Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'administration Truman initia plusieurs réformes structurelles d'envergure, parmi lesquelles la réorganisation de ses capacités de renseignement. En créant la CIA en 1947 et la NSA en 1952, le président Harry S. Truman posa les fondations d'une communauté du renseignement qui ne cesserait de se développer à la faveur de la Guerre froide et au-delà. L'institutionnalisation de cette activité protéiforme, impliquant une multitude d'acteurs bureaucratiques, civils et militaires, se heurta à de nombreux obstacles, révélateurs du fonctionnement de l'État américain et de ses traditions démocratiques. À partir d'une vaste quantité d'archives récemment déclassifiées, cette thèse vise à identifier les acteurs et dynamiques intervenus dans la réorganisation du renseignement opérée par l'administration Truman. En corollaire, elle cherche à analyser leur impact sur la constitution d'un appareil de renseignement et sur son fonctionnement entre 1945 et 1953. Tout d'abord, cette étude examine comment la réorganisation du renseignement, qu'il soit stratégique ou électromagnétique, a été influencée par le processus d'unification des forces armées qui a abouti, en 1947, à l'émergence du concept de sécurité nationale. Ensuite, elle démontre comment les principes de coordination et de collégialité, dont est empreint le National Security Act, ont entravé le développement d'un appareil de renseignement intégré et cohérent. Enfin, cette thèse explique en quoi la dégradation de la situation internationale, symbolisée par le déclenchement de la guerre de Corée en 1950, a favorisé une ébauche de rationalisation de la gestion des activités de renseignement. / In the wake of World War II, the Truman Administration initiated several high-scale institutional reforms which included an overhaul of its intelligence capabilities. By establishing the CIA in 1947 and the NSA in 1952, President Harry S. Truman laid the foundations of an intelligence community that would grow throughout the Cold War and beyond. The institutionalization of intelligence, which involved many bureaucratic players, both civilian and military, faced numerous hurddles highlighting the inner workings of the U.S. state apparatus as well as American democratic traditions. Based on a large amount of recently declassified archival material, this dissertation aims to identify the players and dynamics involved in the reorganization carried out by the Truman Administration. It also seeks to assess their impact on the formation of an intelligence apparatus and on how it operated from 1945 to 1953. Firstly, this study illustrates how the intelligence overhaul was influenced by the unification of the armed forces which lead to the emergence of the national security concept in 1947. It then shows how the principles of coordination and collective decision-making implied by the National Security Act hampered the development of an integrated intelligence apparatus. Lastly, it explains how the deteriorating international situation, symbolized by the start of the Korean War in 1950, prompted an uneven streamlining of intelligence activities.

Signalspaning har sedan länge varit en förmåga som Sverige genomfört och under kalla kriget blev det klart att ge-nomförandet av dessa uppdrag inte var helt ofarliga. Med hänsyn till att det nuvarande systemet är påväg att bli äldre bör en planering av ett ersättande system vara lämpligt att genomföra i närtid.Syftet med föreliggande Studie är att genom en systemanalys kunna finna en lämplig ersättare till den nuvarande plattformen för signalspaning, Gulfstream GIV-SP. Det system som har använts som jämförande plattform är den obemannade plattformen Global Hawk vilket är en toppmodern farkost framtagen av USA som en strategisk UAV. Plattformarna har för att få relevans jämförts emot de grundläggande förmågorna Underrättelse/Information, Uthållig-het samt Skydd vilket medför att prestandan kopplas till dessa.Resultatet av uppsatsen påvisar att prestandamässigt kopplat mot de grundläggande förmågorna så är Global Hawk bättre än det nuvarande systemet och de skillnader som en UAV medför är positiva. Vad gäller just underrättelse så är systemen relativt lika potenta men när det gäller uthållighet och skydd är den obemannade plattformen framstående.Slutsatsen av studien är att Global Hawk just nu är en plattform som kostnad sett är för dyr för det svenska försvaret och är på så sätt inte aktuell i närtid. Dock bör det beaktas som ett möjligt ersättande system i framtiden då under-hållskostnader sjunkit och användarantalet på systemet har ökat. Global Hawk har en prestanda som är mycket god kopplat mot de grundläggande förmågorna vilket är en framgångsfaktor vid anskaffning av system. / Signal intelligence (SIGINT) has since a period of time been a part of the Swedish armed forces ability and during the Cold War due to events this was not a safe and easy task to perform. Considering that the present system is beginning to become outdated, a plan to replace this system should be at its place in a short amount of time.The purpose with this study is, by using a system analysis method, find a suitable replacer for the present platform which is Gulfstream GIV-SP, carrying signal intelligence equipment. The comparative platform that has been used in this study is the Global Hawk which is a modern strategic UAV. The two platforms that are compared have been linked to the theory of the basic capabilities, the theory is delimited to Intelligence/Information, Endurance and Protection which the performance of the platforms creates.The study result in a conclusion that the Global Hawk fulfills this basic capabilities with most efficiency and the differences of an unmanned platform is positive. In terms of intelligence the platforms is rather equal and causes advantages in their own different ways but in terms of endurance and protection the Global Hawk is more efficient.The study´s conclusion is that the Global Hawk is the more efficient platform for carrying signal intelligence equip-ment but due to the high cost of the system, it is not suitable for the Swedish armed forces. However, it should be considered as a possible replacement platform in the future, as the maintenance cost decreased and the number of user has increased.

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 20-23, 2003 / Riviera Hotel and Convention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada / Disk Recorders now represent a high performance, low cost and reliable alternative to traditional tape recorders for a wide range of platform data recording applications. This paper discusses the latest advances in disk-based recording technology in the context of multi-channel Telemetry applications, showing the degree of flexibility that is now possible in terms of both channel count and the ability to record synchronous and asynchronous digital data streams alongside multiple wideband analog channels. The techniques described are equally applicable to Acoustic, SIGINT and Telecommunications data capture and analysis applications aboard static, airborne and maritime platforms. Topics covered include how new disk-based data capture technologies have been able to extend bandwidth, storage capacity, signal fidelity and the overall capability of mission recorders. Advanced operational issues, including true ‘read-after-write’, data security, portability and archiving, enhanced data management and analysis strategies are also covered. The Paper includes detailed test results from COTS Disk Recorders already in service as well as an informative Road Map for this exciting new technology.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.