Electrodermal responding (EDR) and heart rate (HR) were assessed for seven subjects participating in a reaction time task consequated with monetary bonuses (250, 100, and 10), monetary penalties (250,100, and 10), and a monetary neutral value (00). Unlike previous research employing group designs and a tonic measure (i.e., mean over long periods of time), this study utilized a single-subject design and a phasic measure (i.e., mean over 2-s intervals). Heart rate data was too variable for meaningful analysis. EDR data showed that the peak levels of EDR were higher for penalties than for the corresponding values of bonuses (e.g., -250 vs. +250) for most subjects. Similarly, peak levels of EDR were generally higher during sessions in which consequences were presented than in sessions during which consequences were absent.

by Ng Kwok-Kee, Paul. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1980. / Bibliography: leaves 51-52.

As computers become pervasive and better connected, the popularity of peer-to-peer computing has grown immensely. The sharing of unused resources at peers is desirable and practically important because they can collectively comprise a powerful system. The potential benefit, however, can be undermined by uncooperative behavior of some peers because they are managed individually and hence may not follow the expected protocols. To build robust systems, we must incorporate proper trust and incentive mechanisms so that peers would rather cooperate. In this dissertation, we demonstrate that building robust peer-to-peer information dissemination systems is important and viable, using four concrete cases. First, we investigate the incentive mechanism of BitTorrent, an exchange-based file distribution protocol. Our framework based on iterated prisoner's dilemma provides an insight into users' tension between eagerness to download and unwillingness to upload. By using both analytical and experimental approaches, we show that the current incentive mechanism of BitTorrent is susceptible to free riding. We propose an improved mechanism that punishes free riders effectively. Second, we present a trust-aware overlay multicast system that performs well in the presence of uncooperative nodes, which may block, delay, fabricate, or forge the messages they forward. We develop (1) a set of protocols that detect uncooperative behavior, (2) a scheme of trust value assignment according to the behavior of nodes, and (3) an algorithm that adapts the multicast tree based on trust values, all of which allows the system to remain stable and responsive over time. Third, we propose an alternative news feed dissemination system, called FeedEx, in which feed subscribers mesh into a network and exchange news feeds with neighbors. The collaborative exchange in FeedEx, with the help of the incentive-compatible design using the pair-wise fairness principle, reduces the server load and hence increases the scalability. Fourth, we introduce a new concept of peer-to-peer computing, that is, continual service using ephemeral servers. To this end, we develop a system model for the concept and implement a discrete-time simulator to find the conditions and the system support for eliciting cooperation. All four cases are substantiated by experimental results.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Psychology, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Leadership and Policy Studies)--Vanderbilt University, Aug. 2006. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

Individual monetary incentive systems usually include performance feedback as part of the intervention package. However, there is no experimental evidence to suggest that feedback has any functional effect on work performance above and beyond the effects of the incentive systems. It may be that incentive systems have such powerful effects on work behavior that the additional contingencies provided by a feedback system are unnecessary. The present laboratory study investigated the supplemental effects of feedback on work performance under a monetary incentive system. Four subjects were hired to work seven hours a day for four and a half weeks. The experimental work task was a simulation of a proof operator’s job at a bank and involved typing dollar values of “checks” into a computer. Subjects were paid a base salary per session plus incentive money for performance above a criterion. The main dependent variable was the number of correctly completed checks per session. The amount of time off task and rate of responding were also investigated. Subjects were exposed to an ABA experimental design involving; (A) the monetary incentive system without performance feedback, (B) the incentive system with performance feedback, and (A) return to the incentive system without performance feedback. The introduction of feedback resulted in small to moderate performance improvements in two of the four subjects. Possible reasons for the small and inconsistent effects were explored with special attention paid to the functional role of feedback and monetary incentives. It was proposed that small amounts of incentive money and performance feedback may not improve productivity in the absence of other stimulus events inherent in real organizational settings, such as the possibility for pay raises, promotions, and/or the threat of being fired. These variables may have function-altering effects on incentive money and performance feedback. Future laboratory simulations might experimentally manipulate these variables to further investigate the efficacy of monetary incentive systems. / Graduate

The problem considered involved assessing willingness of educators to participate in a study offering monetary incentives. Determination of willingness was implemented by sending educators a packet requesting return of a postcard to indicate willingness to participate. The purpose was twofold: to determine the effect of a monetary incentive upon willingness of educators to participate in a research study, and to analyze implications for mail questionnaire studies. A sample of 600 educators was chosen from directories of eleven public schools in north Texas. It included equal numbers of male and female teachers and male and female administrators. Subjects were assigned to one of twelve groups. No two from a school were assigned to different levels of the inducement variable.

