Thesis (doctoral) - Universitat, Munchen, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-266). Also available in print.

Cheung, Yang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-89). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Related Works --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- Pricing Mechanisms --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Current Situation --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Proposed Pricing Mechanisms --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Congestion Pricing --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Bandwidth Allocation Mechanism --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2 --- Revenue Distribution Mechanisms --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Current Situation --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Novel Revenue Distribution Mechanisms --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Problems in Revenue Collecting Stage --- p.16 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Desirable Characteristics of Internet Pricing Mechanism --- p.19 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Existing Solution --- p.21 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Applying Insurance into Internet Pricing --- p.22 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Internet Pricing Model --- p.25 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- System Model --- p.25 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Decisions Time Scales --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Micro Time Scale Pricing --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Macro Time Scale Pricing --- p.29 / Chapter 3.3 --- Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.30 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- The Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.32 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Properties of the Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.34 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- How Much Insurance Should a User Buy? --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Numerical Examples --- p.37 / Chapter 3.4 --- Premium Coinsurance Function --- p.40 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Problems of Allowing Pull Insurance --- p.41 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- The Premium Coinsurance Function --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Properties of the premium coinsurance function --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.4 --- Numerical Example --- p.46 / Chapter 4 --- Problems in Revenue Distributing Stage --- p.48 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.50 / Chapter 4.2 --- System Models --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Topology Model --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Traffic Model --- p.54 / Chapter 4.3 --- Settlement Model and Definition of Fair Price --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Bilateral Settlement --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Shapley Settlement --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4 --- Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value: The Symmetric Case --- p.61 / Chapter 4.5 --- Properties of the Fair Prices in the Symmetric Case --- p.65 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Sensitivity to traffic pattern α --- p.65 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- Sensitivity to network topology parame- ters p and d --- p.67 / Chapter 4.6 --- Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value: The Asym- metric Case --- p.70 / Chapter 4.7 --- Distributed and Local Approximation of the Fair Price --- p.71 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusions --- p.74 / Chapter A --- Mathematical Proofs --- p.77 / Chapter A.l --- Mathematical Proof for Chapter 3 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.1 --- Proof of Theorem 3.3.2 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.2 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.5 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.3 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.6 --- p.78 / Chapter A.1.4 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.7 --- p.78 / Chapter A.1.5 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 --- p.79 / Chapter A.1.6 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 --- p.79 / Chapter A.1.7 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.5 --- p.80 / Chapter A.2 --- Mathematical Proof for Chapter 4 --- p.81 / Chapter A.2.1 --- Proof of Theorem 4.4.2 --- p.81 / Chapter A.2.2 --- Proof of Theorem (4.6.1) --- p.83 / Chapter A.2.3 --- Terms Description of Equation (4.1) --- p.84 / Bibliography --- p.85

Thesis (M.S.) -- Central Connecticut State University, 1999. / Thesis advisor: Susan G. Vial. "...in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science [in Art]." Includes bibliographical references (leaf 12).

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 99-102).

Thesis (doctoral) - Universität, München, 2006. / Bibliographical references p. 243-266.

Lam Kong. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-85). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Related Work and Background --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Competition-free Unlimited Capacity Model´ؤOne-hop Case --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- Competition-free Unlimited Capacity Model一Two-hop Case --- p.11 / Chapter 3 --- Extensions to Competition-free Unlimited Capacity Model --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1 --- Optimal Pricing for the One-hop Case under Various Utility Distributions --- p.13 / Chapter 3.2 --- Optimal Pricing for Competition-free Multi-hop Wireless Mesh Networks --- p.16 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Issue on Network Scaling --- p.22 / Chapter 4 --- Competition-free Limited Capacity Model --- p.28 / Chapter 4.1 --- One-hop Case --- p.28 / Chapter 4.2 --- Multi-hop Case --- p.36 / Chapter 5 --- Unlimited Capacity Model with Price Competition --- p.42 / Chapter 5.1 --- Renewed Game Model for Networks with Price Competition --- p.43 / Chapter 5.2 --- Pricing Equilibriums in Different Network Topologies --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Case A: Two Access Points Competing in a One-hop Network --- p.47 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Case B: Two Access Points Competing in a Two-hop Network --- p.51 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Case C: Two Resellers Competing in a Two-hop Network --- p.54 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- Case D: Extending Case A into a Multi-hop Network --- p.60 / Chapter 5.2.5 --- Case E: Extending Case C into a Multi-hop Network. --- p.66 / Chapter 5.2.6 --- The Unified Pricing Equilibrium --- p.68 / Chapter 5.2.7 --- Case F: The Characterizing Multi-hop Network --- p.75 / Chapter 5.3 --- Revisiting the Network Scaling Issue --- p.80 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.82 / Bibliography --- p.84 / Chapter A --- Proof of the PBE for Competition-free Multi-hop Wireless Mesh Networks --- p.86 / Chapter B --- Proof of the Unified Pricing Equilibrium --- p.92

