Diss.--Juristische Fakultät--Universität Heidelberg, 2002. / Mention parallèle de titre ou de responsabilité : The @implementation of UN-economic sanctions by the European Community. Bibliogr. p. 517-571. Index.

This thesis examines the impact of financial liberalisation on the capital structure of non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The research hypotheses have been formulated and tested by using various econometric estimation procedures. The empirical assessment begins by resolving some methodological issues relating to the dating of financial liberalisation and the measurement of leverage. Next, a panel of 100 non-financial firms is constructed for the period 1989 to 2007. The pooled Ordinary Least Squares, fixed (within), and random effects (Generalised Least Squares) models are used to estimate the impact of various aspects of financial liberalisation on firm capital structure. Robustness checks are performed by using the instrumental variable technique and the Arellano and Bond (1991: 277) two-step Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. Irrespective of the procedure used, the lifting of international sanctions and stock market liberalisation is associated with a reduction in leverage for all sets of firms. Capital account liberalisation causes firms to access more debt, and there is mild support for domestic financial sector liberalisation. Stock market liberalisation provides avenues for firms to increase their debt maturity structure. The size of the stock market is positively associated with leverage, and banking sector development is negatively correlated to leverage. The effect of financial liberalisation is more pronounced for larger firms, suggesting that the process of financial liberalisation causes a wedge between small and large firms. Furthermore, regime dummies are interacted with firm specific determinants of capital structure. The notable facts arising out of the interactive dummy variable exercise reveal that the lifting of international sanctions and stock market liberalisation cause significant structural shifts in the profitability, growth and tax rate variables. This is evident for the book and market value of the debt to equity ratio. The results of the dynamic model of capital structure document evidence of transaction costs for both the pre and post liberalisation regime. However, it appears that transaction costs reduce dramatically in the post liberalisation regime. The associated coefficient of adjustment increases accordingly. This suggests that a developed financial system promotes competition amongst the issuers of capital, thereby lowering borrowing and transaction costs. The empirical significance of firm specific determinants in a closed economy appears to be weaker than that of the post liberalised regime. Furthermore, firm size speeds up the adjustment to the target level of leverage for firms operating in both the pre and post liberalisation regimes. Finally, the results confirm most of the theoretical predictions of capital structure theories. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Financial Management / unrestricted

Sanctions within the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy The purpose of my thesis is to analyse the EU sanctions legislation, with the focus on the most problematic part - sanctions against non-state actors relating to the fight against terrorism. Within this objective I also focus on the analysis of relevant case law, in particular the latest developments at the Court of Justice, which has not yet been sufficiently reflected in the literature. The reason for my research is the intriguing development the application of sanctions has gone through in the EU, regarding the case law and the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter One is introductory and defines the term international sanctions and the context of their adoption at the UN level. Chapter Two examines the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is the tool EU uses for the sanctions application. Chapter Three thoroughly analyses the relevant provisions of the primary law. First part of the chapter focuses on the pre-Lisbon legislation for its importance for the EU case law. Second part provides a detailed insight into the primary law provisions after the Lisbon Treaty and focuses on the latest Court of Justice decision concerning the application of articles 75 and 215 SFEU. Chapter...

The diploma thesis deals with implementation of legal framework in fight against financing of terrorism and money-laundering in context of anonymous private financial institutition residing in the Czech Republic. Implementation is exercised on the basis of analysis of internal regulations of the institution, anonymous interviews with Compliance officers and survey of the employees from the branches. The thesis shreds some light on problems regarding implementation and also regarding the knowledge of AML/CFT on the side of employees, who are in daily direct contact with clients. In light of these findings, the thesis suggests need for greater enlightment for these employees.

The text explores the multifaceted role of a compliance officer in the Liechtenstein financial market. Drawing parallels to Forrest Gump's life analogy, the compliance officer's routine is marked by unpredictability, earning them the reputation of either a business killer or an everyday hero. Their primary responsibility is ensuring that their company adheres to legal and regulatory requirements. The compliance officer is a vigilant source of information, staying abreast of law amendments, geopolitical developments, and fraud schemes. They act as a second line of defense, rigorously assessing business profiles and monitoring risks associated with client relationships. Additionally, compliance officers play roles as counselors/psychologists, subject matter experts, protectors, and liaisons with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The text emphasizes their liability for actions or inactions, citing examples of legal repercussions for non-compliance. Despite the challenges, the conclusion depicts compliance officers as everyday heroes contributing to the integrity of the financial industry in Liechtenstein.

