This dissertation consists of three essays exploring the labor market in Major League Baseball (MLB), as well as the negotiation environment for arbitration eligible players. Chapter 1 will show that the distribution of individual labor productivity has a significant effect on overall firm output. Results indicate that a firm with heterogeneous workers should consider not only the sum of individual contributions, but also how individual contributions are allocated, as increased concentration reduces overall output. Traditionally, salary dispersion acts as a proxy for ability dispersion. Past literature indicates that workers respond to disparity, though the literature is conflicting as to the direction of this response. In all cases, however, using salary as a proxy for worker production over-simplifies the firm's decision-making process. This chapter uses data from MLB to measure productivity concentration directly, independent of wage concentration. If workers act as complements to one another then the concentration of productivity will influence overall output in a way that is unrelated to the distribution of salaries. This analysis allows for workers’ behavioral response to wage, and the productivity effects of heterogeneous individual production levels, to be evaluated separately. The analysis could extend to any industry in which workers act as a team contributing a portion of a final product. These findings are particularly useful for industries, like MLB, in which varying degrees of monopsonistic power make wage a poor proxy for productivity.\\ Chapter 2 discusses Final Offer Interest Arbitration (FOA), a bargaining mechanism designed to promote private negotiation and, when necessary, resolve a negotiation impasse without a work stoppage. If parties cannot settle on mutually acceptable terms, they bring their proposed terms to an arbitrator. The arbitrator then rules in favor of one party. In a Final Offer system, the winning party's terms become the binding terms of the agreement. In order for FOA to be an effective mechanism, it should promote bargaining, meaning it is used relatively infrequently and, when used, its outcomes should resemble privately negotiated terms. Traditionally, both parties are given equal power to select the arbitrator who will hear the case. This veto power during the selection process should weed out any calculable or predicable favoring of one party over another, so an FOA system should not yield significantly different settlements from those that do not go to arbitration and are instead privately negotiated. This chapter explores the use of FOA in Major League Baseball. Different players face arbitration eligibility at points during their career, allowing for a side-by-side view of settlements with and without an FOA mechanism. Results indicate that FOA has succeeded in promoting bargaining, but that a bias against players lingers even as uncertainty dwindles. Chapter 3 is meant to complement chapter 2 by further exploring FOA. Arbitrators must maintain a degree of unpredictability in order to promote private negotiation. However, they also must be predictable enough that parties expect a "high-quality" ruling, meaning the outcome falls within a range that parties believe reflects privately negotiated decisions. I use data from Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to explore the way teams learn from past decisions to reduce uncertainty surrounding arbitrator decisions. / Economics

South Africa has been experiencing a number of violent strikes by trade unions in recent times. The issue is not only to hold unions liable for damage caused during strikes, but also to reduce the number of violent strikes. This study investigates if victims of such violence can hold trade unions liable for the violent acts committed by their members during industrial action. The Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (LRA) makes provision for the dismissal of employees who commit misconduct during an unprotected strike. It also provides the remedy of an interdict and a claim for just and equitable compensation which can be made against the union, during an unprotected strike. It is further possible to hold the union together with its members liable for damages in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 205 of 1993 (RGA). The study argues that a strike or conduct in furtherance of a strike that becomes violent could lose protection and the trade union should consequently be held liable, in terms of the LRA and/ or the RGA, for damages caused by its members. This study investigates the position in Canada, Botswana and Australia to determine if there could be any other basis upon which to hold trade union liable for the conduct of its members. The study recommends that the common law doctrine of vicarious liability should be developed by the courts to allow trade unions to be held liable for damages caused by members during violent industrial action. Policy considerations and changing economic conditions and the nature of strikes in the Republic favours the expansion of the doctrine of vicarious liability to trade union member relationship. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.