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Abstract This thesis focuses on the oversight mechanism used by congress to supervise the intelligence department, mainly through examining the historical development of the oversight mechanism that the U.S. Congress uses over the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, as well as evaluating the mechanism¡¦s successes and failures, in order to find a suitable direction for establishing an oversight mechanism for our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan over the National Security Agency, NSA. First of all, the inceptive backgrounds and historical developments of the CIA and the NSA are introduced. After establishing an understanding of the special backgrounds and developments of the two agencies, the writer, using the Institutional Process Theory, analyzes and discusses how the U.S. Congress¡¦ oversight mechanism over the CIA has progressed, thereby determining the key to the successes and failures of the U.S. Congress¡¦ intelligence oversight mechanism. Having analyzed the intelligence oversight mechanism of the U.S. Congress, the writer brings up suggestions as to how our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan can develop an oversight mechanism over the NSA in the future. Lastly, from these discussions, the writer addresses the contributions, propositions, and limitations of this research and hopes that these research and discussions can assist the Legislative Yuan in institutionalizing a comprehensive intelligence oversight mechanism over the NSA.

This study analyses parliamentary intelligence oversight in South Africa by assessing the understanding of members of the JSCI of its core business, its mission and vision and powers and functions as are stipulated by law. The study locates the JSCI within an international intelligence oversight milieu through a review and evaluation of selected countries’ intelligence oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, international best practice is sought and applicable lessons are drawn for South Africa. The study is bases on a literature review and interviews with members of the JSCI to gather information and draw insights to evaluate and test the propositions in the context of international and national best practice. The propositions, which are supported by the research, are that: · Intelligence oversight in South Africa under the JSCI has hitherto been relatively effective although there is room for improvement. · The JSCI has good relations with the other arms of the state that are responsible for the oversight of Intelligence in South Africa – making parliamentary intelligence oversight, overall, quite effective. · Despite this effectiveness there are legislative gaps and problems pertaining to the modus operandi of the JSCI that need the attention of both the Executive and Legislature and which could be part of a package of legislative reform. The research supported these propositions whilst pointing out that new initiatives need attention if the culture of oversight is to find root. These are the need to widen the scope of accountability to build a culture of accountability among middle and senior management members of the Intelligence structures and secondly the way Parliament resources the JSCI. / Dissertation (M (Political Sciences))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Political Sciences / unrestricted