The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 addressed the belief that weak analytic tradecraft had been an underlying cause of intelligence failures in the U.S. by requiring the Director of National Intelligence to establish and enforce tradecraft standards throughout the U.S. intelligence community (IC). However, analytic tradecraft-the innate abilities and learned skills of intelligence analysts, combined with the tools and technology needed to conduct analysis-is an understudied and poorly understood concept and a decade later, the frequency of intelligence failures has not improved. Using actor-network theory (ANT) as the foundation, the purpose of this qualitative narrative study was to gain greater clarity regarding the process of intelligence analysis and corresponding tradecraft. Data were collected through 7 semi-structured interviews from a purposely selected sample of U.S intelligence analysts to determine how they understood and navigated the analytic process. These data were inductively coded, and following the tenets of the ANT, the process and actors involved in transforming customer requirements and intelligence information into analytic products and refined collection requirements were identified and mapped. The central finding of this study is that current tradecraft standards address neither the full range of activities taking place nor the complete roster of actors involved in the analytic process. With this knowledge, the U.S. IC may be better positioned to identify specific training and equipment shortfalls, develop tailored reform efforts, and improve intelligence operations, resulting in potential positive social change.

This thesis focuses on whether we can create a categorizational model for foreign intelligence communities and if we can identify factors that will help us predict those foreign intelligence communities' effectiveness in counterterrorism. In order to determine this, the author based one of her main factors on the 1995 Sederberg article that separates counterterrorism models into three main categories: (1) War Model, (2) Criminal Model, and (3) Disease Model. She also relates these models to three of the main geopolitical schools of thought as follows: (1) War Model - Realism, (2) Criminal Model - Liberalism, and (3) Disease Model - Constructivism. The second main factor analyzed here is the centralization of the intelligence community. This clearly affects the consistency of the counterterrorism message being encouraged by the state, as well as the speed with which the Intelligence Community can respond to an emergency situation. The key contributions of this thesis lie in the creation of the comparison model and the subsequent analysis of the six case studies. This model combines and acknowledges theories of counterterrorism effectiveness that have not been previously studied together and is also a useful comparison tool for foreign intelligence agencies without running into many of the same...

As technology advances businesses are being called upon to take an active role in helping protect national security. A variety of different companies and industries within the private sector, which are at the forefront of encryption and hacking technologies, have the option to aid or subvert the intelligence community by sharing breakthrough technology in the interest of helping ensure domestic tranquility. Many industries and companies within the private sector argue that while they are not actively trying to subvert efforts to protect national security it is not in their best interest, or the best interest of their customers, to hand over proprietary technology to the intelligence community through government enforcement of a court order. As a result of the intelligence community's need for assistance from the private sector and the private sectors refusal to provide aid, both parties have turned to the courts for adjudication of the issue. The ensuing legal battle over this question of who is responsible for protecting national security will forever change the relationship between the private sector and intelligence. Has the nature of national security been fundamentally changed as the result of technology and our information society? More specifically, is the intelligence community and other governmental agencies solely responsible for protecting national security? Or, in an age of globalization, has national security become the burden of both public and private actors? The answers to these questions are complex and at the same time straightforward. What was discovered was that while the burden of national security falls to both the public and private sector to an extent. However, it is not the responsibility of the private sector to help protect national security by virtue of providing the intelligence community with proprietary technology or information that could compromise the integrity of a given companies business. Furthermore, the fight to protect national security is important, living in a country that provides certain safety assurances helps businesses grow; but when providing that safety prevents people from living their lives or businesses from operating at their full potential the enemy that the intelligence community is trying to protect us from has already won. In developing the answers to these questions, this paper takes a broad view of the players involved as well as both sides of the legal battle that has already begun. will end with a discussion of the options and opportunities that will be available to both parties as the battle over who should be responsible for helping protect our national security moves forward in the courts.

My thesis looks into the events leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In particular I investigate the intelligence regarding the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and how that intelligence was interpreted by the Bush administration. Furthermore, I look at how the case for war was presented by the Bush administration to the rest of the world and whether or not the administration’s reasoning was justified. In conclusion I assess the underlying motive for the war in Iraq and whether or not it was in the best interest of the United States of America.