Four groups of 12 rats each received constant medium size rewards of nine 45 mg Noyes pellets prior to nonrewarded (N) and nonrewarded punishment (P) (0.25 rna shock of 0.1 sec duration) trials and either large (L) size rewards of sixteen 45 mg pellets· or small (S) size rewards of two 45 mg pellets following N and P trials in a runway. Following acquisition each of the four groups was randomly subdivided into either continuous N or continuous P extinction conditions. This resulted in a two X two X two completely randomized factorial design with the variables and its levels being L and S Post N reward magnitudes, Lands' Post P reward magnitudes, and N and P extinction conditions. In acquisition, reward magnitude did not significantly affect performance. In extinction, large Post N reward magnitude produced larger resistance to extinction (Rn) than small Post N reward magnitude in the run and in the goal sections of the runway. The Post P reward magnitude did not affect performance in either acquisition or extinction. Higher Rn in the goal speed was reflected by the groups that received large Post N reward magnitude in the N extinction condition relative to the P extinction condition. The results of the present study were basically consistent with Capaldi's sequential theory with regard to Post N reward magnitude but not to Post P reward magnitude.

The attrition rate of hypothetically able teachers has caused much concern. Job incentives, if valued by teachers, may aid in solving this problem. Teacher-identified incentives might lead to the development of more productive incentive programs than those offered by school districts. The purpose of this research study was to identify incentives valued by elementary teachers. Characteristics of teachers and values placed on incentives were examined to discover whether relationships exist between them. The literature revealed that many variables influence the retention of motivated teachers. It is fundamental to an organization's existence to find positive incentives and reduce or eliminate disincentives. Teachers receive their major rewards from classroom accomplishments. intrinsically motivated. A fixed-response survey was administered to elementary teachers in three schools in different school districts in Virginia. Frequency analysis was used to determine which incentives were most valued. Incentive ranking and demographic characteristics were cross-tabulated to determine if there were any relationship between them. In addition, analysis of variance was used to determine if values placed on incentives vary with pay scales. The study identified 17 incentives considered very important by a select sample of teachers. Teaching experience was found as a correlate in the selection of incentives. Teaching in a particular school district was found related to the value placed on 25% of the incentives. / Ed. D.

Smokers require high motivation to quit smoking and to remain smoke-free. Worksites might enhance motivation to be smoke-free by offering incentives to employees who quit smoking. A pilot study was conducted where one worksite offered a smoking cessation group plus several incentive programs. The incentives included money and public recognition based on individual performance, and dinners based on group performance. After 12 months, 48% of participants remained smoke-free. This result is significantly different [x2(1)= 3.910, p<.05]. from the results of a smoking cessation group conducted a comparable company (here, 18% of participants remained smoke-free). Another study was designed where one worksite would offer a smoking cessation group, and another worksite would offer an incentive program plus a smoking cessation group. Treatment conditions were randomly assigned. Both worksites were part of the same parent company (General Electric), thus minimizing differences between the companies. Many dimensions of the worksites and of participants at each worksite were assessed to demonstrate comparability between the worksites. In the incentive condition monetary incentives were offered. Participants received $10 for not smoking for two weeks, four weeks. five weeks. six weeks, eight weeks and ten weeks. They received $20 for not smoking after three, four, five and six months. They received $25 for not smoking after nine months and 12 months. Their exhaled air was assessed on a carbon monoxide detector before receiving monetary rewards. As a result, 54% of the 28 participants were smoke-free after nine months. In the non-incentive condition, participants were offered the same smoking cessation program but without major incentives. Participants were assessed on the carbon monoxide machine for five of the six consecutive months after the program ended. They were also assessed at the nine-month mark. Here, 44% of the 16 participants were smoke-free after nine months. Both interventions, then, were very successful. As a result none of the hypotheses of this study were supported. This study did not employ a strong research design, and unforeseen changes in procedures weakened the study's validity. Despite these shortcomings, these interventions have merit. The intervention enabled a high percentage of people to quit smoking. These results might encourage smokers who want to quit. Given the success of these programs, hopefully a well-controlled study will be conducted to ascertain the effects of incentives and rewards upon worksite smoking interventions. / Ph. D.