What is the fundamental justification of the idea of human rights? In this dissertation I argue that human rights are justified in virtue of the special role they play in practical thought: they function as the constitutive conditions of the relationship of right. This answer has two distinctive features: it justifies human rights non-instrumentally and relationally, as those claim rights universally necessary for relating to each other as juridical equals, as lacking authority over one another. This constitutive argument for human rights contrasts with the predominant theories of human rights, which tend to justify human rights instrumentally as means for the protection of an independently intelligible (and non-relational) purpose (e.g., basic needs, urgent interests, autonomy, capacity-development). A strong reason for endorsing the account proposed here is that it explains better than its instrumentalist competitors the universal validity of human rights while offering a more robust response against the human rights skeptic. Furthermore, this constitutive argument gives us the resources for seeing how human rights form an indivisible whole comprising civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and how human rights structure an international order of peace. My account thus promises to offer a much-needed defense of the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

What is the fundamental justification of the idea of human rights? In this dissertation I argue that human rights are justified in virtue of the special role they play in practical thought: they function as the constitutive conditions of the relationship of right. This answer has two distinctive features: it justifies human rights non-instrumentally and relationally, as those claim rights universally necessary for relating to each other as juridical equals, as lacking authority over one another. This constitutive argument for human rights contrasts with the predominant theories of human rights, which tend to justify human rights instrumentally as means for the protection of an independently intelligible (and non-relational) purpose (e.g., basic needs, urgent interests, autonomy, capacity-development). A strong reason for endorsing the account proposed here is that it explains better than its instrumentalist competitors the universal validity of human rights while offering a more robust response against the human rights skeptic. Furthermore, this constitutive argument gives us the resources for seeing how human rights form an indivisible whole comprising civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and how human rights structure an international order of peace. My account thus promises to offer a much-needed defense of the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Chapter 1: Intrafamily Bargaining and Love Popular culture and common wisdom testify that the way partners in a relationship feel for one another very much depends on how they treat each other. This paper posits the hypothesis that altruism or love in a relationship is endogenous to the actions of the partners and studies how this influences allocations and efficiency in a bargaining model of household decision-making. The main results are that agents treat their partner in a kinder way than without endogenously evolving love, this leads to more equitable allocations in household decision making and greater intertemporal efficiency. There are two mechanisms at work: agents treat their partner nicely to avoid retribution by a less loving partner in the future; and they treat the partner nicely so that the kind reciprocal behavior raises their own love towards the partner, which lets them enjoy higher utility. As to love, two interpretations emerge: love is a commitment device by which couples can implement Pareto superior allocations; and love is an investment good in the sense that costly nice behavior towards the partner today may ensure higher levels of trust and efficiency in the future. Chapter 2: Perception of Technology and Technological Progress under Extractive Institutions This paper explores the impact of different perceptions of the nature of technology - whether it may grow in an arithmetic or geometric fashion - on the choices of an elite that lives on extracting resources from the productive populace. We show that slow potential growth destroys the credibility of inclusive institutions that the elite may consider in order to foster growth whereas these can and will be implemented if populace and elite believe in fast growth. Belief in the potential of technological growth leads to growth-friendly policies under both extractive and inclusive institutions and, as history progresses, the true nature of technology reveals itself and this belief spreads. Chapter 3: A critical literature review of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and the communication of Unprotected Information Assets This paper reviews the literature centred on the question of what kind of settings facilitate the transmission of unverifiable pieces of information that re- side with an agent whose incentives are not well aligned with an agent for whom this piece of information is useful. The question is framed within the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and its answers make extensive use of the modelling device of Cheap Talk. The main findings are that communication leads to costly distortions and the efforts to decrease bias and information loss may trigger major revisions to the structure of incentive systems and the allocation of decision-rights. The paper argues that the literature has so far failed to properly examine the question of property rights of information and is therefore focused on niche applications.

På senare år har de mänskliga rättigheterna fått en betydelsefull plats i den svenska skolan. Mest framträdande har de mänskliga rättigheterna i ämnesplanen för samhällskunskap. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur samhällskunskapslärare framställer mänskliga rättigheter (MR) i undervisningen, samt vilka innebörder de lägger i begreppet. För att kunna besvara de två frågorna har fyra semistrukturerade intervjuer genomförts på yrkesverksamma samhällskunskapslärare med god erfarenhet. Svaren lärarna gav analyserades med hjälp av aktuella teorier om de mänskliga rättigheterna. De brukade teorierna problematiserar vad det är, vilka effekter dess införande fått och hur de har upprätthållits.Resultatet av undersökningen visar att lärarna främst uppfattar MR som en blandning av både juridiska och moraliska rättigheter, men att det finns olika slagsidor till de båda sidorna. Vilka innebörder lärarna lägger i begreppet korrelerar med hur de undervisar om MR. Lärarnas framställning av MR-undervisningen kan delas upp i två områden. Antingen problematiserade man MR i alla stater, inklusive Sverige, eller så belyste man endast MR-situationen i andra stater. Här visar både tidigare forskning och human rights theory att MR-undervisning som problematiserar både den egna staten såväl som andra ger ett bättre utfall hos eleverna, än undervisning som belyser MR som något där borta.

