Third party funding (TPF) is a method of financing legal proceedings, in which a party not directly connected to the proceedings funds one of the disputing parties, usually in return for a percentage of the final monetary settlement. The interests behind TPF are that the funded party will have the resources to pursue their claim, while the funder will be able to profit from a percentage of the final settlement. Traditionally, within common law-systems, TPF was excluded through application of the common law torts of “Champerty and Maintenance”.[1] However, in the second half of the 20th century, many common law systems[2] abolished the torts of “Champerty and Maintence”.[3]This effectively opened up TPF as a valid litigation option for many resource poor litigants and birthed a niche industry of litigation financiers[4]. There is debate on TPF in general, with some believing that it allows legal recourse to include those that do not have the means to reasonably finance and confront legal wrongs imposed on them.[5]Others state that there is a danger of letting the funder interests supersede the claimant’s, as exemplified by some retaliatory cases[6] proceeding the Chevron v Ecuador arbitration, in which the funders had veto power over such aspects as the choice of attorneys and priority in the disbursement of a monetary award.[7] However, issues with the general system of TPF is not the focus of this thesis. Instead, focus will be on the issues it brings to the system of investment arbitration. While its operation is largely the same as within national jurisdictions, it does have the potential for damage of distinct principles and procedure of investment arbitration.  At first look, TPF seems to complement the system of arbitration as a whole. If one considers that, at its core, arbitration is a user determined dispute settlement system, then questions of funding should be determined by the parties themselves. This may suggest that due to its emphasis on “Party Autonomy”, TPF is more aligned with arbitration than it is with court-based litigation, where the principles of justice and fairness take a more preferential role. Nevertheless, “Party Autonomy” is not the sole principle of arbitration and does not mean that TPF is harmonious with either general arbitration or in particular investment arbitration. There is the general concern that a funder can actively change the process and end result of a dispute. This is seen through their influence over the funded party. As a funder will have a direct economic control over the funded party, they can dictate, as part of the funding agreement, outcomes such as early settlement, litigation strategies etc.[8] The choice of approach, and it is submission to a third party, however, is squarely within party autonomy and does not raise any fundamental concerns. What is concerning is affected parts of process that are out with party autonomy. One can see below that TPF can affect general trends and principles of arbitration, i.e. transparency and confidentiality , while also conflicting with core aspects of procedure such as jurisdiction and impartiality. This concern has given way to calls for regulation of TPF within the academic and global community. What was traditionally a “legal no mans land”[9] for investment arbitration, with little regard given to regulation, has now had extensive academic commentary and State reactions to regulating TPF. Yet, comprehensive regulation of TPF remains rare and piecemeal within the arbitral world. The majority of jurisdictions and arbitral institutions, while aware of the issues, have made no serious effort to remedy through regulation. That being said, there has been some work done in three distinct areas of regulation: (i) National laws (ii) Trade/Investment Treaties and (iii) Arbitral Rules. Each area’s success however can be described as mixed.   Therefore, the topic of this thesis is to first explore the potential issues of TPF and investment arbitration and then to examine and analysis the response to these issues through regulation. [1] Steyn LJ, in Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 at 328, explained the doctrines thusly: “In modern idiom maintenance is the support of litigation by a stranger without just cause. Champerty is an aggravated form of maintenance. The distinguishing feature of champerty is the support of litigation by a stranger in return for a share of the proceeds.” [2] In Civil law systems, unless TPF was not expressly excluded,  was mostly allowed. [3] For example see s.14(2), Criminal Law Act 1967 (England and Wales) or Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 (NSW, Australia) [4] There is now several prominent litigation financing companies such as: Burford Capital Ltd., Harbour Litigation Funding, IMF Bentham and Longford Capital. For a more in-depth review of the industry in general see Hancok, B, ‘Who Rules the World of Litigation Funding? ’March 30, 2017 , The American Lawyer. [5]Chen AD (2013), 'A Market For Justice: A First Empirical Look At Third Party Litigation Funding', at 1075 [6] Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 800 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [7] U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (2018), “Third Party Litigation Funding” [8] Shaw G (2017), ‘Third-party funding in investment arbitration: how non-disclosure can cause harm for the sake of profit’, at 12 [9]  Van Boom WH (2011), ‘Third-Party Financing in International Investment Arbitration’, at 5

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Economic globalization, the liberalization of markets, and the opening of once closed societies have all heralded the remarkable emergence of the current system of investment treaty arbitration. The current system, however, has attracted significant criticism and calls for reform. This thesis reviews the historical employment of arbitration in international society and the circumstances that lead to the emergence of the current system of investor-state dispute settlement. Following this, two recent proposals for reform of the current system are outlined: the creation of an international court of investment and the implementation of appellate mechanisms for investment treaty arbitration. The thesis concludes by offering an assessment of these proposals and argues for the rejection of the proposal to replace the current system with an international investment court, but offers a cautious endorsement of appellate mechanisms. / Graduate

