O propósito deste trabalho é examinar a constituição sistemática e histórica da teoria da linguagem de Habermas. Seguindo as indicações do próprio Habermas, segundo as quais essa teoria constitui-se como uma \"pragmática formal apoiada em Kant\", uma \"pragmática formal de herança kantiana\" ou, ainda, um \"kantismo lingüístico\", analisamos em um primeiro momento a maneira como ela promove a convergência de duas linhagens filosóficas aparentemente inconciliáveis: a filosofia kantiana e da virada lingüística. Dito de uma maneira mais específica, analisamos a maneira como ela atualiza o motivo da \"transformação pragmática da filosofia kantiana\", central para a segunda linhagem. Em seguida, comentamos a exposição da teoria da linguagem na década de 1970, quando esta assume a forma de uma teoria da competência comunicativa, associada a uma teoria da verdade como consenso. Por fim, comentamos as modificações que Habermas propõe para sua teoria sobretudo na década de 1980, mostrando como ele procura responder às críticas a que foi submetido. / The aim of this work is to examine the systematic and the historical constitution of Habermas\'s theory of language. By following his own suggestions, according to which it constitutes itself as a \"formal pragmatics tied to Kant\", a \"Kantian formal pragmatics\" or a \"linguistic Kantianism\", we analyze at the first moment how it promotes the convergence of two apparently incompatible philosophical lineages: the Kantian philosophy and the linguistic turn. More specifically, we analyze how it up dates the motive of the \"pragmatic transformation of Kantian philosophy\", fundamental for the second lineage. Later on, we comment on the presentation of the theory of language in the 1970s, when it assumes the form of a theory of communicative competence, associated to a consensus theory of truth. Finally, we comment on the modifications that Habermas proposes to his theory mainly in the 1980s, showing how he tries to respond to the criticism to which he had been exposed.

O propósito deste trabalho é examinar a constituição sistemática e histórica da teoria da linguagem de Habermas. Seguindo as indicações do próprio Habermas, segundo as quais essa teoria constitui-se como uma \"pragmática formal apoiada em Kant\", uma \"pragmática formal de herança kantiana\" ou, ainda, um \"kantismo lingüístico\", analisamos em um primeiro momento a maneira como ela promove a convergência de duas linhagens filosóficas aparentemente inconciliáveis: a filosofia kantiana e da virada lingüística. Dito de uma maneira mais específica, analisamos a maneira como ela atualiza o motivo da \"transformação pragmática da filosofia kantiana\", central para a segunda linhagem. Em seguida, comentamos a exposição da teoria da linguagem na década de 1970, quando esta assume a forma de uma teoria da competência comunicativa, associada a uma teoria da verdade como consenso. Por fim, comentamos as modificações que Habermas propõe para sua teoria sobretudo na década de 1980, mostrando como ele procura responder às críticas a que foi submetido. / The aim of this work is to examine the systematic and the historical constitution of Habermas\'s theory of language. By following his own suggestions, according to which it constitutes itself as a \"formal pragmatics tied to Kant\", a \"Kantian formal pragmatics\" or a \"linguistic Kantianism\", we analyze at the first moment how it promotes the convergence of two apparently incompatible philosophical lineages: the Kantian philosophy and the linguistic turn. More specifically, we analyze how it up dates the motive of the \"pragmatic transformation of Kantian philosophy\", fundamental for the second lineage. Later on, we comment on the presentation of the theory of language in the 1970s, when it assumes the form of a theory of communicative competence, associated to a consensus theory of truth. Finally, we comment on the modifications that Habermas proposes to his theory mainly in the 1980s, showing how he tries to respond to the criticism to which he had been exposed.

Rousseau and Kant were philosophers of freedom. Both believed freedom was the essence of humanity, and both believed that "freedom is self-legislation." This thesis examines what they understood to be self-legislation. According to Rousseau natural freedom was lost with the establishment of society. Society is an "unnatural" order and the true basis of society is simply convention. Man is free only if he is subject to laws of his own making, or at least to those laws to which he has consented. The ideal state, according to Rousseau, is the republic based on laws that have been created and adopted by each members of the community. It is in this sense of freedom, for Rousseau, is self-legislation. Kant believed the important issue was demonstrating the metaphysical possibility of freedom, not the reconstruction of society. Kant argued that freedom could be demonstrated, and morality reaffirmed, by focusing on the 11 ought" of reason. The 11 ought 11 transcends the physical world and was a pure law of reason. It is not subject to the physical laws of causality. Man has the ability to act according to this law of reason. Man is transcending the physical realm, and the physical laws of nature, whenever he makes a moral decision based on what he 11 ought 11 to do, or whenever he puts duty before his physical desire. This, Kant argues, is self-legislation, and only here may man hope to be free.