A different type of polity requires a different type of constitution; more importantly, it also requires a different way of thinking, a new constitutionalism able to address the relevant descriptive and normative questions facing this new political entity. This thesis tries to contribute to the development of EU constitutionalism by focusing on the interplay between the different normative concerns behind the EU’s market freedoms identified in traditional legal discourse – as results mainly from court decisions and academic discussions –, and the institutional environment which mediates the freedoms’ application. It is hypothesised that such interplay can be better understood by reference to the findings of some disciplines ‘external’ to internal legal discourses such as economics, philosophy, or political science. Normatively, it is hoped that debates concerning the market freedoms that take into account ‘external elements’ will be more attractive to the legal community than those that do not include such considerations. Descriptively, it is submitted that the incorporation of insights arising from these ‘external’ disciplines into the traditional modes of discourse and analysis on the EU market freedoms – in effect, the internalisation of these ‘external’ elements – can provide better descriptive fits of the law and its development than theories that do not take them into account. An incidental result of this approach is that by the end of this thesis a theory of the market freedoms will have been sketched: by combining ‘internal’ and ‘external’ elements, an analytical framework can be developed that is able to make descriptive sense, formally and substantively, of free movement law at both its most general – where formal common structures seem to be undeniable, and a minimum common substantive content can be found –, and at its most detailed levels – where substantive variations and greater normative specification seem to exist.

Chapter one offers an introduction and a general outline of argument. Chapter two lays out the current scholarship on human rights and the environment and presents rejoinders to three prominent lines of objection to linking human rights and environmental interests: conceptual, those arising from issues of recognition, vagueness and conflicts between human rights, ecological, especially from those seeking protections for the environment regardless of its utility to humans, and those wishing to expand human rights beyond human interests, and adjudication concerns, namely from those sceptical that the polycentric nature of environmental issues create an insurmountable barrier to any significant improvements through judicially enforced human rights. Chapter three introduces and defends the environmental minimum as a normative framework for systematically conceptualizing the relationship between human rights and the environment. As such, it is chiefly concerned with ensuring a good faith regulatory engagement with environmental pollution: specific risks to recognised human rights trigger the environmental minimum, which then provides minimum standards (legal, established and emerging) that set the standard of review for determining whether a violation of human rights has occurred. Chapter four deals with the crucial empirical argument, outlining how the framework can systematically account for and consistently guide the further development of the case law under the European Convention on Human Rights. This conclusion rests on a comprehensive analysis of the environmental case law since 1950 using quantitative methods to expose doctrinal patterns previously not recognized in legal scholarship. Finally, chapter five explores and evaluates the potential benefits of the environmental minimum framework beyond human rights adjudication. Specifically, it investigates benefits to the varied fields of public law, regulatory policy, International Environmental Law, constitutionalism, and other international human rights treaties.

Over the past three decades, privatization and school choice have been introduced and embodied in the vocabulary of several national education policies. Although free education has been constituted, private schooling has been steadily growing its presence over the last years in Greece and Sweden. Parents are asked to choose among different school alternatives in an attempt to find the school that ‘fits them the best’. This study aiming to examine the phenomenon of private schooling and the factors that affect parental school choice, outlined a comprehensive framework of the national policies about private schools and school choice in both countries. Furthermore, the Human Capital, Human Rights and Capability approaches consisted the theoretical background of the study and framed the analysis of its research findings. The case study design of the research provided an in-depth exploration of the two national contexts, enriching the study with empirical data. Twenty semi-structured interviews with education professionals and parents from both countries shed light on the reasons behind the school choice towards private schools. Regarding the findings of the research, several kinds of educational inequalities and social segregation were identified because of the fact that not all parents have access to school choice under equal terms.