Although the Internet is the dominant broadband network, it still has a fundamental shortcoming in traffic management that does not properly support efficient use of resources together with differentiated quality of service for mixed traffic types. Even though a number of mechanisms have been proposed under key approaches of resource adaptation, resource reservation, and resource pricing, this problem remains unsolved to date because of its complexity and the way it relates to so many considerations of engineering and economics, and the diverse range of services desired by users. Hence it is considered difficult to devise a perfect mechanism that can universally solve this problem. In this respect, this dissertation contributes to insights into potential combinations and trade-offs of key approaches above in some efficient manner for managing traffic and scarce resources in the Internet. The first part of this work considers the combination of relaxed resource reservation and resource pricing schemes for handling the unfair bandwidth distribution problem in soft-bandwidth guarantee services of the Differentiated Services (DiffServ) Internet. We show that this unfairness problem can be handled using a network-user cooperative approach that addresses both individual user satisfaction and global optimization. We propose to add a mechanism based on price-based feedback signaling to DiffServ-capable routers providing Assured Forwarding (AF) Service so that they can offer per-flow signaling. This still allows them to work at an aggregate traffic level, hence the scalability feature of the DiffServ network can be retained. Our proposed mechanism allows the network to offer reliable service assurances via a distributed optimization algorithm, without introducing special protocols or requiring routers to have access of individual user requirements. Moreover, it can provide incentives for users to cooperate so that optimum performance can be accomplished. This approach has broad applicability and is relevant to all types of assured service classes. The second part of this work considers the combination of a specific resource pricing scheme based on a distributed optimization algorithm and multimedia adaptation schemes. Such a capability has not been available because most utility functions of multimedia applications do not meet the concavity constraints required by optimization algorithm. We proposed to overcome this limitation by redefining user utility functions into equivalent discrete forms and using combinatorial (discrete) optimization so that interfacing the resource-pricing scheme can be done in a normal way. However, to obtain feasible solutions in a scalable manner, an agent is included into the scheme for solving the combinatorial (discrete) optimization on behalf of a small group of users. In return, all users belonging to this group can benefit from social welfare maximization of their utilities over a network resource constraint. The last part of this work considers the combination of relaxed resource reservation and resource pricing schemes to enable a proper charging scheme for adaptive applications in the DiffServ Internet. We provide an optimization formulation of the problems of revenue and social welfare maximization, applied at a service provider (SP) who gives access to the DiffServ Internet. In this scheme, resources are provisioned per QoS-oriented class in a long time scale (service level agreement (SLA) duration), then priced based on user demand in the short time scale. We also show that the proposed charging scheme can provide feedback and incentives for users to use the network resource optimally via the standard packet marking, hence eliminating the need for specific pricing protocol. All of the proposals in this work can be used together, solving these key problems as a coordinated whole, and all use readily available network mechanisms.

The Internet consists of thousands of autonomous networks connected together to provide end-to-end reachability. Networks of different sizes, and with different functions and business objectives, interact and co-exist in the evolving "Internet Ecosystem". The Internet ecosystem is highly dynamic, experiencing growth (birth of new networks), rewiring (changes in the connectivity of existing networks), as well as deaths (of existing networks). The dynamics of the Internet ecosystem are determined both by external "environmental" factors (such as the state of the global economy or the popularity of new Internet applications) and the complex incentives and objectives of each network. These dynamics have major implications on how the future Internet will look like. How does the Internet evolve? What is the Internet heading towards, in terms of topological, performance, and economic organization? How do given optimization strategies affect the profitability of different networks? How do these strategies affect the Internet in terms of topology, economics, and performance? In this thesis, we take some steps towards answering the above questions using a combination of measurement and modeling approaches. We first study the evolution of the Autonomous System (AS) topology over the last decade. In particular, we classify ASes and inter-AS links according to their business function, and study separately their evolution over the last 10 years. Next, we focus on enterprise customers and content providers at the edge of the Internet, and propose algorithms for a stub network to choose its upstream providers to maximize its utility (either monetary cost, reliability or performance). Third, we develop a model for interdomain network formation, incorporating the effects of economics, geography, and the provider/peer selections strategies of different types of networks. We use this model to examine the "outcome" of these strategies, in terms of the topology, economics and performance of the resulting internetwork. We also investigate the effect of external factors, such as the nature of the interdomain traffic matrix, customer preferences in provider selection, and pricing/cost structures. Finally, we focus on a recent trend due to the increasing amount of traffic flowing from content providers (who generate content), to access providers (who serve end users). This has led to a tussle between content providers and access providers, who have threatened to prioritize certain types of traffic, or charge content providers directly -- strategies that are viewed as violations of "network neutrality". In our work, we evaluate various pricing and connection strategies that access providers can use to remain profitable without violating network neutrality.

