Thesis (M.A.)--Villanova University, 2006. / Political Science Dept. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-141).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 361-380). Also available on the Internet.

A classification of the negotiating tactics used by Russian diplomats has been a facet of Soviet diplomatic behavior which has been relatively ignored. A survey of Western writings on Soviet negotiating behavior indicates that Russian diplomats employ a wide range of bargaining tactics in attempts to gain concessions from Western negotiators. These various bargaining methods have been classified in this paper as to the type of maneuver they represent. There are four discernible Soviet negotiating maneuvers. The first maneuver is comprised of tactics designed to turn a conference or part thereof into a forum for Russian propaganda. Of all the tactics employed those related to propaganda are found most frequently in negotiations primarily because of the relative ease with which they can be utilized. While some propaganda tactics are straightforward, such as slogans and epithets, others are subtle such as the use of general rather than specific terms. The second Russian maneuver contains a large number of tactics designed to obstruct negotiations. A common aspect of Soviet diplomatic behavior has been the skillful use of delaying tactics so that negotiations either drag on or collapse. The Russians use obstructionist tactics frequently to prevent a decision on a proposal which they believe will be inimical to Soviet interests. They also use it to stall for time so that a new policy can be formulated as well as to make the West concede points in order to end Russian delays. The third Soviet maneuver is comprised of offensive tactics designed to obtain as many concessions as possible from the West before an agreement is reached on a particular proposal. Because there are a relatively large number of offensive tactics, for purposes of discussion in this paper, they have been sub-divided into three groups: overt, subtle and those which exploit the inclinations of Western diplomats. The fourth and last group of maneuvers is comprised of Russian duplicity tactics. According to Western observers, the Russians have utilized a number of tactics designed to deceive Western negotiators. The most prominent duplicity tactic has been the feigning of agreements. During the Second World War the Russians entered into many verbal and written agreements largely to demonstrate to the Western allies their co-operative spirit so that lend lease supplies and any post-war territorial gains promised by the West would not be jeopardized. Before the end of the war the Russians stalled on implementing most agreements but as soon as the war finished and lend lease supplies stopped, Soviet violations of agreements and treaties occurred frequently. However, since Khrushchev enunciated the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in 1956, the Russians have used duplicity tactics less frequently although they have demonstrated as recently as the Cuban missile incident in 1962, that if the stakes are high enough they will resort to deception to gain an advantage. According to Western observers, the Russian diplomat is more a specialized messenger or a mechanical mouthpiece than a diplomat in the traditional sense. The Western diplomat can comment extemporaneously on proposals and can advise his government on policy whereas his Soviet counterpart cannot. When Western descriptions of their own diplomats are compared with their descriptions of Soviet diplomats it becomes apparent that many Western observers have black and white conceptions with respect to the differences between Russian and Western behavior. Many Westerners see their diplomats as honest, polite, and cooperative whereas they see the Russian diplomat as insincere, rude and intransigent. Negotiations with the Soviet Union since 1945 have left a number of impressions upon Westerners and some of these impressions have crystallized into a number of strongly held beliefs as to how the West should negotiate with the Russians. These four beliefs concern firmness (temporized by prudence), an anti-conciliatory attitude (because the Soviets supposedly look upon conciliation as appeasement), a stress on specific, written agreements, and a belief that relations between states must be based on trust. However, it is suggested that trust is not a reliable ground upon which to base agreements between states. Basing agreements on mutual self-interest rather than trust might offer greater opportunities for East-West settlements. Moreover, a new Western conciliatory attitude combined with shrewdness in the light of Sino-Soviet difficulties might help to improve East-West relations. Historical examples of Soviet negotiating behavior lend support to the beliefs of those Western observers who claim that the Russians use negotiations for more than just a method of resolving disputes and accommodating interests. Indeed, Soviet diplomatic behavior seems to have been generally consistent with Communist ideological beliefs on the role of diplomacy as another method for furthering international communism against "bourgeois" interests. Western diplomats who have negotiated with the Soviets describe Russian tactics fairly specifically, but rarely do they mention any use of their own tactics. The implication is that many Westerners may have a narrow view of the negotiating process. That is, they see the Russians using tactics but not themselves. This dichotomy is incorrect because Westerners utilize negotiating tactics such as those related to propaganda and offensive maneuvers. Two types of maneuvers which the West has not utilized are duplicity and obstruction, neither of which are really related to the bargaining process. When overt acknowledgment of Western tactics occurs, East-West bargaining should not be as difficult, frustrating or disappointing as Westerners claim it now is. All Soviet actions will not be construed as vile once Westerners accept many Soviet tactics as a legitimate part of the bargaining process. Westerners should also consider that the Soviets are probably wary of Western negotiating tactics. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