This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights' functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents' practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories' in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status' of ‘being in a position' to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-03-23T14:55:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Isadora Ferreira Neves.pdf: 770141 bytes, checksum: c5db710096fcc887c415ceb3e4cfdb32 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-23T14:55:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Isadora Ferreira Neves.pdf: 770141 bytes, checksum: c5db710096fcc887c415ceb3e4cfdb32 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-26 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho possui o objetivo de problematizar a recepção da ponderação de Robert Alexy pela doutrina jurídica brasileira, do ponto de vista da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito. Essa análise é feita através de três perspectivas: em um primeiro momento é feita uma leitura da ponderação nos moldes em que ela foi formulada por Robert Alexy, analisando o projeto da teoria alexyana e o contexto do seu surgimento em meio à jurisprudência dos valores e à aplicação do procedimento de ponderação pelo Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemão. Num segundo momento, passa-se à análise da recepção que teve a ponderação alexyana pela doutrina jurídica brasileira, através do contexto em que se deu essa recepção (consubstanciado na doutrina brasileira da efetividade), bem como a adoção de conceitos conflituosos com a própria teoria alexyana (como é o caso da ponderação de regras, da ponderação preventiva e do princípio da proporcionalidade). Nesse segundo ponto também está presente a abordagem dos discursos que envolvem a recepção da ponderação pela doutrina brasileira, quais sejam, o discurso neoconstitucionalista e o discurso do ativismo judicial. Em relação ao neoconstitucionalismo, aponta-se uma tentativa de superação do positivismo jurídico que se torna frustrada diante da adoção do conceito semântico de norma e da discricionariedade interpretativa. Quanto ao discurso do ativismo judicial, argumenta-se, através de uma distinção entre este fenômeno e a judicialização da política, que ele acaba se tornando um discurso de imposição da vontade do julgador. Por fim, num terceiro momento, parte-se para uma análise da ponderação alexyana a partir dos aportes da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito. Nesse sentido, são apontadas as contribuições de Heidegger e de Gadamer para a ruptura com a ideia de método como elemento estruturante da compreensão, a relevância de Dworkin com o conceito interpretativo de direito e o ideal de integridade e também a importância do contraponto da ponderação de Alexy com a teoria da decisão de Lenio Streck, especialmente no que tange ao problema da discricionariedade. A partir desses aspectos, o trabalho propõe uma reflexão a respeito dos pressupostos que permeiam a recepção da ponderação alexyana pela doutrina jurídica brasileira, bem como a incompatibilidade desta ponderação com a racionalidade hermenêutica. / This dissertation aims to analyse how legal scholars in Brazil adopted Robert Alexy’s balancing theory of legal principles. In order to do so, it will work within a theoretical framework known as critical hermeneutics of law (“Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito” - CHD). This work is structurally divided in three parts. During the first, it will explain how Robert Alexy tailored the balancing theory of legal principle to be a critical response to the jurisprudence of values that was widespread in Germany and applied by its Supreme Court. The second chapter will analyse how Brazilian legal scholars adopted Alexy’s theory. In addition, it will explain the historical background surrounding its adoption, which will allow understanding how Brazilian peculiarities led to the assemblage of a very different balancing theory, far away from Alexy’s original works. This assemblage was essential to the development of two common concepts in Brazilian legal thinking: “neo constitutionalism” and “judicial activism”. The former was an attempt to overcome legal positivism, but failed due to the very nature of legal norms and the result of discretionary interpretations. The latter, as will be seen, is completely different of the judicialization of politics. This distinction allows understanding how judicial activism is inevitably away to institutionalise judges’ will of power. In the last chapter, the text will focus on how the theoretical framework proposed here (CHD) perceives Alexy’s balancing theory. In order to proceed with this, it will demonstrate three different but inherently linked approaches: first, the revolution of Martin Heidegger’s and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea of “method”; second, Ronald Dworkin’s thesis that law is an interpretive concept which needs integrity; third, Lenio Streck’s decision theory as an alternative to solve the problem of discretionary judicial decisions. Considering these relevant theoretical perspectives, this dissertation aims to propose a reflection upon usual assumptions that underlie the incorporation of Robert Alexy’s balancing theory by Brazilian legal scholars and show how it is incompatible with hermeneutical rationality.

The diploma thesis deals with the issue of respect and protection of human rights in the Russian Federation, with particular emphasis on the European view on this topic. Within the content of the thesis is the presentation and explanation of the difference between the approach of the Russian Federation and the European Union to the protection of human rights based on the application of two different theories of access policy - the theory of commitment and the theory of compliance. The thesis focuses mainly on political and civil rights and freedoms, and submits the main factors behind the Russian approach to the protection of human rights and the current situation of human rights in the Russian Federation. The aim of the thesis is presentation and evaluation of different approaches to the protection of human rights of the Russian Federation and the European Union by applying the theory of commitment and the theory of compliance, and to highlight the main causes that lead to the current human rights situation in the Russian region.