distinctive features: it justifies human rights non-instrumentally and relationally, as those claim rights universally necessary for relating to each other as juridical equals, as lacking authority over one another. This constitutive argument for human rights contrasts with the predominant theories of human rights, which tend to justify human rights instrumentally as means for the protection of an independently intelligible (and non-relational) purpose (e.g., basic needs, urgent interests, autonomy, capacity-development). A strong reason for endorsing the account proposed here is that it explains better than its instrumentalist competitors the universal validity of human rights while offering a more robust response against the human rights skeptic. Furthermore, this constitutive argument gives us the resources for seeing how human rights form an indivisible whole comprising civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and how human rights structure an international order of peace. My account thus promises to offer a much-needed defense of the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

No description available.

No description available.

What is the fundamental justification of the idea of human rights? In this dissertation I argue that human rights are justified in virtue of the special role they play in practical thought: they function as the constitutive conditions of the relationship of right. This answer has two distinctive features: it justifies human rights non-instrumentally and relationally, as those claim rights universally necessary for relating to each other as juridical equals, as lacking authority over one another. This constitutive argument for human rights contrasts with the predominant theories of human rights, which tend to justify human rights instrumentally as means for the protection of an independently intelligible (and non-relational) purpose (e.g., basic needs, urgent interests, autonomy, capacity-development). A strong reason for endorsing the account proposed here is that it explains better than its instrumentalist competitors the universal validity of human rights while offering a more robust response against the human rights skeptic. Furthermore, this constitutive argument gives us the resources for seeing how human rights form an indivisible whole comprising civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and how human rights structure an international order of peace. My account thus promises to offer a much-needed defense of the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

No description available.

The project of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment consists in providing a ground for judgments of taste so that we are justified in claiming that everybody else can agree with our judgment (subjective universality) and that all others ought to agree with us (subjective necessity, normativity). This justification is supposed to be accomplished in the Deduction of judgments of taste. The section that carries this title (38) is surprisingly short and for this and various other reasons (some of them textual) commentators have often wondered about the precise location where Kant provides the deduction, whether it is really contained in that short paragraph or whether the argument might actually extend beyond 38. In my thesis, I want to reinvigorate the discussion about the location of the deduction and its interpretation by arguing that it takes place between 30-42.

Zugl.: Siegen, Univ., Diss., 2003

Also published as author's dissertation--Universität Bonn, 2007/2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [227]-236) and indexes.