Orientador: Andrey Ivanov / Co-orientador: Sinésio Ferraz Bueno / Banca: Mariana Paolozzi Sérvulo Cunha / Banca: Matteo Raschietti / Resumo: Santo Agostinho considera que homem possui naturalmente a vontade da vida feliz e da verdade. Ele se reconhece como um ser inquieto e que quer encontrar o repouso. Na obra Confissões, relata o seu erro e as etapas da sua conversão. Investigando a sua própria interioridade, encontra Deus na memória e, simultaneamente, como aquele que a transcende. Enquanto espera a posse da beatitude, vive o perigo das concupiscências. / Abstract: Saint Augustine considers that man naturally possesses the will of happy life and truth. He recognizes himself as a restless being and that wants to find the rest. In the work Confessions, reports his error and the steps of his conversion. Investigating his own interiority, finds God in memory and simultaneously as one that transcends it. While waiting the possession of beatitude, lives the danger of concupiscences. / Mestre

D.Litt. et Phil. / The purpose of this study was to add much needed information to the body of knowledge as regards South African intimate relationships, by looking through the lens of social and cross-cultural psychology. The study set out to investigate the different and nuanced ways of loving and conceptualisations of romantic love across the four broad cultural groups in South Africa. Although romantic love is by and large accepted as a near universal experience, it is said to vary as a function of culture. Western / individualistic and collectivistic romantic love was considered. South Africa‘s multicultural rainbow nation seems to exhibit both individualistic as well as collectivistic modes of loving amongst its four broad cultural groups, with Black and Indian/Asian conceptualisations of romantic love seemingly being tied up in culture bound collectivism, whereas White and Coloured conceptualisations of romantic love are apparently tied up in culture bound individualism. The study initially explored various theories of romantic love which have been developed within the Western canon. These included 1) Freud‘s intrapsychic foundations of love, 2) Fromm‘s humanistic and sociocultural view of love, 3) attachment theory and its genetic, biological and interpersonal viewpoint of love, 4) interdependence theory / social exchange theory and its emphasis on the economic nature of an intimate relationship, 5) the components of passionate and companionate love, 6) Sternberg‘s triangular theory of love and his social constructionist theory of love stories, 7) evolution theory and its focus on explaining how romantic love, mate selection and mate preferences is shaped by inherited biological and genetic make-up and finally 8) Lee‘s six lovestyles. Special emphasis was given to Lee‘s colours of love theory which consists of a typology of lovestyles. These were employed as the central tenet to establish intersections, parallels and differences amongst the types of love. Thereafter the study investigated the nebulous construct of culture through Hofstede‘s five dimensions of culture. Differences between nation, ethnic groups and race were clarified and South Africa‘s four primary cultural groups were explored.

This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.

Critics of Jane Austen can be divided into three groups. The first group, which includes W. H. Helm, Sheila Kaye-Smith and G. B. Stern regards Marianne Dashwood as Jane Austen's only passionate heroine. Her other heroines are condemned for their common sense by these critics, who contend that love is an irrational phenomenon. Love and reason, they believe, are mutually exclusive. Jane Austen saw love as a marriage of these two facets of man's being. Aware of its duality, at once both emotional and rational, she saw the inadequacies (and dangers) of "love" which based itself solely on passion. Mr. Bennet is one of Austen's examples of a man who has failed to assess his chosen mate intelligently, and his subsequent life with her demonstrates the deficiency of a concept of love which does not involve use of the mind as well as of the heart. For Jane Austen, "to feel" was not enough. Marianne Dashwood, her so-called "passionate" heroine, is not meant to be admired, but is a satiric target, for Marianne despises any use of reason in the process of falling in love. For Jane Austen, she represents the antithesis of genuine love. The second group, among them Charlotte Brontë, Virginia Woolf, and Marjory Bald, sees no passion at all in Jane Austen's novels. They are considered to be "dry", "dusty", and superficial, and are said to ignore "[v]ice, adventure, passion." It is undoubtedly the subtlety of their presentation which has misled the critics. Jane Austen's sensitive artistry precluded a lengthy exposition of feeling. She provides us with the material necessary to complete the picture by suggesting and leading up to the direct expression of emotion, rather than expressing the emotion itself. The presentation is in fact an extension of her concept, for the truly passionate have not the capacity for facile articulation. Intense emotions cannot be easily expressed. The interplay of surface tensions conveys the strong undercurrents of emotion. Jane Austen's evocative technique reveals their existence, but neither she nor her best characters will wallow in the sensational slough which is thought by many to be the proper resting place for the passionate. The third group, whose first spokesman was Sir Walter Scott, and whose current advocate is Marvin Mudrick, views the marriages of Jane Austen's heroes and heroines as financial mergers, and not as unions of love. Her recognition of the economic pressures operating on her characters is misinterpreted, and seen as endorsement. Jane Austen was, in fact, extremely concerned with the fate of women in her society. Her concern involved a reconsideration of that society's basic values. Jane Fairfax, Miss Bates, and the Watson sisters are some of her sympathetically-treated symbols of the economic and social vulnerability of women in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Jane Austen does not believe that personal happiness should be subjected to financial considerations. She does show some of her characters succumbing to economic pressures. But they are censured within the novels, and her most admirable people never capitulate. Common to all of these groups is a misinterpretation of, or failure to understand, Jane Austen's concept and presentation of love. Using Jane Austen's novels and letters, this paper will attempt to correct the misinterpretations. / Arts, Faculty of / English, Department of / Graduate

