This thesis seeks to provide an account of the role played by ideologies in acts of mass violence against civilians, such as genocides, murderous state repression, war crimes, and other ‘atrocities’. Mass violence of this kind has already received extensive study, with scholars frequently emphasising their belief that ideology is important. Until now, however, discussions of ideology have been held back by a lack of conceptual and theoretical development, leading to narrow portrayals of ideology’s role, vagueness over its relevance, and dubious assumptions about its theoretical implications. This thesis addresses these problems by building a more focused and integrative theoretical framework for analysing the ideological dynamics of atrocities. I engage in an extensive conceptual and methodological discussion, to establish the best way of defining and utilising the concept of ideology. In doing so, I emphasise how ideology can be important even for that majority of atrocity perpetrators who do not meet classic but misleading stereotypes of fanatical killers driven by burning hatred. I then detail my actual account of the ideological dynamics of deadly atrocities, which centres around the identification of six ‘justificatory mechanisms’: dehumanisation, guilt-attribution, threat-construction, deagentification, virtuetalk, and future-bias. These justificatory mechanisms describe sets of ideological processes that recur across different cases of violence against civilians, and which make that violence look permissible or even desirable to those who, in a variety of roles, carry it out. I then substantiate this account through three case studies: of Nazi atrocities, Stalinist oppression, and Allied area bombing in World War II. These cases demonstrate the cross-case applicability of the six justificatory mechanisms, and illustrate how the framework I offer allows us to construct more causally explicit, psychologically plausible, and comprehensive pictures of the way key ideologies feed in to the most destructive campaigns of violence against civilians.

This thesis explores the role of regional powers in the development of regional nuclear regimes. Its central argument is that the devise of regional nuclear regimes through the leadership of regional powers is driven by both functional and strategic reasons. Functionally, regional nuclear institutions serve to provide more tailored solutions to respond to nuclear risks emerging at the local level. Strategically, the formation of sub-global institutions enables regional powers to exercise considerable influence on nuclear governance processes at both regional and global levels. And in situations where regional powers are dissatisfied with the global nuclear-institutional status quo, regional nuclear institution-building provides an incomparable opportunity to question that status quo and challenge, albeit indirectly, the preferences of the United States, their main architect. The type of leadership provided by regional powers in the establishment of regional nuclear regimes is affected dynamically by two relationships: the regional powers' relation with the United States and their relation with secondary regional players. The former relation is defined as 'global nuclear alignment' and refers to the degree of proximity of the regional power towards U.S. nuclear preferences. The latter is defined as 'regional embeddedness' and captures the degree of convergence of regional powers' nuclear preferences with those of its most proxy regional contender, as well as the level of commitment shown by the regional power vis-à-vis regional integration. The thesis argues that when both relations are low, divergence of the regional nuclear regime from global nuclear institutions is most acute. Conversely, when only one of the relations is high, the regional nuclear regime tends to converge with global nuclear institutions, either in goals or in methods. The theoretical framework is applied to investigate three cases of regional leadership as provided by Brazil, Indonesia and France in the establishment of the regional nuclear regimes in their respective regions.

This thesis examines the Greek institution of proxenia and uses it to explore how inter-polis institutions functioned in shaping the behaviour of both individuals and communities in the ancient world. In response to continuing debate concerning the nature of proxenia, I demonstrate that, throughout the Classical and Hellenistic periods, it was defined as an honorific status by the practical intermediary role which it performed in facilitating interactions between different poleis. As such proxenia was a central element of a broader system of inter-polis institutions which constituted the dominant interstate discourse in the ancient Mediterranean. This thesis shows that Proxenia with its particularly rich epigraphic record allows us to explore how poleis made use of this institutional language of status and legitimacy to assert membership of an interstate system which was conceived of as a society of poleis. In Chapter 1 I propose a new model for reconstructing how proxenia was understood based on the expectations – of what proxenoi should be and do – which poleis communicated in their stereotypical descriptions of honorands in proxeny decrees. Chapter 2 then explores how this abstract understanding of proxenia worked in practice in the political realities of elite competition in the Greek poleis. In Chapter 3 I use proxeny lists to reconstruct the perspective of the polis on proxenia – in the networks of hundreds of proxenoi which even small poleis amassed as a result of constant interaction. Chapter 4 explores the role of proxenia, within a broader system of institutions, in the construction of communal identity within an anarchic interstate system. In Chapter 5 I develop quantitative methods to explore the epigraphic record for proxeny’s decline, arguing that proxenia, along with the other inter-polis institutions, disappeared because the Roman authorities at the centre replaced inter-polis connections as the source of communal identity and prestige.