Sanctions are one of the ways in which individual states or the international community can enforce their rights and interests. They can vary from banning travel to boycott and embargo affecting the entire country's economy. The sanctions have recently been practiced primarily by the European Union and the United Nations, and by the United States in case of particular countries. The topic of this work is international sanctions against Russia and Iran. Both countries have been in conflict with the international community in recent years, and both countries were punished. In the case of Iran, there were concerns about the use of the Iranian nuclear program for military purposes, the main objective was to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Russia has been the subject of sanctions as a result of violations of international agreements and international law on the basis of the occupation of the Ukrainian Crimea and the development of the military conflict in the East of Ukraine. The thesis describes the reasons, course and impact of sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia, the Iranian and Russian economies and their representatives. At the same time, it seeks to assess the impact of sanctions both in the economic sphere and in terms of changes in the political direction of both countries.

L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel. Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation. / The main argument of our thesis is that a unipolar and non hegemonic structure of the international system furthers collective security. After having shown that the present international structure is as such and having justified our neoliberal theoretical approach, we have adopted the interaction model of the Stackelberg leadership model to demonstrate that a conflicting cooperation between rational States, that are respectful of the international order, is possible, which allows them to overcome their collective action dilemma. This cooperation depends on the existence of shared interests, on the ability of the leader to foster cooperation among them, and on structural conditions as well, which enable the setting up of “a reciprocity strategy”. They, thus, form what we call as a “Stackelberg’s group”. With regard to the periphery follower, or defector, he should adjust to the mutual interest of the group, as defined by this latter, as well as cooperate and negotiate with it, under the pressure of sanctions or the use of force if necessary. In the event of a successful negotiation, a Stackelberg equilibrium, furthered by the leader of the group, that is the unipolar and non hegemonic power, is then reached where cooperation between the members of the group, i.e. the States, allows them to get their share, that is a benefit from their mutual interest. In our case study, the Stackelberg’s group includes the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council plus Germany, all acting under the US leadership. Iran is a periphery follower suspected of defection, and the mutual interest is the international security against WMD proliferation. Our empirical assessment shows that the respective conditions, which enable a reciprocity strategy within the Stackelberg’s group, are then met by its members, whereas those of Iran are still under negotiations.

La « responsabilité de protéger », concept politique adopté en 2005 pour prévenir et mettre fin aux atrocités criminelles, repose sur un premier pilier —l'obligation de l'Etat de protéger ses populations— dont le consensus apparent a conduit à un manque d’analyse institutionnelle dans sa double dimension constitutionnelle comparée et internationale. Or, l’obligation de l’Etat incombe enparticulier au chef d'Etat. Son obligation de protéger est un élément commun de définition de sa fonction, mais aussi un critère essentiel de différenciation —selon que le chef d’Etat relève d’un modèle étatiste, privilégiant la protection de l’Etat quitte à suspendre le droit, ou d’un modèle libéral, privilégiant la protection de la Constitution et la soumission permanente de l’action politique au droit. La thèse analyse d'abord les sources de l'obligation de protéger du chef d’Etat,successivement théorisée, constitutionnalisée et internationalisée, puis l'exécution de cette obligation résultant de prérogatives, d'immunités et de contrôles de la protection. Les sources de l’obligation révèlent que le chef d’Etat, à l’interface des ordres juridiques interne et international, aune obligation spécifique, non réductible à celle de l’Etat ou de l’individu, qui comporte à la fois une dimension négative (ne pas commettre de crimes contre la population) et une dimension positive(empêcher la commission de tels crimes) et dont l’internationalisation permet de combler les lacunes des Constitutions. Si l’exécution par le chef d’Etat de son obligation de protéger, par la mise en oeuvre de ses prérogatives de protection, est soumise à un contrôle croissant, tant politique que juridictionnel, ce processus reste néanmoins inachevé, faute d'une responsabilité politique internationale, systématique et institutionnalisée. La thèse conclut à l’utilité d'une individualisation de la « responsabilité de protéger » et à l’enrichissement de ce concept par le contrôle de l’obligation de protéger du chef d’Etat. / The political concept of the “responsibility to protect” was adopted in 2005 to prevent and p ut anend to criminal atrocities. The apparent consensus over its first pillar, the State’s obligation to protect its populations, has resulted in a lack of institutional analyses regarding its combined comparative constitutional and international aspects. Importantly, the State’s obligation rests in particular with the Head of State. The obligation to protect is common to all heads of state, but it also differentiates among them, depending on whether their obligation is State-oriented (with the aim to protect the State, even if that requires the suspension of the rule of law) or Rule-of-law oriented (with the aim to protect a liberal constitutional order while always subjecting political actionto the rule of law). The thesis begins with an analysis of the sources of law relating to the Head of State’s obligation to protect, as it was successively theorised, constitutionalised and internationalised. It then turns to the execution of this obligation, which derives from the Head of State’s prerogatives, the relevant immunities involved and available institutional review over his orher activities. The study of the sources reveals that the Head of State (at the interface between the domestic and the international legal orders) is bound by a specific obligation, which exceeds the confines of the obligations of either the State or the individual. This obligation is both negative and positive as it requires both not to commit crimes against the population, and to prevent and put an end to such crimes. Its international dimension supplements the missing parts in the Constitutions.The execution of this obligation, by the implementation of the Head of State’s prerogatives, is subject to an increasing political and judicial control. However, this control remains under construction due to a lack of systematic and institutionalized international political responsibility. The thesis concludes that the “responsibility to protect” could be usefully “individualized” and enriched by institutional supervision and judicial review of the Head of State’s obligation to protect.

