This thesis examines the way in which the United States formulated its policy toward Greece during the Greek civil war (1943-1949). It asserts that U.S. intervention in Greece was based on circumstantial evidence and the assumption of Soviet global intentions, rather than on dispatches from the field which consistently reported from 1943-1946 that the Soviets were not involved in that country’s affairs. It also maintains that the post-Truman Doctrine American policy in Greece was in essence, a continuation of British policy there from 1943-1946, which meant to impose an unpopular government on the people of Greece, and tolerated unlawful violence of the extreme Greek right-wing

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Since the end of the Cold War the Alliance's transformation has erased doubts about its survival. NATO continues to adapt to new threat environments by expanding its mission scope to out-of-area operations and by assuming new security missions. For the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and subsequent 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain complicated an already robust Greek security plan. Greece's extensive security planning, in addition to coordinating NATO support, highlighted the challenges and readiness requirements for the Alliance in the 21st century. Terrorist concerns, burden-sharing, recognition of Greek sovereignty, political limitations in deploying NATO's CBR Defense team and NRF utilization were all elements of the challenges faced in security preparation for the Games. In assessing the dynamics behind NATO's history and its security participation in the 2004 Summer Olympics, this thesis serves as a case study in the continuing transformational role and adaptability of NATO. Overall, the Alliance's willingness to assume security support to a major international sporting event represented its long-time relationship with Greece, its ability to perform significant security missions and its commitment to and solidarity with its allied members. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

Among the states, the history of which was affected by the Cold War can undoubtedly be ranked both Greece and Turkey. Their geostrategic singularity, accentuated by the outcomes of the World War II, caused that the "struggle" between the United States and the Soviet Union for influence in those countries had considerably contributed to a shift in the course of U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and to adopting an entirely new strategic concept which was to be called as the "strategy of containment". A number of quality books have already been dealing with the general characteristics of this strategy; however, historians have not turned enough attention - which is rather surprising - to its implementation in particular countries and territories. Therefore, an analysis of particular impacts of the strategy of containment on Greece and Turkey, as well as an evaluation of how successfully this approach of the United States towards both the countries worked, have become primary aims of my dissertation. The U.S. strategy of containment, which can be regarded as an example of the so called "grand strategy", had become a key factor of the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The process of its coming into existence was complicated and cannot be marked off by one document or an event; its...

This thesis examines the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) sent to French Indochina, from 1950 to 1956, when the United States provided major monetary and material aid to the French in their war against the communist Viet Minh. MAAG observed French units in the field and monitored the flow of American materiel into the region. Relying upon primary research in the National Archives, the thesis departs from previous interpretations by showing that MAAG held generally positive assessments of France‟s performance in Indochina. The thesis also argues that MAAG personnel were more interested in getting material support to the French, than in how that material was used, to the point of making unrealistic assessments of French combat abilities. By connecting primary research with the greater history of Cold War American military assistance, the thesis contributes to the scholarship on American involvement in Vietnam.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.