At present two options are available that can lead to a determination of how moral education may be possible in practice. One takes its formulation from the work of Kant, the other stands in the tradition of Aristotle. Kant emphasizes the importance of duty mid obligation. In contrast, Aristotle attempts to construct a theory of moral life on the practice of virtue. Both theoretical perspectives have debilitating deficiencies. A spectrum of moral experience is presented that represents the wood opportunities available to the agent in life experience. The polarities of this spectrum pull most naturally towards either an Aristotelian or a Kantian perspective, although neither perspective is capable of addressing the requirements of the entire spectrum. The Aristotelian perspective is associated with the life of non-dilemmic virtue, undertaken in community, where relational realities and the contextual contingency of moral life is emphasized. The Kantian perspective is associated with dilemmic situations to be resolved by a process of moral The central problem of the dissertation acknowledges the antithetical nature of these perspectives, and the dichotomous nature of their philosophical roots. The central task of the dissertation is the establishment of a dialogic process that has the potential to reconcile this dichotomy, and to allow these perspectives to mutually inform and reinforce each other. This task is accomplished by providing responses to a central research question that is accompanied by a series of subsidiary questions. From an analysis of various theories of moral education, Kohlberg's theory of structural developmentalism is chosen for reformulation as it is informed by the exploration of the requirements of the dialogic process. To address the research questions, additional Spectra are offered to provide an epistemological and ontological basis for a five-step dialogic treatment that combines, through a developmental climacteric, the Magistral dialogue of Vvgotsky Socratic dialogue of Bakhtin. The five-step model is comprised of a recursive loop through the four steps of the Magistral dialogue prior to an entrance into a Socratic dialogue. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The philosophies of Kant and Hegel have experienced a renaissance for the past thirty years, and a debate continues as to whether Hegel's objections to Kant's moral philosophy are sound, and/or whether Hegel's ethics are an improvement on Kant's. This debate takes many forms, and most recently, theorists have been interested in measuring Hegel's objections against contemporary theories following in the Kantian tradition. 'Critics,' (theorists defending Hegel's moral point of view) suggests such reconstructed theories leave themselves open to identical criticisms Hegel wielded at Kant almost 200 years ago. 'Defenders,' (theorists supporting Kant's moral philosophy, or a revised version) reply in one of two ways. They either suggest that Hegel's criticisms of Kant are unwarranted, meaning Hegel misinterprets Kant's ideas and/or purposes; or, they maintain that Kant's ethics are vulnerable to Hegel's objections, however some newer version of Kant's ethics is not because it has been purged of those Kantian elements which Hegel attacks. Clearly, both views render Hegel's critique of Kant obsolete. So, why are we witnessing such an aggressive resurgence of Hegelian-styled arguments in the contemporary literature? In seeking to answer this question, this thesis reconsiders Hegel's actual critique of Kant. In this way, the thesis falls into a specific category of political philosophy. It is a study in the 'history of ideas.' Rather than considering the question of whether contemporary Critics or Defenders have the better argument concerning the merit of reconstructed Kantian theories, I intend to re-evaluate the soundness of Hegel's objections to Kantian ethics. Kant's moral and political thought on the proper ordering of society is deeply embedded in the pluralist democracies of the western world. As such, those Kantian ideas/elements should be defendable against Hegelian criticisms. Following an in-depth consideration of Hegel's critique of Kant, I argue that whereas Hegel accurately identifies weaknesses in the system of Kant's moral philosophy, his critique does not successfully achieve its goal. It does not show that Kant's ethical theory is an inadequate prescription for the rational agent seeking to act morally. Rather, it serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in democratic liberal theory.

<p>Keywords: Immanuel Kant (</p><p>narratives in European naturalism and political anatomy. Yet the concept surfaces in gender historical research on the period in foot notes and cursory remarks. This paper interrogates why epigenesis has been eradicated from the historical consciousness of today’s scholarship on gender politics. By honing in on the weirdness, a term borrowed from Lorraine Daston, in and of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) theory on animal generation I show how an alertness it requires a re-evaluation of views on "political anatomy" taken-for-granted in scholarship, but also of Kant’s philosophy itself. The endeavour is divided into three main sections.</p><p>In the first, I situate the failure of Kant-scholars to, in the words of John H. Zammito, "stabilize" epigenesis by exploring the hitherto unacknowledged peculiarity of Kant’s use racial hybridity to ‘prove’ the theory. In the second, the analysis departs from the notion ‘modern sex difference’ and show that a reading of epigenesis requires a re-thinking of sexed bodily identity in terms of conflict and contradiction. The third section reads this strife in light of Kant’s experience of "astonishment", a cognitive mode, I argue, designed to resolve both physiological and ideological inconsistencies. The antinomy of sex differentiation is in a concluding section juxtaposed with Kant’s phrase "eloquent speechlessness" in which the gender practice activated in the writing of, about, and on epigenesis is compared to the structure informing moral philosophy’s definition of lies.</p>

Keywords: Immanuel Kant ( narratives in European naturalism and political anatomy. Yet the concept surfaces in gender historical research on the period in foot notes and cursory remarks. This paper interrogates why epigenesis has been eradicated from the historical consciousness of today’s scholarship on gender politics. By honing in on the weirdness, a term borrowed from Lorraine Daston, in and of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) theory on animal generation I show how an alertness it requires a re-evaluation of views on "political anatomy" taken-for-granted in scholarship, but also of Kant’s philosophy itself. The endeavour is divided into three main sections. In the first, I situate the failure of Kant-scholars to, in the words of John H. Zammito, "stabilize" epigenesis by exploring the hitherto unacknowledged peculiarity of Kant’s use racial hybridity to ‘prove’ the theory. In the second, the analysis departs from the notion ‘modern sex difference’ and show that a reading of epigenesis requires a re-thinking of sexed bodily identity in terms of conflict and contradiction. The third section reads this strife in light of Kant’s experience of "astonishment", a cognitive mode, I argue, designed to resolve both physiological and ideological inconsistencies. The antinomy of sex differentiation is in a concluding section juxtaposed with Kant’s phrase "eloquent speechlessness" in which the gender practice activated in the writing of, about, and on epigenesis is compared to the structure informing moral philosophy’s definition of lies.