La réflexion sur le tiers dans le contentieux international a pour origine le constat d’une présence accrue des tiers dans le cadre du règlement juridictionnel des différends internationaux, questionnant la vision traditionnelle du procès international comme étant « la chose des parties ». Le tiers est défini négativement, comme toute entité qui n’est ni l’organe juridictionnel, ni les parties à l’instance. Tout au long de l’étude, il est procédé à une identification plus précise de cette notion à géométrie variable : selon la juridiction considérée et le type de procédure examiné, le tiers est un Etat, une organisation internationale, une personne privée physique ou morale. Dans le cadre d’un corpus de juridictions varié, la place du tiers dans le contentieux international est étudiée, en examinant successivement les aspects relevant de sa protection et de sa participation dans le contentieux international. En filigrane, l’étude appréhende la contribution des tiers au maintien de la paix, dans le cadre du règlement pacifique juridictionnel des différends internationaux. / The reflection on third entities in international litigation comes from the finding of an increased presence of “thirds” in the jurisdictional settlement of international disputes, thus questioning the traditional vision of the international trial as being “the thing of the parties”. The “third” is defined negatively, as any entity that is neither the jurisdiction nor the parties to the proceedings. Throughout the study, a more precise identification of this notion is developed : depending on the jurisdiction in question and the type of procedure examined, third entities are either States, international organizations, private (physical or moral) persons. Within the framework of diverse jurisdictions, the study apprehends the place given to third entities in international litigation, examining successively their protection and their participation. In the background, the study looks at the contribution of third entities to peacekeeping, as part of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

No description available.

