This study examines the price reaction to the announcements of joint venture and strategic alliance formation, the main determinants of the partnering firm's choices to enter a specific joint venture and a specific strategic alliance, and the impact of such alliance formation on partnering firms' valuation. The analysis of the price reaction at the announcement of alliance formation indicates that market can distinguish between value creating and non-value creating alliances. I also provide evidence supporting the argument that alliance formation is not a random process. A firm's choice of entering an alliance designed as diversifying or non-diversifying strategy is a result of a complex interaction of external factors and internal needs. Finally, using the change in excess value from the year prior to the year following the alliance formation, I document that alliance formation negatively impacts the valuation of the single segment partnering firms relative to their industry peers, and has no impact on the valuation of multiple segment firms. Thus, single segment firms entering alliances are facing the trade-off between the longterm benefit provided by the alliance and the immediate costs affecting the activity developed in the house.

The purpose of this research is to explore the motivation of business group firms to adopt pyramidal ownership structures. The traditional approach claims that pyramids are useful in tunneling resources to other affiliates by transferring value to firms with high cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Using a unique dataset of 7,180 Ecuadorian firms, I analyze the transmission of profits' shocks among group firms to assess the existence and the amount of tunneling. The comprehensive ownership information allows me to identify pyramidal and horizontally owned group firms separately and better understand the nature of their ownership structure. The results provide support for the existence of tunneling in Ecuadorian business groups. About 70% of the profits of the average group firm are transferred to another affiliate, although only half of this money shows up on its books. An alternative explanation for the flow of money among group firms is the existence of internal capital markets to substitute for imperfections in the external market. I test this hypothesis by comparing the impact of cash flow availability in the investment decision of group firms with that of stand-alone firms. Group firms' cash flow to investment sensitivity appears to be only half of the value for comparable standalone firms. Moreover, group liquidity is also a determinant of the average group firm's investment, especially for pyramidal firms. The analysis sheds light on the nature of business groups in Latin America, their ownership patterns, and their resource allocation decisions.

This paper investigates the impact of diversification and the financial crisis on firm performance in India.The dataset of this paper is focused on Indian publicly listed firms between 2006 and 2012. By analyzingaccounting-based and market-based measures of firm performance, this study tries to explain the factorsthat influences the costs and benefits of diversified firms compared to non-diversified firms. This studyfound that diversified firms have on average a higher firm performance than non-diversified firms.During the global financial crisis, the performance of both diversified and non-diversified firms in Indiadeteriorated caused by a meltdown of global economic activities. This study does not find evidence thatdiversified firms perform relatively better than non-diversified firms during crisis times. Diversification isexpected to be more beneficial in the absence of well-developed and integrated capital markets due theeffects of “more money” and “smarter money”, arising from an increased efficiency of the internalcapital market. The analysis gives an impression that the total number of diversified firms increased afterthe crisis.

This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover from an internal capital allocation perspective. We test whether new CEOs make different divisional investment decisions than their predecessors, and if yes, how would this difference affect firm performance. We find that segment investments respond to factors, such as segment investment opportunity, segment cash flow, and other segments’ cash flows, differently after CEO turnover. Evidence also indicates that new CEOs adjust the segments’ previous over-investment /under-investment status to match industry average investment level, and they adjust the relative investment preference among divisions. These findings support the argument that different CEOs have their own set of skills and incentives, which directly affect their internal capital allocation decisions after they take over the office. We also examine the affiliation relationship between certain divisions and new CEOs, and find that new CEOs do not make capital allocation in favor their affiliated divisions. Furthermore, the analyses on firm-level internal capital allocation sensitivity do not support the literature about positive relationship between firm performance and the “Q-sensitivity”. But, our analyses do find a positive and robust relationship between changes in firm performance and changes in the “cash flow-sensitivity”. This suggests that new CEOs making internal capital allocation in favor of their “cash cow” segments are more likely to improve firm performance after CEO turnover.

Corporate investment decisions are among the most important decisions of a firm. Internal capital markets play a key role in facilitating the allocation of capital resources in order to finance investment projects within diversified firms. This thesis investigates internal capital markets and its relationship with analysts earnings forecast errors in three countries with two distinct financial systems, namely, the market-based and bank-based financial system. Using segment level data for public listed companies in the UK, France and Germany between 2005 and 2010, we examine the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets in market- and bank-based systems. We also examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on internal capital markets and analysts earnings forecasts errors, namely, the accuracy, bias and dispersion. The findings indicate internal capital markets actively facilitate the allocation of resources within diversified firms and, in general, operate inefficiently. Furthermore, internal capital markets appear to be more active in France compared with the UK. On the other hand, their role appears to be limited in Germany, as segments appear to rely more on their own resources and less on internal capital markets for investments. In addition, we find that internal capital market activity declines and efficiency improves during the financial crisis in UK. In contrast, there is no significant evidence to suggest that efficiency improves during the crisis in France or Germany. This research also finds some evidence to suggest internal capital markets operations aggravate firm complexity and, in turn, negatively affect short-term forecast accuracy in the UK. In addition to this, our analysis shows there is a positive relationship between the size of internal capital markets and dispersion in analysts earnings forecasts. In general, our study shows analysts are optimistic about firms future performance; however, the level of optimism significantly declines during the financial crisis. Lastly, we report a positive relationship between efficiency of internal capital markets and optimism in earnings forecasts.

Cross-border M&A’s have been gaining momentum in the past decades. As growth opportunities are becoming scarce, more and more multinational corporations seek their expansion opportunities across the border through M&A’s. Whether these cross-border M&A’s add value has been a heavily debated topic. This research takes a value adding perspective by showing the effect of financial market development and capital dependence on the abnormal returns of acquiring firms from the US. Our results show that the effects of financial development and capital dependence are statistically significant, but their financial significance is small.