(English) In the field of international law, the negotiated agreement between the EU and the US - TTIP - is a major source of law. In addition, its intended scope should encompass the provisions on investment protection. However, during the course of the bilateral negotiations, there was a leak of information which revealed that the agreement should include provisions of the dispute settlement mechanism that do not differ in its substantial aspects from those which are and have been incorporated into bilateral investment agreements between States. Therefore, in the process of investment disputes initiated under the TTIP agreement, the major influence would have had the provisions of international conventions which set out the rules for the functioning of the International Investment Tribunals - the Convention of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. However, given that both the general public and professional circles have long expressed concerns that question the very legitimacy of the international investment arbitration, this fact have been accepted with great disrespect. This was particularly, because of the previous practice of decision-making in the investment disputes, which...

An issue in investment treaty arbitration is the extreme effort needed to obtain recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. Even though the 1958 New York Convention was signed to simplify the process of recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, in the new digital world, the recognition and enforceability risks of authenticating an investment treaty arbitral award need to be reconsidered. Ultimately, it is the enforceability of the award that gives credence to the entire arbitration process and justifies the costs and time that the parties of a dispute have invested in the resolution process. Thus, upcoming technologies like blockchain could be a part of the future in Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) to provide more efficiency and benefits for the rendering an arbitral award. With blockchain, ITA awards could be rooted in digital code, stored in a transparent platform, and protected from removal, tampering, and modification, resolving the necessity to prove the existence of a duly rendered award, previnting additional costs and procedures. The thesis discusses how blockchain could solve recognition and enforcement issues in an investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) scenario. It introduces legal aspects of the possible application of blockchain technology in investment treaty disputes. It has the purpose to study the possible benefits that blockchain could bring to Investment Treaty Arbitration with particular attention to the recognition and enforcement of investment treaty arbitration awards. The peculiarity of blockchain technology is that it might represent an opportunity to restructure the investments protection paradigm by implementing a trustworthy, transparent, more affordable, highly standardized, time-stamped and automated recognition and enforcement of ITA arbitral awards. Finally, blockchain might not be the solution to all the problems of ISDS. However, it offers a foundation that can bring a new entire value chain by guaranteeing immediate recognition and enforceability of arbitral awards and getting rid of the deficiencies that the actual system has. This would give more legal certainty to the parties of the ITA in the recognition and enforcement of award on investor-state disputes.

In 2014 Russia took control over Crimea, and significant numbers of Ukrainian investors pursued investment claims against Russia regarding investments in Crimea made prior to the annexation.Thus, a fundamental concern is the applicability of the Ukraine-Russia BIT to such investments.The BIT empowers Ukrainian investors to initiate arbitration for compensation if Russia expropriates any Ukrainian investments on its territory. In order for the investors’ capital in Crimea to qualify as “investments” under the BIT, the tribunals had to determine whether Crimea constituted a part of the Russian “territory”. Even though Crimea was de facto controlled byRussia, de jure the Russian sovereignty over it had been questioned. As of time of the Thesis at least 10 cases were initiated and in seven of which decisions on responsibility and compensation were made. Investors are now enforcing the decisions in different jurisdictions facing jurisdictional challenges from Russia`s side. In 2019, Russia changed the strategy deciding to actively participate in the cases, which may play a decisive role on further developments of the disputes. The paper will examine whether investment tribunals in the Crimean cases have authority to hear them and the award to stand during set-aside/enforcement proceedings from the perspective of different enforcing jurisdictions, as well various litigation tactics and strategies presented by Russia.

The past few decades have seen a veritable explosion of investment treaty and other arbitration claims brought against States. Many of these claims have been heard through ICSID arbitration. In comparison to other arbitration frameworks, the ICSID regime has its own self-contained rules for enforcement. Thus, given the significant increase in arbitration claims against States, on the one hand, and States’ not too seldom invoking of the defence of sovereign immunity, on the other hand, this treatise is timely in addressing various outstanding issues that award-creditors have and will continue to encounter when dealing with defaulting States.   The doctrine of sovereign immunity translates into the conventional wisdom that a State cannot be sued without its consent in foreign courts. This doctrine derives from the practical consequence that the sovereign makes the law, and consequently can break it too. This idea is an extension of primarily the common law doctrine to the international plane, which emerged largely as a result of international comity.[1] This concept is also based upon principles ‘equality’ in terms of ‘equal sovereign status’. Some authors even call it ‘independence’ and ‘dignity’ etc., In this respect, the ICJ has also held that it was equality, that is the basis, i.e. justification for the general rule of immunity.   The theory of immunity has gradually shifted from absolute to restrictive immunity, making it significantly easier for award-creditors to enforce an arbitral award. However, the barrier vis-à-vis immunity from execution makes the last link in ITA vulnerable. This evolution has made substantially an easier task for award-creditors in ITA and ISDS holding an arbitration award against a sovereign State. In view of this relatively at ease syndrome that award-creditors now possess, the immunity protections granted to State and its assets will be accessed albeit the proportionality test of acta jure imperii (i.e. sovereign or government purpose) &amp; acta jure gestionis (i.e. commercial or mixed purpose) and the measurement standard applied to such tests is UNSCI 2004, which are now largely constituting States customary international law.   Ultimately, to the author’s opinion, the value of international arbitration (‘ITA and ISDS’) as a means and ends of solving disputes is dependent upon the extent to which arbitral awards are honoured and enforced. In this light, the author can vociferously say that sovereign immunity remains a significant impediment against award-creditors seeking to enforce arbitral awards against unwilling States. The barrier is not one that will fade away. Thus, outstanding award-creditors could be advised to exercise some pressure through alternate and viable forms of enforcement measures. Therefore, the States should not stand-alone to shield their commercial assets from enforcement, attachment and execution, especially for de minimis sovereign purposes.[2]  [1] R Doak Bishop (ed), Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns (JurisNet, LLC Publ 2009). [2] R Doak Bishop (ed), Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns (JurisNet, LLC Publ 2009). / <p>My thesis opposition was done through virtual presentation in Zoom. </p>

