This thesis analyses the conundrum at the intersection of (i) recognition, (ii) enforcement, and (iii) execution of investment treaty arbitral awards pursuant to the ICSID convention. Orienting between recognition, enforcement, and execution  has recently stirred quite some debate. This culminates in the question of, on the one hand, whether it is necessary to differentiate between “enforcement” and “execution” in light of the plea of  sovereign immunity, and how to do so, on the other hand. In this context, the concept of sovereign immunity in general and as a potential objection within the ICSID enforcement proceedings will be analysed in particular. This thesis does so by analysing scholarly work, the ICSID history and as a result of municipal case law vis-à-vis sovereign immunity and ICSID enforcement. A particular emphasis will be put on statutory interpretations, for example on ICSID enforcement regime and its terminology. In this light, a terminological analysis of language is instrumental given that the ICSID convention has three original languages.

As the investment treaty arbitration regime matures, consensus is emerging as to the need for public interest considerations to be taken into account in resolving disputes under international investment agreements (IIAs). However, the question of how such considerations should be reflected remains contentious. This thesis proposes that the remedies stage of the process can, and should, play a role in taking account of public interest considerations and so in easing the tension between host state regulatory sovereignty and investment protection that lies at the heart of the investment treaty regime. Thus, this thesis argues that, while, on the one hand, there is a need to introduce an element of reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process in order to ensure continuing state co-operation and to reflect the broader underlying purposes of IIAs, on the other, the primary object of the system remains the protection of foreign investors. These competing imperatives can lead to difficulties in taking account of public interest considerations at the merits stage of the arbitration process. Therefore, in order to reconcile these competing imperatives and to achieve an optimal balance between host state regulatory sovereignty and investment protection, this thesis proposes that public interest considerations should be recognised at the remedies stage where such considerations cannot be taken into account either sufficiently or at all at the merits stage and identifies a number of situations in which this approach would be appropriate. Potential doctrinal bases for implementation of this approach are also examined and the conclusion reached that, given the significant degree of discretion afforded to tribunals in applying the full reparation principle and the role that equity can permissibly play in quantifying damages, this approach can, save in the case of lawful expropriations, be implemented within the parameters of existing legal principles.

As the field of investment treaty arbitration has exponentially grown in the last years, the definition and the framework of key elements in the field, such as legitimate expectations, have been largely discussed by scholars and arbitrators. As jurisprudence has gone on to tackle such issue, it has been the appearance of concepts, such as due diligence, which have shaped and re-defined the standing of legitimate expectations in the field of investment treaty arbitration.

Over the last decade, investment treaty arbitration has been confronted with relatively extensive and fundamental criticisms. The problem with the system in fact boils down to a misconception by tribunals of the nature of investment treaty arbitration. Many scholars and tribunals have perceived and treated investment treaty arbitration as a reciprocal arrangement with a private function. This is so mainly because of the way they formulate the establishment of investment treaty arbitration. To put it simply, it has been though that investment treaty arbitration, similar to international commercial arbitration, is founded upon a reciprocal contract made through a merger of intentions of the host State and the foreign investor. This perception would necessarily lead to the application of the principle of party autonomy as the main governing principle over the process of arbitration; a principle that is well tailored to adjudications with private function. Contrary to this, a careful examination of the nature of investment treaty arbitration reveals not only the public dimensions of the system, but also the unilaterality of the framework on which the system stands. These two characteristics require a shift in paradigm; otherwise, the system will expose to more and more legitimacy crises. The present research, therefore, tends to make a clear distinction between the two systems of international commercial and investment treaty arbitration, and explore the implications of this paradigm-shifting for the process of investment treaty arbitration, in particular, the way tribunals interpret the instrument of consent and the autonomy of tribunals in the course of the arbitration.