This thesis examines the EU's influence on regional cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mercosur in South America and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) by drawing on concepts from diffusion studies. It argues that conventional perspectives have tended to view different cases of regionalism as independent phenomena reflecting particular structural, institutional or ideational conditions, mainly internal to the respective region itself. I propose instead to conceive of regional organisations as asymmetrically interdependent, in that the EU as the most successful regional grouping in the international system influences other regional organisations in important respects; yet in ways that are ill-captured by the conventional depiction of external influence as a form of coercion. The central question addressed in this thesis is thus: Under what conditions and in what ways does the EU affect the trajectory of formal rules in regional cooperation elsewhere? I advance three main arguments. First, I suggest that given the EU's ideational and material power in global regionalism, it is likely to act as a focal point in debates about regional rule change around which actors' expectations converge when being confronted with an exogenous cooperation problem. This renders EU influence difficult to escape. Second, I argue that there are two dynamics by which EU influence affects outcomes in global regionalism - the EU as switchman and as driver. While the former leads policy-makers to choose EU-type rules instead of similarly viable alternatives given a particular cooperation problem, the latter affects the very incentives for regional rule change and thereby acts as an independent driver of regional cooperation. Third, I argue that, in terms of outcomes, EU influence has been highest in SADC, lower in Mercosur and lowest in ASEAN, mainly reflecting different degrees of material and ideational interdependence between the EU and other regions. Yet, policy-makers' widespread reluctance to share national sovereignty has sharply delineated the boundaries of EU influence in all three regions. I test these arguments across three central areas of regional cooperation: market building, institution building and community building.

This thesis investigates how peace operations work. It contributes to the larger study of peace operation effectiveness by analysing the processes through which these institutions influence local actors in postconflict societies. Looking beyond traditional concerns with mandates and resources, it aims to understand how a peace operation seeks to achieve its goals, focusing on why local populations might cooperate with or obstruct its activities. The thesis draws on theories of social power, compliance and legitimation to answer four central questions: what power do peace operations have to achieve their objectives? From where do peace operations derive power? How do local perceptions of an operation enable or constrain its effectiveness? How are peace operations legitimised at the local level, and with what effect? It begins by critically reviewing the academic literature, arguing that existing approaches are unable to account for important dimensions of peace operation effectiveness because they neglect the local setting in which operations pursue their goals, and the extent to which the achievement of those goals requires local cooperation. It then develops an analytical framework to examine the processes of coercion, inducement and legitimacy through which peace operations seek to shape the decisions and actions of local actors. This power-legitimacy framework is applied to study the effectiveness of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI). By comparing variation in local cooperation between and within these cases, the thesis shows that the way a peace operation is locally perceived is an important but often overlooked determinant of its effectiveness. In particular, when local actors perceive a peace operation to be legitimate, they are more likely to behave in ways that assist the operation to achieve its goals. The thesis concludes by discussing the implications of this finding for the future study and practice of peace operations.

This thesis provides an account of the work of Canadian organizations that took part in the global anti-apartheid movement and then continued political advocacy work in South Africa post-1994. My central research question is: What explains the rise and fall of international solidarity movements? I answer this question by exploring the factors that allowed the Canadian anti-apartheid network to grow into an international solidarity movement and explaining how a change in these factors sent the network into a period of decline post-1994. I use two organizations, the United Church of Canada and CUSO, as case studies for my analysis. I argue that four factors were behind the growth of the Canadian solidarity network: the presence of large CSOs in Canada willing to become involved in solidarity work, the presence of radical spaces in these organizations from which activists could advocate for and carry out solidarity work, the frame resonance of the apartheid issue in Canada and the political incentives the apartheid state provided for South African activists to encourage Northern support. Post-1994 all of these factors shifted in ways that restricted the continuation of international solidarity work with South Africa. Accordingly I argue that the decline of the Canadian network was driven in part by specific South African factors, but was also connected to a more general stifling of the activist work of progressive Canadian CSOs over the 1990s. This reduction of capacity was driven by the ascent of neo-liberal policy in Canada and worldwide. Using examples from a wide swath of cases I outline this process and explain how all four factors drove the growth and decline of Canadian solidarity work towards South Africa.

