Strategic voting in valuation choice experiments violates the common modeling assumption that everyone votes for his unconditionally most preferred choice. This presents a challenge to accurate estimation of values. We provide an examination of strategic voting in a homegrown value experiment that mimics choice experiments. In this way, we can test whether “prompting” participants to think about the others’ vote affects their vote. We reject this hypothesis. We also solicit participant perceptions about the vote distribution and test whether these perceptions affect their vote. We find that they do, but that the percentage of strategic voters is small.

This thesis serves as an introduction and overview of the broad and closely related fields of mechanism design, contract theory, and information economics. Each chapter is intended to provide a self-contained guide to the particular area of application -- examples include adverse selection, moral hazard, and auctions. The reader should benefit from the thesis in two ways: by understanding the general notions of the revelation principle, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality from the mechanism design theory as well as by examining the particular information asymmetry models in the individual areas. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

We consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information where individual behavior exhibits ambiguity aversion along the line of maximin expected utility decision making. For such economies we introduce different notions of maximin value allocations. We also introduce a strong notion of (maximin) incentive compatibility. We prove existence and incentive compatibility of the maximin value allocation, when the economy's state space is either finite or non-finite. In the latter case, we provide two different existence results: assuming first countable and then uncountable infinitely many states of nature of the world. We conclude that unlike the Bayesian value allocation approach, incentive compatibility is related to efficiency rather than to direct exchange of information.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22227号 / 経博第615号 / 新制||経||293(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 関口 格, 教授 原 千秋, 准教授 NEWTON Jonathan Charles Scott / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

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An ad hoc wireless network is an infrastructure-less, autonomous system of nodes connected through wireless links. In many current applications of ad hoc wireless networks, individual wireless nodes are autonomous, rational, and intelligent and are often referred to as selfish nodes, following game theoretic terminology. In an ad hoc wireless network, a typical node may be an intermediate node of a route from a source node to a destination node and therefore is often required to forward packets so as to enable communication to be established. Selfish nodes may not always forward the packets since the forwarding activity consumes the node’s own resources. Such behavior by individual nodes may lead to suboptimal situations where nodes, through their actions, lead to a state that is undesirable from an overall network viewpoint. To counter this, there is a need to stimulate cooperation through methods such as providing appropriate incentives. In this thesis, our interest is in designing rigorous incentive based methods for stimulating cooperation among wireless nodes, in the specific context of broadcast. In particular, we address the Incentive Compatible Broadcast problem: how do we design broadcast protocols that induce truth revelation by the individual wireless nodes? We do this using a game theory and mechanism design framework. Incentive compatibility of broadcast protocols could manifest in two forms: (1) Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC) (also called strategy-proofness) and (2) Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). A DSIC broadcast protocol is one which makes it a best response for every wireless node to reveal its true type, regardless of what the other nodes reveal. A BIC broadcast protocol is one which makes truth revelation a best response for a node, given that the other nodes are truthful. The DSIC property is stronger and more desirable but more difficult to achieve. On the other hand, the BIC property is much weaker and easier to achieve. In this thesis, we first design a DSIC broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks using the well known VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanisms and investigate its properties and performance. Next, we design a BIC broadcast protocol, investigate its properties, and compare its performance with that of the DSIC broadcast protocol. Both the protocols developed in this thesis provide an elegant solution to the incentive compatible broadcast problem in ad hoc networks with selfish nodes and help stimulate cooperation among the selfish wireless nodes.

In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide. Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.

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The main aspiration behind the contributions of this research work is the achievement of simultaneuos delay-efficiency, autonomy, and security through innovative protocol design to address complex real-life problems. To achieve this, we take a holistic approach. We apply theoretical mathematical modeling implementing implications of social-economic behavioral characteristics to propose a cross-layer network security protocol. We further complement this approach by a layer-specific focus with implementations at two lower OSI layers. For the cross-layer design, we suggest the use of game and mechanism design theories. We design a network-wide consumer-centric and delay-efficient security protocol, DSIC-S. It induces a Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible equilibrium among all rational and selfish nodes. We prove it is network-wide socially desirable and Pareto optimal. We address resource management and delay-efficiency through synergy of several design aspects. We propose a scenario-based security model with different levels. Furthermore, we design a valuation system to integrate the caused delay in selection of security algorithms at each node without consumer's knowledge of the actual delays. We achieve this by incorporating the consumer's valuation system, in the calculation of the credit transfers through the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments with Clarke's pivotal rule. As the utmost significant contribution of this work, we solve the revelation theorem's problem of misrepresentation of agents' private information in mechanism design theory through the proposed design. We design an incentive model and incorporate the valuations in the incentives. The simulations validate the theoretical results. They prove the significance of this model and among others show the correlation of the credit transfers to actual delays and security valuations. In the layer-specific approach for the network-layer, we implement the DSIC-S protocol to extend current IPsec and IKEv2 protocols. IPsec-O and IKEv2-O inherit the strong properties of DSIC-S through the proposed extensions. Furthermore, we propose yet another layer-specific protocol, the SME_Q, for the datalink layer based on ATM. We develop an extensive simulation software, SMEQSIM, to simulate ATM security negotiations. We simulate the proposed protocol in a comprehensive real-life ATM network and prove the significance of this research work. / Ph. D.

In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide. Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.:Preface … 7 1. Introduction … 8 1.1. Applications of auction design … 8 1.2. Optimal use of information in allocation processes … 12 1.3. Modeling non-cooperative situations … 14 1.4. Motivation for the dissertation … 16 2. An Incentive Compatible Double Auction for Multi-Unit Markets with Heterogeneous Goods … 21 2.1. Introduction into double auctions … 21 2.2. Setting of a multi-unit market with heterogeneous goods … 25 2.3. Concept of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 29 2.4. Definition of the allocation rule … 31 2.5. Creation of the price vector and the trading bundles … 37 2.6. Characteristics of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 40 2.7. Discussion of the properties of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 43 3. An Alternating-Price Auction for Interdependent-Valuation Environments … 46 3.1. Introduction into ex-post efficient auction design … 46 3.2. Setting of an interdependent-valuation environment … 50 3.3. Concept of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 54 3.4. Characteristics of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 62 3.5. Discussion of the properties of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 64 4. Facilitating Short-Term and Long-Term Efficiency with an Integrated Electricity Market Design … 66 4.1. Introduction into electricity market designs … 66 4.2. Setting of an electricity market … 72 4.3. Concept of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 78 4.4. Characteristics of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 88 4.5. Discussion of the properties of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 91 5. Conclusion ... 94 Reference List … 96