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The aim of the present thesis is to introduce the topic of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the multiscience (multidiscipline) perspective. FDI is a phenomena that cuts across many fields of human activity. It is of major significance for the national economies and an important factor for the global economic growth. Although these characteristics of FDI are widely known today, it was not always the case in the past. Since the sixties, it has been a focus of deeper studies and an object of interest especially for the international organizations that supervise the global economy. As each socio-economic phenomena, the issue of FDI has its historical background and this thesis seeks to comprehend this subject and further tracks the emergence of the business climate and economical processes that show the characteristics of later defined FDI. The historical formation of FDI is related to qualitative and quantitative development of the phenomena, and to its temporal and geopolitical context. The thesis presents the most relevant factors and causes of the present state of FDI, and monitors the crucial moments of the elements contributing to the evolution of the international investment environment. A more detailed study is devoted to Central European countries, since their specific development after...

Whenever states’ rights to regulate and investor’s interests conflict with each other it is an unsolved question in investment treaty arbitration how one should balance those two positions. In particular, it is indefinite where to draw the line at what point states can actually exercise their rights without unlawfully violating the investor’s interests. A solution for this issue might be the proportionality test or analysis. Over the years, several tribunals approached proportionality, but took very different paths to understand and apply this legal concept. Especially, if one considers proportionality from its root in European and German law, some applications in investment treaty arbitration create confusion. Originating from a fixed methodological approach in the background of justifications of state measures, tribunals use proportionality in the process of defining and determining in contrast to the justification, as one would expect. Thus, it remains questionable which of those approaches is correct or if there is rather one correct application of proportionality in the context of investment treaty arbitration. This work argues in favour of proportionality being a legal concept which originates from German and European jurisprudence and migrated to international law. In international law it was established as a legal principle and subsequently adopted, inter alia, in investment treaty arbitration. Nevertheless, tribunals should be more careful when using proportionality. Especially, when naming and transferring a particular legal construct, it should not be used out of context. This endangers an award’s persuasiveness and furthers the fragmentation in international investment law. Tribunals should only refer to the ‘principle of proportionality’ or a ‘proportionality test/analysis’ when they actually apply it. And this application requires the concept to be used in the background of justification and not determination. Furthermore, the three/four significant steps must be followed in order to obtain the aimed proportional result.

Investment treaty arbitration has borrowed a number of elements from commercial arbitration, including confidentiality. The scope of confidentiality in investor-state arbitrations can make it hard for amicus curiaeto participate in the arbitral proceedings.    The rules regarding transparency in investor-state arbitration relates, among others, to access to information and documents, third-party participation and the publication of awards. Transparency in investor-state arbitrations is also related to changes in legislation that could affect the investor. Changes in legislation is a way of adapting to new circumstances as changes in government or an attempt to prevent health issues or fulfilling environmental goals in the interest of the public.   The possibility of amicus curiaeparticipation and submissions make it possible for the public to affect what information the tribunal have in cases where public interests are discussed. Tribunals have, when they have found that the public interest is not only general, decided to allow amicus curiaesubmissions even without the consent of the parties. They have allowed such submissions in cases where the amicus curiaecould enlighten the tribunal or provide additional information about the merits.     There is no binding case law in arbitration. Since the tribunal only have jurisdiction in the particular case, awards cannot be binding in other disputes. The lack of case law can lead to a lack of predictability for both investors and states. It has led to fewer changes in domestic regulation, the phenomenon is called the “chilling effect” and refers to states who make less changes (including changes in the interest of the public) in an attempt to avoid a violation of the FET standard.    Transparency, i.e. making the dispute public, including the party’s identities, documents and the award, can help providing predictability to investment-treaty arbitration. The outcome of the case is not binding as case law for future disputes but could provide both states and investors knowledge about how certain treaties and actions might be interpreted by a future tribunal.

That subjective and political values form the sources and function of international law, is an often encountered claim and the literature produced by schools of international legal theory in response to this inquiry diverge. On the one hand, according to classical and positivist approaches to international law, a formalistic and ideal form of the law that is also detached from the world of politics is possible. On the other hand, the perception that attitudinal and institutional constraints might determine the content of the law is common in international legal scholarship ranging from international relations approaches and the New Stream to policy oriented perspectives. Understanding the content of the law, however, would also necessitate questioning how adjudicators interpret legal texts and decide in causal-positive terms. In other words, in theorizing international law, one should explore the interpretation and application of international law in order to test whether adjudicators are influenced by background, training, personality, value preferences as well as normative and structural institutional constraints and, thus, if international law operates based on law and/or politics. Based on the theories and methods of judicial behaviour that originate from the American legal realism movement of the early 20th century, this work undertakes a non-empirical socio-legal research that studies the behaviour of ITA tribunals. It considers that law is indeterminate and that the process of judicial-decision making is a mixture of law, politics and policy. This work constructs a framework based on the political regimes approach by Clayton and May (1999), supplemented by the political jurisprudence literature of Shapiro (1964) and the historical interpretive approach of Smith (1988). It argues that ITA Tribunals “may believe that individual legal institutions are themselves embedded within, and draw meaning from, the larger political regime”. In doing so, the ITA Tribunal may assume a principal political role in order to accommodate the interests of various stakeholders involved in the broader political regime of international investment, albeit limited to constitutive and non-constitutive institutions. This work investigates the role of institutions embedded in the broader political regime in judicial decision-making in ITA. How do institutions, with their political characteristics, affect the process of decision-making in ITA or do they affect at all? To that extent, this work is concerned with whether the ITA Tribunal oscillates between the normative character of the law and the political contingency of the law. It examines the extent to which the ITA Tribunal accommodates politics in its decisions and, in this vein, whether there is a correlation between politics and decision-making in ITA. As its case study, this work studies arbitral decision-making under NAFTA Chapter 11. It first explores the broader political regime in which NAFTA tribunals operate, revisiting the original bargain that underlies the NAFTA deal. It then identifies specific constitutive institutions that are influential in NAFTA ITA decision-making. It traces the specific vocabulary or ‘grammar’ (Koskenniemi 1989) that is used by Chapter 11 Tribunals in considering the place of these constitutive institutions in ITA decision-making. Subsequently, this work studies the normative political development of Article 1105 on the minimum standard of treatment within the broader political regime under NAFTA. It investigates shifts in the specific vocabulary vis-à-vis the distortions to the two pillars of the political regime of NAFTA, namely asymmetric obligations and the regulation of environment. This work demonstrates that the development of the minimum standard of treatment under Article 1105 reflects a brief history of intrusion by non-disputing parties from sovereign states and amici. This is enabled through the constitutive institutions and draws meaning from the political regime of international investment under NAFTA. It concludes that the ITA Tribunal is able to develop a vocabulary with which it could internalize the conundrums of the broader political regime in which it operates. This shows that the ITA Tribunal is not only competent in settling disputes but also in judicial politics.

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), has seen an increased transparency in the past couple of decades. The participation of third parties in the proceedings and the disclosure of documents or information regarding the arbitrations are some of the most important and controversial issues regarding transparency nowadays. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the evolution of transparency in ICSID, as well as specific cases that dealt with issues of third party participation and the disclosure of documents or information in investment treaty arbitration, and analyze the decisions taken by the tribunals. The evolution of transparency within the history of ICSID allows us to see the principal amendments made, and how transparency has been evolving in favor of investment treaty arbitration, providing more confidence, openness and legitimacy on this system of dispute resolution. Nevertheless, transparency is not a panacea. Excessive transparency might bring more challenges than benefits, depending on the circumstances on a case-by-case basis, therefore, it is necessary to consider the effects that transparency may produce in investment treaty arbitration, and find a right balance with elements such as confidentiality, the power of the tribunals and the will of the disputing parties in the arbitration, among others. This thesis proposed that even if there is always space for improvements, the evolution of transparency has reach a limit where further changes would be futile and prejudicial for the system of investment treaty arbitration. This would bring a series of challenges, such as, an extra burden to the disputing parties, a delay on the proceedings, and in certain cases leaving the result of the arbitration in hands of the public scrutiny, the media or turning the dispute in a political matter.