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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T19:31:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio Lucio Mello Tobias.pdf: 2409705 bytes, checksum: b8ec1976f7df1b5b86f7a9c45b95a29e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-05 / Secretaria da Educação do Estado de São Paulo / The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate the observation and surveillance of the United States over the Brazilian politics by the CIA from 1947 to 1964. Therefore, based on studies about the subject and with access to declassified documents of the period as secret and released by the U.S. government sought also show that the alignment of Brazil Foreign Policy United States was vital to the interests of the hegemonic power in the continent during the early-Cold War / O objetivo desta dissertação é demonstrar a observação e vigilância dos Estados Unidos sobre a política brasileira por intermédio da CIA entre 1947 a 1964. Para isso, com base nos estudos sobre o assunto e com acesso a documentos do período desclassificados como secretos e liberados pelo governo norte-americano buscamos também demonstrar que o alinhamento do Brasil a Política Externa norte-americana era vital para os interesses da potência hegemônica no continente durante o início da Guerra-Fria

My thesis looks into the events leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In particular I investigate the intelligence regarding the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and how that intelligence was interpreted by the Bush administration. Furthermore, I look at how the case for war was presented by the Bush administration to the rest of the world and whether or not the administration’s reasoning was justified. In conclusion I assess the underlying motive for the war in Iraq and whether or not it was in the best interest of the United States of America.

Abstract This thesis focuses on the oversight mechanism used by congress to supervise the intelligence department, mainly through examining the historical development of the oversight mechanism that the U.S. Congress uses over the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, as well as evaluating the mechanism¡¦s successes and failures, in order to find a suitable direction for establishing an oversight mechanism for our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan over the National Security Agency, NSA. First of all, the inceptive backgrounds and historical developments of the CIA and the NSA are introduced. After establishing an understanding of the special backgrounds and developments of the two agencies, the writer, using the Institutional Process Theory, analyzes and discusses how the U.S. Congress¡¦ oversight mechanism over the CIA has progressed, thereby determining the key to the successes and failures of the U.S. Congress¡¦ intelligence oversight mechanism. Having analyzed the intelligence oversight mechanism of the U.S. Congress, the writer brings up suggestions as to how our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan can develop an oversight mechanism over the NSA in the future. Lastly, from these discussions, the writer addresses the contributions, propositions, and limitations of this research and hopes that these research and discussions can assist the Legislative Yuan in institutionalizing a comprehensive intelligence oversight mechanism over the NSA.

Bibliographic record SVÍTEK, Filip. Securitizing Culture: Normative Behavior and the US Central Intelligence Agency in the Global War on Terror. Prague, 2016. 82 p. Diploma work (Mgr.) Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of Security Studies. Diploma work supervisor JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. Abstract This monograph attempts to explore the system the intelligence community in the US from a constructivist perspective to understand domestic security policy as applied to international threats. The research questions examine how the US Central Intelligence Agency is able to functionally employ controversial tactics such as coercive interrogations and extrajudicial detention within a society that represents liberal normative democracy - one that in theory should prefer to uphold norms of human rights rather than infringe upon them. There appear to be two main concepts at play: security as an underlying culture (as a product) and security as a subjective act (as a process). Thus, this work will apply concepts of National Security Culture and securitization as product and process, respectively, using interrogations of suspected terrorists as a case example. The underlying results show that norms, rules, and culture of national security, utilized through...

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En 1950, la Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) fut le théâtre d'une profonde réorganisation, trois années seulement après son implantation. L'origine de cette tourmente s'appelait Joe-1, la première bombe atomique soviétique. La victime qui paya le prix pour ce manque d'efficacité fut l’Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). Responsable d'estimer - entre autres - l'avancement de l'Union soviétique en matière d'armement nucléaire, l'ORE fut rapidement démantelé et condamné sans réserve par la communauté américaine du renseignement. Pourtant, l'ORE était un des fleurons des services secrets américains par la qualité de son personnel issu des grandes universités et des prestigieuses académies militaires. Que s'est-il passé? Où l'ORE a-t-il commis une faute? Que savait-il exactement sur le programme atomique soviétique? Quelle était sa perception de la menace stratégique soviétique? Pour répondre à ces questions, il nous faut retourner aux sources et analyser les estimations d'intérêt national (NIE) que l'ORE produisait à un rythme quasi industriel. C'est alors que nous verrons que l'ORE a péché par excès de confiance; par triomphalisme. Pour l'ORE, nul ne pouvait surpasser les Etats-Unis dans sa marche vers le progrès, il se trompa. / When the CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) was dismantled in 1950; many were eager - in the U.S. Intelligence Community - to condemn its performance without reservation. Although many reasons were cited for reorganizing the CIA'S analytical structure, the failure to accurately predict the explosion of Joe-1, the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 was the foremost point. But ORE was the brainchild of highly trained militaries and recognized scholars. It was one of the «state of the art» agencies of the American secret services. What went wrong? What exactly did ORE say about the Soviet atomic energy program9 What evidence was available, and how did ORE make use of this material9 What was ORE's perception of the Soviet nuclear threat9 To answer those questions, we must go back in time, back to the roots of this dilemma that lies in the national interest estimates (NIE), which ORE produced at an industrial rate. It is then that we will see ORE's own mistake, its excessive confidence in the American way of life: its triumphalism. Because for ORE, nothing can surpass America in any domain, time will tell differently. / Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2014

Following the 1959 victory of the Cuban revolution, the United States government along with the CIA and their Cuban émigré allies immediately undertook a campaign of subversion and terrorism against the Cuban revolution. From 1959 until 1963 a clandestine war was waged between supporters of the revolution and the counter-revolutionary organizations backed by Washington. This project is a new synthesis of this little-known story. It is an attempt to shed light on a little known aspect of the conflict between the United States government and the Cuban revolution by bringing together never-before seen primary sources, and utilizing the two distinct and separate historiographies from the U.S. and Cuba, concerning the clandestine struggle. This is the story of Cuba’s resistance to intervention, the organization of the counter- revolution, and finally how the constant defeat of CIA plots by the Cubans forced changes in U.S. strategy concerning intervention in Cuba and in other parts of the developing world that would have far-reaching and long-last effects.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.