La confrontation des soldats marocains avec la violence est un phénomène qui s’inscrit dans le temps. Elle a pris des formes multiples alors que les soldats marocains combattaient sous le drapeau français et les questions liées aux traumatismes de guerre sont devenues assez récemment un réel enjeu de société. Or de ce point de vue les soldats marocains sous domination française (protectorat) offrent un terrain d’enquête jusqu’à présent peu traité au Maroc et en France. Pourtant, de 1914 à 1954, ces soldats marocains, notamment très présents en Indochine, ont subi les conséquences de l’expérience de la violence de guerre sur leur psyché. Nous avons cherché à saisir et interpréter leur comportement en insistant sur la période de l’après Deuxième Guerre Mondiale.Pour comprendre les tensions vécues en Indochine par les combattants marocains, il fut nécessaire de situer tout d’abord le combattant dans sa conjoncture socioculturelle et dans la série des expériences militaires vécues avant la guerre d’Indochine (Grande Guerre et la Seconde Guerre mondiale) sur la base des sources d’archives (militaires, diplomatiques, médicales) et de l’évaluation des approches psychiatriques et médicales de l’époque. Pour l’après-1945 le travail est enrichi par une collecte triple (témoignages, récits de vie, et sémiologie post-traumatique) auprès de quelques anciens combattants. Ainsi l’impact psychologique lié à violence de guerre sur quarante ans d’expérience au sein de l’armée d’Afrique (1914-1954) a pu être cerné de façon nouvelle puisqu’une partie des observations permises par la confrontation à des anciens combattants a une portée certaine pour l’époque antérieure à leur engagement.Tout ce qui relève de pathologies psychologiques ou psychiatriques, notamment durant la guerre d’Indochine, a été analysé et a permis de réévaluer les voies suivies par ces soldats, qui vont jusqu’à la désertion et le passage à l’ennemi vietnamien ou encore des coups de folie meurtriers ou suicidaires, et d’éclairer le rapport au politique de ces hommes pris entre des causes qui n’étaient pas les leurs. Pour le cas de l’Indochine, certains d’entre eux ont vécu cette guerre comme l’expérience d’un lieu d’affirmations idéologiques. L’exil du roi Mohamed V les amena parfois à rejoindre la résistance indochinoise. D’autres soldats, faits prisonniers par le Viet-Minh, ont été bouleversés par l’expérience de la captivité.Cette thèse éclaire ainsi le rapport à l’engagement dans l’armée coloniale, le rapport aux violences subies et données, et offre une interprétation des comportements constatés qui montre le fonctionnement discontinu du rapport au religieux, l’impact des traumas sur la capacité de remémoration et de tissage des rapports sociaux après les guerres. Ceci éclaire sous un nouvel angle les sources d’archive disponibles sur ces soldats marocains de l’Armée d’Afrique et la façon dont les violences ont pesé sur eux. Cette recherche amène à penser que la mise à l’écart des dimensions traumatiques — au profit de l’héroïsme le plus souvent — dans les décennies qui ont suivi l’ère du protectorat a produit un effacement qui a faussé en partie la perception de l’histoire vécue par ces combattants / The confrontation of the Moroccan soldiers with violence is a phenomenon that inscribes itself in the time. It took many forms as Moroccan soldiers fought under the French flag, and issues related to war trauma became a real social issue quite recently. From this point of view, Moroccan soldiers under French rule (protectorate) offer a field of investigation hitherto little treated in Morocco and France. However, from 1914 to 1954, these Moroccan soldiers, particularly present in Indochina, suffered from the consequences of the experience of war violence on their psyche. We sought to interpret their behaviour.To understand the tensions experienced in Indochina by the Moroccan fighters, it was necessary to first, locate the fighter in his socio-cultural situation and in the series of military experiences lived before the Indochina war (Great War and World War II) based on archival sources (military, diplomatic, medical) and the evaluation of psychiatric and medical approaches of the time. For post-1945, work is enriched by a triple collection (testimonials, life stories, and post-traumatic semiology) with some veterans. Thus, the psychological impact linked to wartime violence over forty years of experience in the African army (1914-1954) could be identified in a new way.All that pertains to psychological or psychiatric pathologies, especially during the Indochina war, was analysed and allowed to re-evaluate the tracks followed by these soldiers, who go as far as desertion and the passage to the Vietnamese enemy or murderous or suicidal feats of madness, and to enlighten the relation to politics of these men caught between causes which were not theirs. In the case of Indochina, some of them experienced this war as the experience of a place of ideological affirmations. The exile of King Mohamed V sometimes led them to join the Indochinese resistance. Other