This dissertation consists of two studies related to internal capital markets and bank relationship using Japanese corporate spin-offs. The first study analyzes the relation between internal capital markets and banks by examining 137 Japanese corporate spin-offs created between the years 2001 and 2003 (since the establishment of new spin-offs law in 2001). In a univariate analysis, we find significant positive average cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements, market-adjusted excess returns after the spin-offs, an increase of the Herfindahl index, and a reduction in the diversification discount after the spin-offs. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that bank-related governance variables such as the keiretsu-affiliation indicator, bank loan to total asset ratio, main bank ownership, and indicator variable of the existence of a bank-appointed director on the board indicator variables are significantly positively related to cumulative average abnormal returns around the announcements, market-adjusted excess returns after the spin-offs, an increase in focus of firms in terms of the Herfindahl index, and a reduction in the diversification discount. Therefore, we conclude that there is a significant relationship between internal capital markets and banks in Japan; after the internal capital market reorganization through spin-offs the closer relationship with banks creates shareholder wealth and increases the focus of firms. This paper is now co-authored with Professor Yoon K. Choi. The second study analyzes the investment policy changes in internal capital markets and the effect of banks' monitoring on the investment changes using Japanese corporate spin-offs, including merger-facilitated spin-offs within conglomerates. We find that investment sensitivity increases significantly after internal restructuring through spin-offs, consistent with Gertner et al. (2002). Furthermore, our results show that bank-related spin-offs' investments are more sensitive to investment opportunities, Tobin's Q, after being spun off. This suggests that the efficiency of Japanese internal capital markets has increased through spin-offs after the financial deregulation in 2001. We conclude that banks seem to play significant monitoring roles in internal capital markets to increase the investment efficiency after spin-offs. This paper is now co-authored with Professor Yoon K. Choi.

Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration using a large sample of vertical takeovers. The efficiency rationale posits that vertical integration prevents future holdup between non-integrated suppliers and customers. In contrast, the foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration harms competition. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the wealth effects of the merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of vertical takeovers. Our univariate and cross-sectional results suggest that firms alter their vertical boundaries in a manner that is consistent with the efficiency rationale. Our tests do not find evidence supportive of the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration. Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital Markets In this paper, we investigate the determinants of vertical relatedness between business segments of multi-segment firms and how vertical relatedness affects the internal allocation of capital. Consistent with theory, we observe a higher degree of vertical relatedness between segments in environments likely to involve contracting problems. Further, there is a greater tendency for investments to flow towards segments with better investment opportunities as the degree of vertical relatedness between business segments in the firm increases. This indicates that internal capital markets function better in the presence of significant vertical relatedness between segments. This finding supports the Stein (1997) model, which suggests that the headquarters is able to do a better job of “winner-picking” when firms operate in related lines of businesses.

Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T13:48:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2198.pdf: 307779 bytes, checksum: 8c8e01407b3636642a4278a44d141667 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-08-11 / We have presented in this paper the importance and effects of internal capital markets, and the consequences of its application. In order to do it, we applied a basic model of internal capital markets, a ssessing its successes and failures. As an example, the model was used in a scenario of application of resources among divisions of a small diversified company, and the damage it suffered due to the incorrect applications of these resources. Afterwards, we have identified models that, when applied to situations where internal capital markets did not work, were capable of showing the reasons, indicating possible interferences and constraints. Finally, we have applied a model that allows the identification of inefficient resource transfer when it goes to divisions with poor investment opportunities. / Procuramos apresentar neste trabalho a importância e os efeitos dos mercados internos de capitais, e as conseqüências quando da sua aplicação. Para isso, aplicamos inicialmente um modelo básico de mercados internos de capitais, avaliando os pontos atingidos e algumas idéias não abrangidas por ele. Exemplificamos com uma situação de aplicação de recursos entre divisões de uma pequena empresa diversificada e seu fracasso devido à má alocação desses recursos. Na seqüência, identificamos modelos que, quando aplicados às situações em que os mercados internos de capitais não funcionaram, foram capazes de apontar o porquê, indicando possíveis interferências e impedimentos. Por fim, aplicamos um modelo que permite comprovar a ineficiência na transferência de recursos quando esses vão na direção das divisões com as piores oportunidades de investimento.

The first part of the dissertation examines whether M&As are related to internal capital markets by analyzing the changes in internal capital market utilization following M&As in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry during the period 2000-2015. The results suggest that both acquiring insurers and targets increase internal reinsurance and undergo more intragroup capital transactions after the M&A. The probit analysis provides evidence that insurers with low internal capital market utilization via reinsurance are more likely to engage in M&As as an acquirer or a target. This indicates that acquiring insurers with small internal capital markets have an incentive in making acquisitions to expand their internal capital markets. This study finds empirical evidence that internal capital market use is one of the determinants of M&As by utilizing internal transaction data of U.S. property-liability insurers. The second part of the dissertation investigates the relationship between executive compensation and internal capital market efficiency in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry for the period 2000-2015. The results indicate that executive compensation has a significant and positive influence on the efficiency of internal capital allocation. An executive’s incentive for efficient internal capital allocation is different depending on the type of compensation, the size of internal capital markets, and external events such as the global financial crisis. These findings are robust to corrections for potential endogeneity bias. I also find evidence of a non-linear relationship between efficiency and the size of internal capital markets. Internal capital markets should continue to expand as long as the benefit of relaxing credit constraints is greater than the cost of managing larger internal capital markets. Overall, the result of the study is consistent with the view that better alignment of executive incentives with shareholder interests leads to efficient internal capital allocation. / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance