This thesis examines the way in which the United States formulated its policy toward Greece during the Greek civil war (1943-1949). It asserts that U.S. intervention in Greece was based on circumstantial evidence and the assumption of Soviet global intentions, rather than on dispatches from the field which consistently reported from 1943-1946 that the Soviets were not involved in that country’s affairs. It also maintains that the post-Truman Doctrine American policy in Greece was in essence, a continuation of British policy there from 1943-1946, which meant to impose an unpopular government on the people of Greece, and tolerated unlawful violence of the extreme Greek right-wing

Anti-Americanism in the Middle East is a growing trend that must be addressed. This study has compiled the three greatest contributors to anti-Americanism in the region: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, U.S. foreign policy and the patrimonial leadership style of the Middle East. The understanding and improvement of these three factors would bring about a decrease in animosity toward the U.S. which would bring waves of benefits worldwide.

This project examines the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons during the Syrian civil war in 2013 and places the disarmament process in the context of the international nonproliferation regime and the history of United States weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policy. Additionally, I argue that U.S. policy on WMDs does not operate by a fixed set of standards; rather, cultural assumptions about a state and its weapons (such as the USSR, Iraq, Israel and their WMDs) are used to justify nonproliferation action. I present weapons as a mode of Othering that the U.S. and the nonproliferation regime employ to justify the designation of an enemy state. This analysis also examines the “myth of neutrality” of humanitarian intervention and applies these concepts to nonproliferation intervention.

The United States made El Salvador one of its top priorities in the 1980s as the communist threat from the Soviet Union made its way to El Salvador. The Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group, the Farabundo Martí­ National Liberation Front (FMLN), was supported by the Soviet Union via Cuba and became the target of the hard line politicians that ruled in El Salvador. In order to combat the guerrilla movement, the United States structured its policy around national security to justify intervention in El Salvador. The three main points of the policy were to prevent a left-wing takeover by the communist-backed FMLN, to promote democracy by establishing free elections, and to reduce the number of human rights abuses that were rampant at the beginning of the 1980s. The question of whether or not the United States was successful in its efforts in El Salvador was a very controversial one. Through the analysis of the perceptions and statements of the United States Ambassadors that were assigned to El Salvador between 1979 and 1992, this thesis will show that the three-pronged policy was successful. It is important to note that El Salvador still has many issues to address before it fully recovers from the civil war, but the policy of United States during its civil war was achieved.

In 1969, Richard M. Nixon became the thirty-seventh President of the United States. He brought with him an aggressive foreign policy aimed at retarding the escalating Cold War and ending America's war with Vietnam. In his inaugural address, he exclaimed that under his leadership the United States was going to enter an era of negotiation, leaving the age of confrontation behind. Determined to create a structure of peace around the world, Nixon and his administration fashioned a policy to reflect their goals. This study seeks to understand why the Nixon administration allowed the Middle East to fall into the peripheries of their foreign policy. A conflict as devastating as the October War was certainly the kind of incident Nixon and his advisors wished to avoid. Between the years of 1969 and 1973, they worked tirelessly in the Middle East and around the globe to secure a more hospitable international climate; so why, despite their efforts, did the Arab-Israeli conflict spiral so devastatingly out of control?

北韓問題是二十世紀延續至今卻始終未能解決的複雜議題，這是因為牽涉的因素眾多：南北韓、周邊國家以及國際的考量使「維持現狀」與「模糊」政策成為處理北韓問題可以接受的模式。但事實上，吾人必須認知到在此議題上，最重要的主角仍是北韓與美國，但顯然雙方各有盤算而不能或不願直接解決。因此本文旨在探討2001至2011年美國對北韓之政策，且嘗試在現今相關領域的多數美國立場中，盡可能尋求以相對公允、同理心的角度分析問題，而非美國觀點的一言堂。本文以法國戰略學家薄富爾(André Beaufre)之「行動戰略」(Strategy of Action) 理論作為研究途徑，輔以大量相關數據資料及專著，用意在於平衡地討論美國戰略並批判其中好壞。 本文認為，小布希與歐巴馬政府對北韓政策目標一致，但戰略有所不同。受制於北韓核報復攻擊、中東戰事、經濟與他國因素，美國難以動武直取北韓，因此必須從軍事外的選項著手。筆者從軍事、政治、經濟與外交面向，以政治診斷(political diagnosis)及戰略診斷(strategic diagnosis)探討兩屆政府對北韓之行動方案。小布希和歐巴馬政府在戰略應用上符合薄富爾的觀點，但在架構面上卻有缺失，最終由於無法促使中國相助，以及自身立場的謬誤，導致兩屆政府北韓政策之失誤。 / The North Korea issue remains unresolved, and the only acceptable options for the neighbor countries are the status quo policy and the policy of deliberate ambiguity. However, it has to be acknowledged that the most important roles are North Korea and the U.S., and it is obvious they have different plans in their minds. The main idea of this thesis is to study the U.S. Policy toward North Korea (2001-2011), and present unbiased points of view instead of only the U.S. aspect. This thesis uses the Strategy of Action of André Beaufre, a French Strategist, as the research method, to analyze data and studies to fairly find out the pros and cons of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea. This thesis shows that the George W. Bush administration and the Obama administration share the same goals but different strategies toward North Korea. The U.S. have difficulty in using military action since it tries to avoid North Korea taking nuclear retaliation, and the war in the middle east and the sinking economy also limit the ability of the U.S. government. This thesis analyzes the U.S. policy toward North Korea from the aspects of military power, politics, economy and diplomacy, and it uses political diagnosis and strategic diagnosis as the approaches to examine the action plans of both Bush and Obama administrations. The research shows that the actions plans match the point of view of André Beaufre strategically, but the flaws of the plan structure, the failure to have China take a stance against North Korea and the illogicalness of the government position finally led the U.S. policy toward North Korea to a frustrated end.

This paper will focus on three alternative options for addressing the current crisis in Syria (direct military intervention, arming the rebels, and a diplomatic/political solution) that have been discussed by both scholars and politicians. The paper is divided into four main chapters. The introduction is the first one. The second chapter presents the three alternative policies, and the debate among some scholars and politicians in relevant issues. In the third chapter, the author analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments for each alternative. In chapter four, the author offers his recommendation by determining the best policy to pursue in Syria, arguing why it is the most suitable one.