soldiers, taken prisoner by the Viet-Minh, were upset by the experience of captivity.This thesis emphasises the relation to the commitment in the colonial army, the relation to the violence suffered and given, and offers an interpretation of the observed behaviours, which shows the discontinuous functioning of the relation with the religious, the impact of the traumas on the ability to remembrance and weaving of social relationships after wars. This sheds new light on the available archive sources of these Moroccan soldiers of the Army of Africa and the way the violence has weighed on them. This research suggests that sidelining this dimension in the decades following the protectorate era has produced an erosion that has partially distorted the perception of the story of these fighters

This thesis examines the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) sent to French Indochina, from 1950 to 1956, when the United States provided major monetary and material aid to the French in their war against the communist Viet Minh. MAAG observed French units in the field and monitored the flow of American materiel into the region. Relying upon primary research in the National Archives, the thesis departs from previous interpretations by showing that MAAG held generally positive assessments of France‟s performance in Indochina. The thesis also argues that MAAG personnel were more interested in getting material support to the French, than in how that material was used, to the point of making unrealistic assessments of French combat abilities. By connecting primary research with the greater history of Cold War American military assistance, the thesis contributes to the scholarship on American involvement in Vietnam.

Cadet sans terre d’une famille paysanne des Hautes-Alpes, Martin Bertrand (1915-2008) échappe au séminaire en s’engageant dans la garde républicaine mobile qui le conduira à Casablanca, au Maroc, où il sera stationné dès 1941. Mobilisé en 1943 à la suite du débarquement des Alliés en Afrique du Nord, il est affecté à l’encadrement d’une unité coloniale marocaine. Avec « ses » tirailleurs, il participe à la campagne d’Italie, au débarquement en Provence, à la libération de l’Alsace et à l’occupation de l’Allemagne. Après avoir regagné le Maroc pour quelques années, son bataillon est déployé de 1949 à 1951 à Tourane, en Indochine, où l’administration coloniale française tente de reprendre le contrôle de la région. Durant chacune de ses longues absences, Martin Bertrand écrira quasi quotidiennement à son épouse, Hélène, originaire d’une famille de colons espagnols installés en Algérie. Par l’analyse de cette correspondance, ce mémoire de maîtrise propose d’intégrer l’expérience de Martin Bertrand, sous-officier d’un régiment colonial, au sein d’une histoire impériale plus large; celle d’une France qui mène ses troupes au front de ses dernières guerres coloniales et qui déstabilise, dans ce processus, l’ordre qui régit la fonction et la position de chaque soldat. Ainsi, en faisant parler les mots intimes de Martin Bertrand au prisme du contenu de sources plus officielles, telles que les rapports militaires sur le moral des hommes, ce mémoire rend compte à la fois de la complexité des hiérarchies sociales et raciales qui établissent les rapports entre les sous-officiers français et la troupe « indigène » tout autant qu’il explore les questionnements identitaires plus personnels d’un petit cadre. / Deprived of his land inheritance like many youngest-born of peasant descent, Martin Bertrand (1915-2008) eventually fled life as a seminarian in the French High-Alps by enlisting in the Mobile Guard and then being stationed in Casablanca, Morocco in 1941. Following the Anglo–American invasion of French North Africa, he was drafted in 1943 to lead a Moroccan colonial recruit unit. With “his” tirailleurs, he took part in the Italian campaign, the Provence landing, the liberation of Alsace, and the occupation of Germany. After the War, he returned to Morocco only to be deployed 3 years later with the same battalion to Tourane, Indochina where the French colonial administration attempted to retake control of the region. During each one of his long absences, Martin Bertrand wrote almost daily to his wife Hélène, descendent of Spanish settlers established in Algeria. By analyzing these letters, this master’s thesis proposes to integrate Martin Bertrand’s experiences, in his functions as a non-commissioned officer in a colonial regiment, into a broader imperial story where France led her armies through her last colonial wars and destabilized the colonial order under which each soldier was governed. Furthermore, this study compares Martin Bertrand’s private letters with more official sources like troop morale reports which allows for an analysis of the complex social and ethnic hierarchies between French non-commissioned officers and “indigenous” troops. At the same time, it explores the deeper questionings of a military intermediary’s self-identity.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.