M.Comm. / The purpose of this study is to determine the meaning of 'arm's length transactions' as stated in the Income Tax Act, Act 58 of 1962. Although the meaning of arm's length transactions have been properly interpreted by our courts, no guidelines or policy documents pertaining to this concept, have been issued by the South African Revenue Services in as far as it relates to transfer pricing. Several of the developed countries have adopted the guidelines of the Organisation of Economic Co-ordination and Development regarding transfer prices and the arm's length principle in respect of international transactions. The substance of arm's length transactions : The concept of arm's length is not easy to state: it is not unlike the proverbial elephant which could easily be recognised, but could not be defined. It can be defined by reference to the terms of the transaction in question, or by reference to the relationship between the parties to it, or by reference to both of these factors. Normally, parties enter into an arm's length transaction when each party: • Is independent of the other; and • Strives to get the utmost possible advantage from the transaction for himself. The effects of an arm's length transaction are: • The rights and obligations created by the transaction are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal; and • The means and manner employed in entering into the transaction are more likely to be normal than abnormal. It is clear that the meaning of arm's length is defined, but that the effect of such transactions will depend on the facts of each case. What may be normal in one case can be abnormal in another depending on the underlying facts. Although South African transfer pricing legislation includes the arm's length principle in respect of international transactions, legislation on transfer pricing should be more clear as to what is normal or abnormal in respect of international transactions.

The purpose of this study was to examine whether unmined ore stockpiles fall within the ambit of the definition of trading stock in section 1 of the Income Tax Act (58/1962) and therefore needs to be considered for the purposes of section 22 in the determination of taxable income. Furthermore the judgement in Richards Bay Iron&Titanium (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR (1996:55) would be analysed to determine whether a distinction could be made between the stockpiled material held in that case as opposed to unmined ore. The research object would be determined by analysing the nature of ore stockpiles, the accounting treatment ore stockpiles and its effect on the tax treatment as well as the taxation of stockpiles in terms of case law. As to the first part, a distinction in the legal sense was examined between movable and immovable property. It was concluded that stockpiles could by its nature in certain circumstances, be considered immovable property even though they became movable by its separation from the soil. Intention was furthermore identified as one of the most important criteria in a three tier test for the determination of the legal nature of stockpiles. As to its tax nature, it was concluded that even though case law suggests that the intention to realise through mining activities could make such stockpiles floating capital, it was submitted that intention remains the conclusive criteria and therefore only once an intention exist, to utilise mining property in a mining process that is a scheme of profit making, does the intention change and does the fixed capital (both immovable property and movable stockpiles) become floating capital. In the second chapter an analysis was done of the financial reporting requirements for stockpiles and whether the accounting treatment thereof would influence the tax treatment. It was concluded that the accounting treatment would influence the tax treatment as the definition of trading stock in section 1 of the ITA (58/1962) is actually an extension of the normal grammatical meaning, the latter for which the accounting treatment is critical. In terms of IAS1 it was found that an essential criterion for a current asset was that it must be expected to be realised in the 12 months after the reporting date. It was found that even though mined ore and crushed ore could be seen as work in progress and thus inventories, such ore still had to comply with the requirements of IAS1 and IAS2 to be classified as inventory. The valuation of the ore would be in terms of IAS2 if at historical cost and in terms of SANREC if at net realisable value. It was concluded that stockpiles that did not meet the trading stock criteria due to various uncertain circumstances could be disclosed as non-current assets at historical cost, but not in terms of IAS16. However, if no reasonable expectation of future benefits existed, then no disclosure would be required. In