M.Ing. / The development of Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) technologies offers a novel platform for IP-based service resale via Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) that provide high network coverage and lower infrastructure cost. In this IP-based service resale business, the Access Point (AP) providers sets their pricing policies as IP-based service resellers to maximize their profits, while the resale-users (end users of the WMNs) who are price- and quality-of-service (QoS)- sensitive, respond to AP providers’ pricing policies by controlling their usage. This research exploits the efficiency of dynamic pricing by integrating pricing into best effort based WMNs as an economic control tool to optimize the profit of the AP providers and improve the utilization of their limited uplink bandwidth by taking into consideration the resale-users’ price- and QoS- sensitivity. Two cases are presented in this thesis: a monopoly, where a single AP provider aims to maximize its profit while guaranteeing its resale-users with a minimum allocated bandwidth; and a duopoly, where two AP providers compete to maximize their individual profits based on the resale-users’ price- and delay- sensitivity. For both cases, the limited uplink bandwidth of the AP providers is considered as a bottleneck of the WMN. We propose two dynamic pricing models for these two cases respectively and investigate how pricing depends on the assumptions that we make about the market. Indeed, the pricing model proposed for the monopoly is a preliminary study for the duopoly pricing model. In formulating and analyzing these two pricing models, we see how prices are driven by the profit-maximizing aim of one AP provider and the competition between two AP providers.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2004 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis deals with the criminal liability of Internet providers. The focus is on Germany, but the analysis is put in a wider, comparative context. This is done with reference to South Africa, as well as Europe and the American system. This thesis demonstrates and discusses the existing legal norms to regulate Internet provider liability for illegal content on the Internet and the international efforts to deal with this issue. In the introduction it is shown how the Internet has given rise to a new form of global communication and the accompanying legal problems. This is followed by an examination of the different functions Internet providers have. A survey of some of the important crimes affecting the Internet and also some Internet-specific offences put the more general issue of liability in a more specific context. Traditional and new forms of crimes are discussed. This section is followed by an analysis of Internet provider liability under German criminal law and Germany's Teleservices Act. From an international criminal law perspective some international instruments, like the Cybercrime Convention of the Council of Europe, is discussed. National legislation, especially in the context of the European Union, must always be put in the proper regional and international context. The thesis concludes with some thoughts on alternative, or perhaps complementary, methods to fight illegal and criminal conduct on the Internet. This is done not as a critique of the responses to Internet crime, but rather to strengthen the many hands trying to reduce Internet crime. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis handeloor die strafregtelike aanspreekliheid van Internet diensverskaffers. Die fokus val op Duitsland, maar die analise word ook geplaas in 'n wyer, vergelykende konteks. Dit word gedoen met verwysing na Suid-Afrika, sowel as Europa en die VSA. Die tesis demonstreer en bespreek die bestaande regsnorme wat Internet diensverskaffers reguleer met spesifieke verwysing na aanspreeklikheid vir onwettige inhoud op die Internet en internasionale pogings om hierdie probleem aan te spreek. Ter inleiding word daar aangetoon hoe die Internet aanleiding gee tot nuwe vorme van globale kommunikasie en die regsprobleme wat dit tot gevolg het. Dit word gevolg deur 'n ondersoek na die verskillende funksies van Internet verskaffers. 'n Ontleding en bespreking van Internet-spesifieke misdrywe plaas die meer algemene vraagstuk in 'n meer gefokusde konteks. Tradisionele en nuwe vorme van misdaad word bespreek. Hierdie afdeling word gevolg deur 'n ontleding van Internet diensverskaffer aanspreeklikheid ingevolge Duitse reg en die Duitse wetgewing op die terrein van telediens. Uit 'n internasionale strafreg oogpunt word sekere internasionale instrumente, soos die Cybercrime Convention van die Raad van Europa, bespreek. Nasionale wetgewing, veral in die konteks van die Europese Unie, word ook in die relevante regionale en internasionale konteks geplaas. Die tesis word afgesluit met sekere gedagtes oor alternatiewe, of moontlik komplimentêre, metodes in die stryd teen Internet-kriminaliteit. Dit moet nie gesien word as kritiek op die huidige stand van sake nie, maar eerder as 'n poging om die talle rolspelers in die stryd teen Internet misdaad se hande te sterk.