The focus of this study is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) preventive diplomacy interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. The core aim of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of the SADC security mechanism (the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in conflict prevention, management and resolution on the basis of the Lesotho experience. Data for this qualitative case study was collected through interviews and document analysis. The twenty four participants for the study were drawn from the SADC OPDS unit, Lesotho political parties, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Academics from the University of Botswana (UB) and the National University of Lesotho (NUL), retired Botswana Defence officers who participated in the Lesotho missions and office of the post-2007election dispute dialogue facilitator in Lesotho. Documents on the SADC Treaties, Protocols, Communiqués and interventions in other set ups were used to highlight its operational policies, mandate, structures, successes and challenges. Lesotho was chosen as a case study because SADC employed both non-coercive (SADC Troika and Eminent Person mediation, 1994 and 2007 respectively) and coercive measures (the 1998 military intervention). The findings of the study revealed that SADC as a regional body had its own successes and challenges. Different perceptions on the SADC interventions in Lesotho emerged mainly between the participants from the ruling party and the opposition parties. While the former commended SADC for successfully mitigating the calamitous effects of 1994, 1998 and 2007 post-electoral violence, the opposition parties viewed the regional organisations as engaged in illegal interference in the domestic affairs of the country to defend the incumbent governing party. It also emerged from the study that the SADC security mechanism has numerous structural and operational flaws. There were several unanswered questions revolving around the legality and mandate of some of the missions. For instance, no concrete evidence emerged as to whether the 1998 military intervention was authorised by the SADC. The study also revealed that SADC has learnt valuable lessons from the Lesotho missions. Some of the reforms which the SADC has introduced in the OPDS such as the establishment of the SADC Stand by Force, Early Warning structures, the Mediation Unit, and a panel of expert mediators emanated mainly from the Lesotho experiences. The study recommends that SADC needs to harmonise the efforts of its OPDS structures such as the Mediation Unit; the Troika; the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Summit of Heads of States and Governments for rapid, coherent and well coordinated interventions in future regional preventive missions. It is also recommended that SADC should focus on identifying and mitigating underlying causal factors such as underdevelopment; poverty; deprivation of freedoms, marginalisation and other forms of social stratifications and oppression in its preventive diplomacy missions if durable peace is to be achieved in Lesotho and any other future cases.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In an otherwise broad literature on civil conflict little attention has so far been paid to actual conflict violence and variation in severity. Existing work is also hampered by a reliance on a ‘closed polity’ model of the state, leading to disregard of the transnational dimensions of internal conflict, and by a dependence on over‐aggregated data. The present inquiry expands on the existing explanatory framework for variation in civil conflict severity by including transnational factors and characteristics of sub‐national actors. Data on conflict battle deaths are combined with recently available data on transnational ethnic linkages, transnational support and neighbouring conflict as well as other actor and country characteristics. Results from ordinary least squares regression analysis indicate that support for rebel groups from external non‐state actors increase conflict severity, while rebel presence in other states is associated with less severe conflicts. In addition, severity increases with duration but with a diminishing marginal return. Internal armed conflicts are less severe in democratic and ethnically polarised countries but rebel territorial control increases the level of violence. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die andersins omvangryke literatuur oor burgerlike konflik is daar tot op hede min aandag geskenk aan werklike konflikgeweld en variasie in felheid (vernietigende omvang). Bestaande werk word ook belemmer omdat dit staat maak op ’n model van die staat as ‘geslote regering’, wat lei tot verontagsaming van die transnasionale dimensies van interne konflik, en staat maak op oor‐geaggregeerde data. Hierdie ondersoek brei uit op die bestaande verklarende raamwerk vir variasie in felheid van burgerlike konflik deur transnasionale faktore en eienskappe van subnasionale deelnemers in te sluit. Data oor konflikgevegsterftes is gekombineer met onlangse data oor transnasionale etniese koppelings, transnasionale steun en naburige konflik, sowel as ander deelnemer‐ en landeienskappe. Resultate van gewone kleinstekwadrate‐regressie‐analise dui daarop dat steun aan rebellegroepe deur eksterne nie‐staatsdeelnemers konflikfelheid laat toeneem, terwyl rebelleteenwoordigheid in ander lande geassosieer word met minder fel konflikte. Felheid neem ook toe saam met duur maar met ’n afnemende marginale opbrengs. Interne gewapende konflikte is minder fel in demokratiese en etnies gepolariseerde lande, maar rebellebeheer oor grondgebied verhoog die vlak van geweld.

Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / This study undertakes to look at the relationship between peace agreements and the violence that follows these agreements. Throughout modern history, there are examples of peace agreements between two warring internal factions that ended in post-conflict violence and in extreme cases, to the end of the peace agreement. It does not necessarily lead to full out war, but can manifest in riots, like Malaysia and criminal violence in South Africa. This study attempts to compare both South Africa and Malaysia by looking specifically at the reasons for post conflict violence. South Africa has faced a growing problem with violent crime after the negotiations of the early 1990’s and its result, the new constitution of 1993, that functioned as the peace agreement. Malaysia moved through several constitutions to arrive at their constitution of 1957 that which viewed as their constitutional agreement. This constitutional agreement went to great lengths to protect the sons of the soil, the bumiputra. The uneasy peace only lasted until 1969, when race riots followed the general elections and left hundreds dead or injured. By studying South Africa and Malaysia and looking at the underlying factors of violence, with special focus on ethnic factors and especially poverty, can we move closer to the underlying causes of post conflict violence. Malaysia tried to address these problems by making constitutional amendments, following the 1969 riots. These amendments were implemented in 1972. Since then the problem of post conflict violence has been addressed to some extent. There are however, still factors of violence that have not been completely eradicated, that might lead to a flaring of violence again one day. The question that this thesis tries to address in the end is, if we need to consider and implement constitutional amendments, like Malaysia, to address our growing problem of post conflict violence. I attempt here to answer this question, comparing the histories of South Africa and Malaysia and the underlying factors of violence to see exactly how similar these states are and if the same solution can work for both.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, December 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.