examining the taxation of stockpiles the definition of trading stock was analysed. It was concluded that to the extent that the normal grammatical meaning did not apply, the extension to the definition still had to be considered. It was held that the extension to the definition had two parts of which the first required that the object must be acquired, produced or manufactured for the purpose of use in a manufacturing process, irrespective of whether the object was saleable in its current condition. The second part required no intention but was an objective enquiry of whether a saleable object was disposed of and which the proceeds would be revenue in nature It was also found that a distinction between a mining process and a manufacturing process exists in the South African tax law and that objects intended for use in the different processes could be treated differently from a tax perspective. Finally the analysis of the Richards Bay case (1996:55) revealed that even though the court considered that stockpiles are raw materials or work-in-progress, it was the taxpayer’s admission of a manufacturing process and his lack of distinction of the mining process that was critical in the decision against him. The court accepted the taxpayer’s contentions and withheld opinion on these two critical matters. It was concluded that stockpiles of unmined ore did not constitute trading stock in the extended definition and only under very specific circumstances could it be considered trading stock under the normal grammatical meaning when inferred from accounting disclosure and valuation requirements. Copyright / Dissertation (MCom)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Taxation / unrestricted

With effect from 26 October 2004, section 8C was introduced into the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 and replaced the previous section 8A. The main purpose of the new section was to effectively tax directors and employees on the receipt of income from equity based incentive schemes and therefore close potential ‘loopholes’ that existed in the previous section 8A. The purpose of this study was to critically analyse section 8C and specifically the principles of ‘vesting’ and ‘restricted equity instruments’ as introduced by the section. Since no case law exists and the application of the principles within the section is deemed to be detailed and complex, the possibility for inconsistent treatment or misinterpretation exists. Due to limited information being available regarding the application of section 8C and in order to determine whether different interpretations may exist in practice, selected tax practitioners and/or specialists were also asked to provide information through the completion of a questionnaire. Section 8C has already been amended since its introduction and as indicated in the study, further amendments may be necessary in order to address problem areas. Employers with equity based incentives need to be aware of the significant impact that section 8C has on the taxation of equity instruments and have to ensure that they comply. Depending on the instruments in use it could also have a major impact on the administrative duties of employers, who have the responsibility of calculating and paying the necessary taxes on time. Copyright / Dissertation (MCom)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Taxation / unrestricted

No abstract available. Copyright / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Taxation / unrestricted

The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (“Act”) entitles taxpayers to deduct certain losses and expenses incurred by them from their taxable income if such losses and expenses comply with the requirements of section 11(a) of the Act. One of the requirements of section 11(a) is that, in order to be eligible for a deduction, the losses and expenses must have been “actually incurred” by the taxpayer. The area of tax deductions in our tax law represents the frontline in the continuous and inevitable war between the taxpayer (almost always desperately trying to maximise her deductions) and the revenue authorities (as often times desperately trying to minimise the deductions to which the taxpayer is entitled). The stage on which the various battles which make up this mighty war between citizen and state are fought is the court and the arsenal with which each party comes armed is the Act and, more specifically, the absolute belief of each party in the correctness of their interpretation of the Act, which, each party hopes, will be ably demonstrated by their able (and often extremely expensive) counsel. Such is the determination of the taxpayer and the tax authorities alike that the body of case law relating to this specific area of our law is, especially when one considers that it essentially involves on only one section of the Act, relatively voluminous. The author’s intention is to consider only one of the requirements with which the taxpayer must comply in order to be eligible for a deduction, namely, the requirement that the relevant loss or expenditure must have been “actually incurred” by the taxpayer. Despite the fact that the meaning of the phrase “actually incurred” has been considered extensively by our courts, significant uncertainty still exists as to its exact meaning. The author will deal with three specific contexts in which the meaning of this phrase remains a subject of uncertainty, namely, share-based payments, contingent liabilities and losses and expenses incurred in relation to illegal receipts. The author will begin first by dealing with the interpretation of tax statutes, the author will then, in general terms, consider the general deduction formula after which the author will delve into the meaning of the phrase “actually incurred” in the contexts of each of the transactions mentioned above. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / gm2014 / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

Thesis (MAcc)--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In November 2006 section 103(1) of the Act was abolished and replaced by a new Part IIA, containing sections 80A to 80L, which targets impermissible tax avoidance arrangements. Section 80A(c)(ii) introduced a new concept to the South African tax law: a misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act, including Part IIA thereof. The objective of this study was to establish the origin, meaning, application and effect of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. The evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) was therefore examined where after the enacted version was analyzed. It was essential to determine the origin of section 80A(c)(ii) in order to establish some point of reference from which inferences could be drawn as to the possible application and effect thereof. Case law, practice statements and articles relating to its proposed root was then examined. A ‘misuse or abuse’ of a provision, it was found, implies, frustrating or exploiting the purpose of the provision. This contention was confirmed by existing Canadian precedent. Such an interpretation, however, has a strong resemblance to the words in which the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) was couched. It is therefore in contrast to the presumption that different words (in the enacted version) imply a different meaning. The precise meaning of the words ‘misuse or abuse’ is thus still elusive. It was established that section 80A(c)(ii) has its roots in section 245 of the Canadian Act. Section 245(4) was regarded as an effective comparative to section 80A(c)(ii) as it also contained a so-called misuse or abuse rule. The application of this rule in the Canadian tax environment required the following process: - Interpret (contextually and purposively) the provisions relied on by the taxpayer, to determine their object, spirit and purpose. - Determine whether the transaction frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions. Section 245(4) had the effect of reviving the modern approach (a contextual and/or purposive theory) to the interpretation of statutes in Canada. Reference to the ‘spirit’ of a provision (above) was found not to extend the modern approach to statutory interpretation: it does not require of the court to look for some inner and spiritual meaning within the legislation. As section 245(4) was regarded as an effective comparative to section 80A(c)(ii) it was contented that it would have a similar effect, than that of its Canadian counterpart, on the approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa. However, it was established that a modern approach to statutory interpretation was already authoritative in South Africa. This finding led the author to the conclusion that section 80A(c)(ii) could at best only reinforce the case for applying such an approach. Such a purpose for section 80A(c)(ii) was however found to be void in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which was enacted in 1996, and provides a sovereign authority for the application of the modern approach. It was also found that the practical burden of showing that there was a ‘misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act (including the provisions of this Part)’ will rest on the shoulders of the Commissioner, notwithstanding section 82 of the Act. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 103(1) van die Inkomstebelastingwet is herroep in November 2006 en vervang deur Deel IIA, bestaande uit artikels 80A tot 80L, wat daarop gemik is om ontoelaatbare belastingvermydingsreëlings te teiken. Artikel 80A(c)(ii) het ‘n nuwe konsep in die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstebelastingreg ingebring: ‘n misbruik of ‘n wangebruik van die bepalings van die Wet, insluitende Deel IIA. Die doel van hierdie studie was om die oorsprong, betekenis, toepassing en uitwerking van artikel 80A(c)(ii) vas te stel. Die ontwikkeling van artikel 80A(c)(ii) is daarom ondersoek waarna die verordende weergawe daarvan geanaliseer is. ‘n Sleutelaspek van die analise was om die oorsprong van artikel 80A(c)(ii) vas te stel. Hierdie oefening het ‘n verwysbare bron daargestel waarvan afleidings rondom die moontlike toepassing en uitwerking van artikel 80A(c)(ii) gemaak kon word. Hofsake, praktyknotas en artikels rakende die voorgestelde oorsprong is vervolgens ondersoek. Daar is vasgestel dat ‘n ‘misbruik of wangebruik’ van ‘n bepaling neerkom op die frustering of uitbuiting van die doel van ‘n bepaling. Hierdie bewering is bevestig deur bestaande Kanadese presedent. So ‘n interpretasie is egter soortgelyk aan die woorde waarin die konsepweergawe van artikel 80A(c)(ii) uitgedruk is. Dit is daarom in teenstelling met die vermoede dat ‘n wysiging van die woorde (in die verordende weergawe) ‘n gewysigde betekenis impliseer. Die presiese betekenis van die woorde ‘misbruik of wangebruik’ is dus steeds ontwykend. Daar is bevind dat artikel 80A(c)(ii) waarskynlik sy ontstaan in artikel 245 van die Kanadese Inkomstebelastingwet gehad het. Artikel 245(4) van die Kanadese Inkomstebelastingwet is beskou as ‘n effektiewe vergelykende artikel vir artikel 80A(c)(ii), aangesien dit ook oor ‘n sogenaamde misbruik of wangebruik reël beskik. Die toepassing van hierdie reël in die Kanadese belastingmilieu vereis die volgende werkswyse: - Interpreteer (kontekstueel en doeldienend) die bepalings waarop die belastingpligtige steun, ten einde die oogmerk, gees en doel daarvan vas te stel. - Bepaal of die transaksie, deur die belastingpligtige aangegaan, die oogmerk, gees of doel van die bepalings frustreer. Artikel 245(4) het aanleiding gegee tot die herstel van die moderne benadering (‘n kontekstuele en/of doeldienende teorie) tot die interpretasie van wetgewing in Kanada. Daar is bevind dat die verwysing na die ‘gees’ van ‘n bepaling (hierbo) nie aanleiding gee tot die uitbreiding van die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg nie: dit vereis nie dat die hof moet soek na die innerlike of geestelike betekenis van die wetgewing nie. Aangesien artikel 245(4) as ‘n effektiewe vergelykende artikel vir artikel 80A(c)(ii) beskou is, is daar aangeneem dat dit ‘n soortgelyke uitwerking, as sy Kanadese eweknie, op wetsuitleg in Suid Afrika sal hê. By nadere ondersoek is daar egter bevind dat ‘n moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg alreeds gesaghebbend in Suid Afrika is. Hierdie bevinding het die skrywer tot die gevolgtrekking gebring dat artikel 80A(c)(ii), in beginsel, slegs die saak vir die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg in Suid Afrika sal versterk. Indien hierdie die doel is wat die wetgewer gehad het met die verordening van artikel 80A(c)(ii), sal dit egter niksseggend wees in die lig van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, wat verorden is in 1996, en ‘n oppermagtige gesag bied vir die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg. Daar is ook vasgestel dat die onus op die Kommissaris rus om te bewys dat daar ‘n ‘misbruik of wangebruik van die bepalings van hierdie Wet (waarby ingesluit die bepalings van hierdie Deel)’ was, ondanks artikel 82 van die Wet.

Thesis (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The Income Tax Act, Act 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) currently defines a permanent establishment in section 1. The definition of a permanent establishment in the Act refers to article 5 of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital of the Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development. The existence of a permanent establishment in a tax jurisdiction determines the right of the jurisdiction to tax the profits of the permanent establishment. The concept foreign business establishment was inserted into section 9D of the Act by clause 10(1)(a) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act, Act 59 of 2000. Section 9D is an antiavoidance provision, which determines that certain foreign-sourced income generated by South African controlled foreign companies are subject to tax in South Africa. The concept foreign business establishment is one of the exclusions from the anti-avoidance provisions in section 9D. The Revenue Laws Amendment Act, Act 59 of 2000, replaced all references to the concept permanent establishment with a reference to the newly introduced concept foreign business establishment in section 9D(9)(b) of the Act. The Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2000 (SARS 2000:1-12) does not provide a reason for the replacement of the concept permanent establishment. The objective of this study was to analyse and compare the concepts permanent establishment and foreign business establishment in order to make recommendations regarding the required additions and amendments to replace the concept foreign business establishment with the internationally recognised and accepted concept permanent establishment. The proposed replacement of the concept foreign business establishment with an internationally recognised and accepted tax concept will enhance the international compatibility of the Act. The use of an internationally recognised and accepted tax concept will provide clarity and certainty regarding the tax implications of section 9D(9)(b) for those affected by it. It was found that the concepts permanent establishment and foreign business establishment are used in different contexts within the Act. The concepts also apply to different types of taxpayers in different situations. The two concepts have, however, the same objective, being the identification of criteria for the existence of legitimate and substantive business activities in the foreign tax jurisdiction. A comparison between the definitions of the two concepts reveals that there are various components in the definitions with the same wording and meaning. After a detailed comparison between the two definitions it was found that, subject to some suggested additions and amendments, the internationally recognised and accepted concept permanent establishment can replace the concept foreign business establishment in section 9D(9)(b) of the Act without having a material impact on the objective of section 9D(9)(b). This replacement is possible due to the mutual objective of and similar components contained in the definitions of the concepts permanent establishment and foreign business establishments. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Inkomstebelastingwet, Wet 58 van 1962 (‘die Wet’) definieer ’n permanente saak in artikel 1. Die definisie van ’n permanente saak verwys na artikel 5 van die ‘Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development’. Die bestaan van ’n permanente saak in ’n belastingjurisdiksie bepaal die reg van die belastingjurisdiksie om die winste van die permanente saak te belas. Die begrip buitelandse besigheidsaak is deur artikel 10(1)(a) van die Wysigingswet op Inkomstewette, Wet 59 van 2000 in die Wet ingesluit. Artikel 9D is ’n teenvermydingsbepaling wat bepaal dat sekere inkomste vanaf ’n buitelandse bron gegenereer deur ’n Suid-Afrikaans beheerde buitelandse maatskappy in Suid-Afrika belas word. Die begrip buitelandse besigheidsaak is een van die uitsluitings van die teenvermydingsbepaling in artikel 9D. Alle verwysings in artikel 9D(9)(b) na die begrip permanente saak is deur die Wysigingswet op Inkomstewette, Wet 59 van 2000, vervang met ’n verwysing na die nuwe begrip buitelandse besigheidsaak. Die ‘Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2000’ (SARS 2000:1-12) verskaf nie ’n rede vir die vervanging van die begrip permanente saak nie. Die doel van die studie was om die begrippe permanente saak en buitelandse besigheidsaak te vergelyk sodat voorstelle gemaak kan word rakende die nodige byvoegings en wysings om die begrip buitelandse besigheidsaak met die internasionaal aanvaarde en erkende begrip, permanente saak, te vervang. Die voorgestelde vervanging van die begrip buitelandse besigheidsaak met ’n internasionaal aanvaarde en erkende begrip sal die internasionale verenigbaarheid van die Suid Afrikaanse wetgewing bevorder. Die gebruik van ’n begrip wat internasionaal aanvaar en erken word, sal sekerheid en duidelikheid bewerkstellig vir diegene wat deur die artikel geaffekteer word. Daar is bevind dat die begrippe permanente saak en buitelandse besigheidsaak in die Wet in verskillende verbande gebruik word. Die begrippe is ook van toepassing op verskillende belastingbetalers in verskillende situasies. Die twee begrippe het egter dieselfde doelwit naamlik die identifisering van kriteria vir die bestaan van wesenlike en volwaardige besigheidsaktiwiteite in die buitelandse belastingjurisdiksie. ’n Vergelyking tussen die definisies van die twee begrippe toon dat verskeie komponente van die definisies dieselfde woorde en betekenis bevat. Na ’n detail vergelyking van die twee begrippe is daar bevind dat, onderhewig aan sommige voorgestelde byvoegings en wysigings, die internasionaal erkende en aanvaarde begrip permanente saak die begrip buitelandse besigheidsaak in artikel 9D(9)(b) van die Wet kan vervang. Die vervanging is moontlik weens die gemeenskaplike doelwit en soortgelyke komponente in die definisies van die begrippe permanente saak en buitelandse besigheidsaak.

M.Com. (Taxation) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

No abstract available. / Theses (LL.M.)- University of Natal, Durban, 1999.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.Com.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2005.