L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel. Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation. / The main argument of our thesis is that a unipolar and non hegemonic structure of the international system furthers collective security. After having shown that the present international structure is as such and having justified our neoliberal theoretical approach, we have adopted the interaction model of the Stackelberg leadership model to demonstrate that a conflicting cooperation between rational States, that are respectful of the international order, is possible, which allows them to overcome their collective action dilemma. This cooperation depends on the existence of shared interests, on the ability of the leader to foster cooperation among them, and on structural conditions as well, which enable the setting up of “a reciprocity strategy”. They, thus, form what we call as a “Stackelberg’s group”. With regard to the periphery follower, or defector, he should adjust to the mutual interest of the group, as defined by this latter, as well as cooperate and negotiate with it, under the pressure of sanctions or the use of force if necessary. In the event of a successful negotiation, a Stackelberg equilibrium, furthered by the leader of the group, that is the unipolar and non hegemonic power, is then reached where cooperation between the members of the group, i.e. the States, allows them to get their share, that is a benefit from their mutual interest. In our case study, the Stackelberg’s group includes the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council plus Germany, all acting under the US leadership. Iran is a periphery follower suspected of defection, and the mutual interest is the international security against WMD proliferation. Our empirical assessment shows that the respective conditions, which enable a reciprocity strategy within the Stackelberg’s group, are then met by its members, whereas those of Iran are still under negotiations.

This thesis emphasizes the role of political risk in international business by analyzing the impact of political events on the valuation of firms. The guiding question is how governments interfere with the business interests of firms located in their own country as well as with the business interests of firms from other nations, as a consequence of the application of international sanctions. Therefore, the focus is on multi-country and multi-sector effects due to the occurrence of specific sanction events. The empirical methodology is the event-study approach, which analyzes stock market reactions to new information. The research objective is to detect abnormal stock returns across multiple markets and sectors, as a consequence of events related to the imposition of or threat of international sanctions. The empirical model of this thesis differentiates between risk-effects for firms located in the sender country (i.e., the origin of sanctions), for firms located in or specifically related to target countries (i.e., the receiver of sanctions) and firms located in third countries (i.e., countries not directly involved). There are three different cases analyzed: E.U. Economic Sanctions against African countries (2002-2005), the U.S. Steel Tariff (2002) and the Iran Sanctions Act (2007). The cases represent sanctions applied on the nationwide, sector- and firm-specific level. The event studies provide empirical evidence for the existence of political risk-effects due to sector-specific sanctions. Risk-effects are detected for firms in target countries and for firms in the sender country itself. The applied political risk framework describes how political risk affects multinational firm value and explains that it varies among firms. The impact of political risk on a firm's value depends on the risk exposure of a firm's individual business interests to it. This contributes a new perspective on political risk that emphasizes multinational and multi-sectoral effects and underlines that a specific political risk can be relevant for a variety of different international business interests. (author's abstract)