Expansion Policies by applying Keynes' key concepts on how market ought to expand or political intervention policies and how it is related to state's political expansion. I refer to it

Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'administration Truman initia plusieurs réformes structurelles d'envergure, parmi lesquelles la réorganisation de ses capacités de renseignement. En créant la CIA en 1947 et la NSA en 1952, le président Harry S. Truman posa les fondations d'une communauté du renseignement qui ne cesserait de se développer à la faveur de la Guerre froide et au-delà. L'institutionnalisation de cette activité protéiforme, impliquant une multitude d'acteurs bureaucratiques, civils et militaires, se heurta à de nombreux obstacles, révélateurs du fonctionnement de l'État américain et de ses traditions démocratiques. À partir d'une vaste quantité d'archives récemment déclassifiées, cette thèse vise à identifier les acteurs et dynamiques intervenus dans la réorganisation du renseignement opérée par l'administration Truman. En corollaire, elle cherche à analyser leur impact sur la constitution d'un appareil de renseignement et sur son fonctionnement entre 1945 et 1953. Tout d'abord, cette étude examine comment la réorganisation du renseignement, qu'il soit stratégique ou électromagnétique, a été influencée par le processus d'unification des forces armées qui a abouti, en 1947, à l'émergence du concept de sécurité nationale. Ensuite, elle démontre comment les principes de coordination et de collégialité, dont est empreint le National Security Act, ont entravé le développement d'un appareil de renseignement intégré et cohérent. Enfin, cette thèse explique en quoi la dégradation de la situation internationale, symbolisée par le déclenchement de la guerre de Corée en 1950, a favorisé une ébauche de rationalisation de la gestion des activités de renseignement. / In the wake of World War II, the Truman Administration initiated several high-scale institutional reforms which included an overhaul of its intelligence capabilities. By establishing the CIA in 1947 and the NSA in 1952, President Harry S. Truman laid the foundations of an intelligence community that would grow throughout the Cold War and beyond. The institutionalization of intelligence, which involved many bureaucratic players, both civilian and military, faced numerous hurddles highlighting the inner workings of the U.S. state apparatus as well as American democratic traditions. Based on a large amount of recently declassified archival material, this dissertation aims to identify the players and dynamics involved in the reorganization carried out by the Truman Administration. It also seeks to assess their impact on the formation of an intelligence apparatus and on how it operated from 1945 to 1953. Firstly, this study illustrates how the intelligence overhaul was influenced by the unification of the armed forces which lead to the emergence of the national security concept in 1947. It then shows how the principles of coordination and collective decision-making implied by the National Security Act hampered the development of an integrated intelligence apparatus. Lastly, it explains how the deteriorating international situation, symbolized by the start of the Korean War in 1950, prompted an uneven streamlining of intelligence activities.

The dissertation aims to examine the intelligence coordination mechanisms in the US and UK with a view to comparing them and identifying similarities and differences between them. To achieve this aim, the study provides a conceptual framework of intelligence as a system and explains the rationale for coordination between the respective intelligence services. The study analyses the coordination mechanisms which existed in the US and UK prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks and the Second Gulf War. The study examines the findings and recommendations of inquiries in both the UK and US that followed these events. This is followed by an analysis of the measures that were introduced after these events in order to strengthen and improve intelligence coordinating mechanisms in the US and UK. The study highlights the need for centralised intelligence coordination systems, and illustrates that coordination is required to ensure that intelligence services function as a unified intelligence community. The study concludes that the nature of twenty-first century threats demands that intelligence communities improve coordination, which entails a shift from decentralised services toward a centralised, unified intelligence community. Copyright / Dissertation (MSS)--University of Pretoria, 2008. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

Diploma thesis "U.S. Homeland Security: Reality or Myth? Domestic Counterterrorism post-9/11" examines the change in U.S. domestic counterterrorism policy after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. More specifically, it focuses on the U.S. government's reorganization, which led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. As outlined in this thesis, the homeland security agenda was aimed at unifying the U.S. efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. This thesis sets out to answer two interconnected questions: (1) whether the proposed homeland security agenda led to an efficient and unified system of U.S. domestic counterterrorism measures based on enhanced information sharing; and (2) why, in spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 attacks, a comprehensive reorganization of the U.S. government to create a coherent homeland security agenda did not materialize. Throughout this thesis, it is argued that an efficient U.S. government reorganization was obstructed by three main factors. First, the change was obstructed by the organizational nature of the government agencies. Second, the reorganization was hindered by the "rational choices" of the U.S....

Countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development have experienced a decline in citizens' trust in government in the last few decades. In response, public administration shifted from traditional public administration to New Public Management (NPM) with the goal of increasing trust in government by trying to make government more responsive, work better, and cost less. An important element of NPM is the reliance on managerialism's application of private sector solutions such as performance management whose assumed strength is that it can deliver on efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. An underlining basis of private sector imports into the public sector environment is that they are based on universalism – the existence of general laws irrespective of the situation or circumstance. Often, referred to as a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. However, after a few decades of implementing performance management based on universalistic principles the evidence suggests that performance management has not fully met expectations. Contrasting universalism is particularism - meaning that different rules and applications will depend on the situation, in other words, context matters. In short, 'no best way'. To explore the universalism vs particularism debate, this research uses the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) which is a Canadian government's long-standing performance management tool. The MAF serves as a proxy for a one-size-fits-all approach to performance management. With regards to particularism, this research employs a contingency approach as the theoretical basis to explore performance management. The contingency approach is premised on three core concepts: external contingent factors, internal contingent factors, and fit. The Canadian Intelligence Community (IC) is used as the case study to explore the primary question of whether a universalism-based or a particularism-based approach is better suited for performance management in the public sector? In seeking an answer to this question, two additional sub-questions are explored. First, what makes the IC different from the other policy domains? Second, what is the fit between the MAF and the IC's contingent factors? To answer these questions, data collection consisted of content analysis of documents as well as interviews with senior officials. Findings from this exploratory study reveal that universalism-based approaches to performance management should at the very least be complemented by particularism considerations. The IC was found to be different from other policy domains in terms of both external and internal contingent factors. The former consists of the threat environment, the legislative framework, and the external expectations of the IC. The latter consists of the intelligence process, the intelligence product, intelligence and secrecy, and the IC as a high reliability organization. It was found that there was more misfit than fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors. In exploring these questions, this research contributes concurrently to the public administration and intelligence studies literature in a number of ways. For instance, evidence that universalism-based approach to performance management does not always deliver what it promises, being able to intersect intelligence studies and public administration which is currently lacking, examining the 'hidden' parts of the public sector (i.e., the IC) that tends to be ignored in public administration, peering into the 'black box' of public sector organizations' management tools, the exploration of how practitioners use management tools, analyzing public sector organizations operating in a complex environment, adding to a limited non-historical contemporary Canadian IC literature, looking at the IC's performance-related issues that goes beyond the overwhelming intelligence failure literature. In addition to contributing to knowledge, the research highlights the importance of performance management and intelligence in relation to society.

In the wake of the misbegotten US invasion of Iraq in 2003, we have to acknowledge that there are critical flaws in how our intelligence community (the CIA and its “sister-agencies”) produces knowledge. Instead of arguing that the intelligence community acted in bad faith, or that the mistaken pre-war intelligence was a “perfect storm” of bad luck, as others have, this dissertation argues that the intelligence community’s rhetorical culture led it into fatally flawed epistemological practices, demonstrated most dramatically in the mistaken pre-invasion allegations of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. Chapter one explains the problematic assumptions behind the question of whether or not the intelligence community overtly politicized its pre-war intelligence estimates. In chapter two, the intelligence community’s theories of language are explored. Chapter three addresses how the intelligence community teaches and practices writing. The intelligence community’s inflexible commitment to writing in a “clear” prose style proves problematic when that clarity belies the uncertainty of its estimates. The fourth and final chapter addresses issues of disciplinarity in the intelligence community, explores the possibility of a rhetorical theory of intelligence, and offers conclusions. / text