Transboundary water treaties are often expected to prevent conflicts over waters from shared rivers. However, empirical evidence shows that some upstream countries continue to experience conflict after signing a water treaty. This study explains why some upstream countries experience high post-treaty transboundary water conflict levels while others do not. Departing from theories on the character of states, I argue that weaker upstream countries are more likely to experience post-treaty transboundary water conflict than stronger upstream states. This is because a weak upstream state has fewer capabilities, which creates an imbalance of power with its downstream riparian neighbor and presents a zero-sum game condition. As a result, the upstream state is more likely to experience a high level of conflict after signing an agreement. The hypothesis is tested on two transboundary river cases, the Helmand River Basin and the Indus River Basin, using a structured, focused comparison method. The data is collected through secondary sources, including books, journals, news articles, and reports, government records. The results of the study mainly support the theoretical arguments. It shows a significant relationship between the character of the upstream state and the level of post-treaty transboundary water conflict in the upstream state.

Transboundary water treaties are established to prevent disputes over shared rivers between states. Nevertheless, empirical studies indicate that international organizations manage to bring cooperation between states in some cases and fail in others. This research explains why the efforts of international organizations to promote water cooperation sometimes succeed or sometimes fail and which factors contribute to their varying levels of success in different cases? International organizations are more likely to achieve cooperation between states with strong characters (less change in power dynamics) and share mutual benefits than weaker states (frequent shift in power dynamics) and have less shared benefits. I will examine how shared benefits and the character of the state can help international originations achieve cooperation or conflict that can be influenced by power asymmetry or by creating an imbalance/balance of power (causal mechanisms). Thus, weak riparian countries are less likely to achieve cooperation, increasing the probability of conflict. The hypothesis is tested on the Nile River Basin and the Indus River Basin, using a comparative analysis. The findings indicate an important relationship between the state’s characters, shared benefits, and the role of international organizations in bringing cooperation and preventing conflict between riparian states.