The EU has, for a long time, portrayed itself as an international leader on climate change. Previous studies have tended to focus on the characteristics of EU leadership, but have failed to examine the extent to which EU leadership generates “followership”. Going beyond these existing approaches, this dissertation analyzes not just EU attempts at leadership but also the response of two potential followers: China and India. Based on extensive fieldwork, the dissertation explains the pattern of EU engagement and the response to engagement in each case, and makes three key arguments. First, EU engagement was driven by a desire to build the international role of the EU, but also from 2000 onwards in particular by growing normative concern and material interest within the EU regarding combating climate change. The development of engagement was also conditioned by the broader development of EU relations with China and India. Second, EU engagement took the form of institutionalized dialogue and capacity-building projects. These were generally more extensive in the EU-China case; the EU-India relationship was significantly more limited. Both cases were characterized by a lack of EU capacity—particularly the EU-India case—and to some extent by inconsistency and incoherence. Third, the Chinese Government responded through limited normative emulation and limited but growing lesson-drawing through bilateral cooperation in specific sectors. While the Indian Government also responded through limited normative emulation, the principal Indian response was resistance. Moreover, both the Chinese and Indian Governments resisted the EU approach to the international climate change negotiations. This pattern of engagement and significant resistance stemmed partly from the EU’s failure to develop sufficient capacity for effective engagement, but also partly due to significant differences in the way each side has framed the issue of climate change. Based on these findings, the dissertation concludes that while the EU was not entirely a leader without followers, it has acted as a highly restricted leader in its relations with China and India on climate change.

This thesis is a study of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. In particular, the thesis explores Chinese policy-makers’ ideas about Japan in the wake of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), and considers how those ideas shaped China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. To do so, the thesis employs a four-part ideas framework that examines Chinese policy-makers’ background, foreground, cognitive and normative ideas about Japan, and shows how the interaction between these four different idea types shaped China’s Japan policy between 1949 and 1965. Furthermore, the thesis draws on over 200 recently declassified Chinese-language archival records from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as well as additional Chinese, Japanese, US and British archival sources. It argues that China’s experience of Japanese imperialism, industrialisation and war during the first half of the twentieth century deeply shaped Chinese ideas about Japan after 1949, though in ways that at first seem counterintuitive. Although Japan had waged a brutal war against China, Chinese policy-makers viewed Japan as an important source of industrial goods, technology and expertise, and a symbol of a modern, industrialised nation-state. However, China’s experience of Japanese imperialism and militaristic aggression often made it difficult to justify the policy of ‘trading with the enemy’. Ultimately, the thesis argues that China sought to expand economic ties with Japan after 1949 because Chinese policy-makers believed that doing so would assist China in becoming a modern and industrialised state, one that was strong enough to withstand foreign imperialism and restore its central position in the international system. Chinese conceptions of Japan thus help to explain how Japan became China’s largest trade partner by 1965, despite the bitter legacy of the War of Resistance and the Cold War divide between the two countries after 1949.

Traditional historiographies of the Cold War Middle East read into Britain's postwar economic decline a corresponding demise of British regional influence. According to these accounts, the Suez Crisis served to teach Britain new limits to its military capabilities, occasioning a break from independent endeavours to project power in the region. However, the case studies presented in this thesis demonstrate that the Suez Crisis did not mark a precipitous turning point in Britain's political influence in the Middle East in the short- to medium-term. Britain's power in the region rested upon not only its material assets, but other less tangible bases as well. Most importantly, Britain's power in the Middle East during the period examined increasingly included its ability to influence the policies of United States – a country with great resources and an emerging presence in the region.

This thesis investigates the place of African states in the international system and seeks to understand what space exists for aid-dependent governments to exercise agency in relations with donors. In exploring these issues I focus on the case of Uganda’s NRM regime which has enjoyed very substantial international support despite its increasingly authoritarian nature, destabilising regional policy and questionable human rights record. The two central questions posed are therefore: ‘why has Uganda benefited from such uncritical international support and what role has the NRM regime itself played in bringing about this situation?’ The thesis also compares Uganda’s experience to those of Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda to demonstrate the broader relevance of these questions. I argue that donors have taken a lenient approach to Uganda because they perceive it as valuable as an economic success story, an ally in the ‘War on Terror’ and a guarantor of regional stability. The study stresses, however, that these perceptions are just that: perceptions. They do not necessarily reflect reality nor are they formed without input from Africa, as some inadvertently suggest. Indeed, the principal contention of this thesis is that these three donor perceptions of Uganda have been actively constructed, moulded, managed and bolstered by Kampala itself in an effort to shore-up international support. Using a variety of ‘image management’ strategies the regime has succeeded in convincing its donors to see it as a valuable ally worth supporting. The same is true of the Rwandan and Ethiopian governments, I suggest, but not of the Kenyan. In doing so, the thesis contends, Kampala has carved out a subtle but substantial degree of agency in relations with donors and this raises important questions for scholars and policy-makers.