Love is crucial to a good human life; it animates our most meaningful relationships, and it also reveals to us what we value and who we hope to become. My research focuses on the relationship between love and valuing, and defends a version of the quality theory of love. According to quality theories, love's fittingness is determined by properties of the beloved. Quality theories face many objections. In the first part of my dissertation, I argue that five prominent objections to quality theories miss the mark. In the second part, I argue that a less-appreciated objection to quality theories, the problem of love's object, has not yet received a satisfying response. In the third part, I present a new quality theory that both avoids the problem of love's object and is independently well-motivated. Brief summaries of these three parts follow. Quality theories, again, hold that love's fittingness is determined by properties of the beloved. These theories contrast with relationship theories, on which love's fittingness is determined by features of the (substantive, historical, ongoing) relationship between lover and beloved. I motivate quality theories by arguing that loving someone and valuing a relationship are distinct phenomena, subject to different norms. I then defend quality theories in general against several objections. The most important of these is the fungibility objection: if love is fitting because of qualities of the beloved, then the lover should gladly swap out a loved one for a qualitatively similar other. I argue that this objection rests on the moralistic fallacy, which involves treating norms extrinsic to an emotion-e.g. moral or prudential norms-as if they were intrinsic to it. I show how the quality theory can accommodate the importance of loyalty to relationships without requiring the impossible - that our loved ones be the most fitting of all possible candidates. Next, I turn to an objection that is harder to answer than most quality theorists allow, the problem of love's object. Briefly, if we love people on the basis of certain of their properties, then our love must be for these properties, not for the person who has them. Some (Delaney, Keller) respond to this problem by distinguishing the ground from the object of love: even if some of the beloved's properties ground love-i.e. make it fitting-the beloved as a whole is nevertheless the object of love. I argue that the ground/object distinction is no more than a narrow, technical fix. To address the problem meaningfully, the quality theorist must explain why the object of love is also valued by love. Kolodny attempts such an explanation, but implausibly maintains that the beloved is valued only extrinsically. Others (Velleman, Badhwar) respond to the fungibility objection and the problem of love's object together, by making the beloved's "true self" both the object and the ground of love. This is more promising, but neither account works; in answering the fungibility objection, each winds up still vulnerable to the problem of love's object. Finally, I propose a new quality theory that answers the problem of love's object and is independently well-motivated. I argue that in loving someone, we value them for qualities attributable to them as an organic unity, not for qualities that constitute merely a part of them. That is, love does not value some aspect of a person, like her wit or good looks; rather, love is a way of seeing the whole person as possessing some valuable property, such as beauty or goodness, that is attributable to organic unities. This general approach has many advantages. It allows the quality theorist to say that love intrinsically values the whole person, because the valuable property is attributable only to the beloved as a whole, not merely to some of her parts. It also explains why love is fitting, because the properties in question really are worthy of a positive emotional response. Finally, because the valuable property needn't depend on common base properties, the organic unity view offers an expansive account of what we might fittingly love.

No description available.

archives@tulane.edu / I have composed my dissertation out of three distinct but related essays with each working, as the title of the work would indicate, to return philosophy to life. The first two essays seek this by challenging and offering alternatives to philosophical theories that would keep philosophers from fully engaging with life in its fundamental teleological being. The third essay works from the philosophical idea of Eros to bring about this engagement. In the first essay “A Science of Consciousness – Physicalism or Phenomenology?” I enter what I describe as a dialectic in philosophy in its seeking the realization of the scientific ideal within its practice. As I observe in the essay, two opposing schools of thought within philosophy claim the mantle of this ideal, physicalist theory and phenomenology. I examine both in terms of two fundamental criteria of science – basic logicality and empirical substantiation. Upon these criteria, I argue that phenomenology with its basis in life itself, deserves the mantle and so a new respect within the philosophical community going forward. In the second essay, “An Epistemology of Life,” I engage critically with Immanuel Kant’s epistemology as found in Critique of The Power of Judgment and in Critique of Pure Reason. In particular, I challenge Kant’s claim in Judgment that the constitution of our cognitive faculties precludes an intuition of life’s teleological being, the necessary basis, Kant argues, for our making determinant judgments about life. To make my case, I offer evidence to the contrary from the world of life itself. I then examine Kant’s understandings of the noumenal, the transcendental aesthetic and of our epistemic intuition of causal being and bring forward alternatives. In the final essay “At Any Time the Heart Awakes!” I undertake a philosophical engagement with life through a children’s song and introductory philosophical essay for instructors. I have written these in the hope of bringing a first awakening within children of the philosophical ideal of love spoken to in Plato’s Symposium. In addition to Plato, I reference Aristotle, Kant, Kierkegaard and The Buddha as sources for the song’s content and methodology. / 0 / Keith J. Silverman

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Viewing desperate love as marked by insecurity, urgency, a great need for reciprocation, idealization and affective extremes, this study was designed to investigate the assumption that desperate love constitutes a manifestation of predispositional characteristics. The primary hypothesis is that people can be differentiated as tending or not tending toward the experiences of desperate love based upon significantly different patterns of response when describing characteristic qualities of the self and important others. A secondary hypothesis is that this differentiation is also reflected in a more romantic attitude toward love along the romantic-companionate continuum among those who tend toward desperate love.

This study looked for a correlation between romantic love and EEG data. Fifteen university students (fourteen female, one male) were used who professed a strong feeling of love for their partner. The EEG data was compared while they viewed pictures of their loved one and pictures of well known celebrities. There was a significant quadratic trend over all sites and several band widths. Greatest overall quadratic significance was seen at F7 which aligned with the insula which has been shown to be a key neural structure in the production of love ( Bartels & Zeki, 2000). Therefore there appears to be the greatest relationship between F7 and romantic love that needs to explored further in future research.