The past few decades have seen a veritable explosion of investment treaty and other arbitration claims brought against States. Many of these claims have been heard through ICSID arbitration. In comparison to other arbitration frameworks, the ICSID regime has its own self-contained rules for enforcement. Thus, given the significant increase in arbitration claims against States, on the one hand, and States’ not too seldom invoking of the defence of sovereign immunity, on the other hand, this treatise is timely in addressing various outstanding issues that award-creditors have and will continue to encounter when dealing with defaulting States.   The doctrine of sovereign immunity translates into the conventional wisdom that a State cannot be sued without its consent in foreign courts. This doctrine derives from the practical consequence that the sovereign makes the law, and consequently can break it too. This idea is an extension of primarily the common law doctrine to the international plane, which emerged largely as a result of international comity.[1] This concept is also based upon principles ‘equality’ in terms of ‘equal sovereign status’. Some authors even call it ‘independence’ and ‘dignity’ etc., In this respect, the ICJ has also held that it was equality, that is the basis, i.e. justification for the general rule of immunity.   The theory of immunity has gradually shifted from absolute to restrictive immunity, making it significantly easier for award-creditors to enforce an arbitral award. However, the barrier vis-à-vis immunity from execution makes the last link in ITA vulnerable. This evolution has made substantially an easier task for award-creditors in ITA and ISDS holding an arbitration award against a sovereign State. In view of this relatively at ease syndrome that award-creditors now possess, the immunity protections granted to State and its assets will be accessed albeit the proportionality test of acta jure imperii (i.e. sovereign or government purpose) &amp; acta jure gestionis (i.e. commercial or mixed purpose) and the measurement standard applied to such tests is UNSCI 2004, which are now largely constituting States customary international law.   Ultimately, to the author’s opinion, the value of international arbitration (‘ITA and ISDS’) as a means and ends of solving disputes is dependent upon the extent to which arbitral awards are honoured and enforced. In this light, the author can vociferously say that sovereign immunity remains a significant impediment against award-creditors seeking to enforce arbitral awards against unwilling States. The barrier is not one that will fade away. Thus, outstanding award-creditors could be advised to exercise some pressure through alternate and viable forms of enforcement measures. Therefore, the States should not stand-alone to shield their commercial assets from enforcement, attachment and execution, especially for de minimis sovereign purposes.[2] [1] R Doak Bishop (ed), Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns (JurisNet, LLC Publ 2009). [2] Bishop (n 1).

Third-Party funding refers to a financing arrangement in which a non-party entityprovides financial resources to a disputing party in return for some benefits whichis usually dependent on the outcome of the dispute before the court or tribunal.These benefits could be for pecuniary profits or for the achievement of somepolicy objectives.Whilst this funding model has been commended for promoting access to justice, ithas also been criticized for the possibility of it leading to the filing ofunmeritorious claims, its inherent conflict with the common law tort of champertyand maintenance, the disclosure of privileged information and its impact on theimplied or express duty of confidentiality owed by the parties in arbitration.This research seeks to examine the effect of the disclosure of privilegedinformation by the party seeking funding to the potential funder before or duringArbitration with a view to determining whether the said disclosure constitutes awaiver of litigation privileges or can the third-party funder be deemed to share acommon interest with the funded party? This research will be viewed from thelens of the domestic law operational in England and Wales and Nigeria in acomparative analytical fashion with a view to determining what lessons could belearnt by the developing jurisdiction.This study also makes a brief review of extant legal regime on Third-Partyfunding in both jurisdictions on the adequacy of the provisions on disclosure witha view to providing some safeguards towards promoting the third-party fundingpractice, balance competing interests amongst the parties, promote investorconfidence as well as enhance the growth of foreign direct investment in spite ofthe various existing criticisms against the third-party litigation financing model.

Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.