<p>The master thesis provides a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the scope of most-favoured-nation clauses, focusing on the application of such clauses to dispute resolution mechanisms in bilateral investment treaty’s (BIT).</p><p>The ICSID decision in Maffezini was the first in a series to extend the scope of an MFN clause to dispute resolution in such context. Traditionally, such a clause had been relied on regarding substantive rights. The debate evoked by this and subsequent decisions of arbitral tribunals, which often conflict with each other in their outcome and in their analytic methodology, illustrates the controversy of this issue.</p>

The master thesis provides a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the scope of most-favoured-nation clauses, focusing on the application of such clauses to dispute resolution mechanisms in bilateral investment treaty’s (BIT). The ICSID decision in Maffezini was the first in a series to extend the scope of an MFN clause to dispute resolution in such context. Traditionally, such a clause had been relied on regarding substantive rights. The debate evoked by this and subsequent decisions of arbitral tribunals, which often conflict with each other in their outcome and in their analytic methodology, illustrates the controversy of this issue.

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This thesis examines whether the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty prescribe most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. The right to MFN treatment concerns the issue whether taxpayers resident in one Member State can “cherry-pick” the most beneficial tax treaty available to other taxpayers. Two issues of fundamental impor-tance are examined in this thesis. First, whether a resident of a Member State (A) who receives income in another Member State (B), can claim from that state, the most beneficial tax treaty available to a resident of a third Member State (C). Second, whether a resident can claim from his state of residence (A), the same tax treatment as provided in a tax treaty concluded by his state of residence and another Member State (C), when this tax treaty provides better treatment in terms of avoiding double taxa-tion in the state of residence than the tax treaty applicable to the source of income (B). The ECJ has held that discrimination arises only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situa-tions. The current state of EC law prohibits unequal treatment of residents and non-residents as well as residents who have exercised their rights to free movement in comparison to residents who have not. The condition is that they must be considered to be in comparable situations and that there is no objective difference to justify the difference in treatment. The ECJ has so far not ruled on the MFN issue. It is there-fore uncertain as to whether Member States are obligated to treat; 1) different non-resident taxpayers equally and, 2) whether Member States are prohibited from treat-ing their own residents differently when they exercise their rights to free movement in different Member States. This thesis identifies the requirements for the application of MFN treatment and ex-amines in which tax treaty provisions it is possible to apply MFN treatment. The ECJ, has in its case law, concluded that the application of tax treaties must be exer-cised in accordance EC law. It can be argued that a well-functioning internal market cannot allow bilateral tax treaties to provide preferential tax treatment to residents of one Member State, while denying it to residents of the remaining Member States. However, the application of MFN treatment could have far-reaching ramifications on the Member States’ existing tax treaty network. It is therefore fair to assume, as has been stated in other doctrinal opinions, that the ECJ will approach this issue care-fully when providing its interpretation on the matter.

<p>This thesis examines whether the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty prescribe most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. The right to MFN treatment concerns the issue whether taxpayers resident in one Member State can “cherry-pick” the most beneficial tax treaty available to other taxpayers. Two issues of fundamental impor-tance are examined in this thesis. First, whether a resident of a Member State (A) who receives income in another Member State (B), can claim from that state, the most beneficial tax treaty available to a resident of a third Member State (C). Second, whether a resident can claim from his state of residence (A), the same tax treatment as provided in a tax treaty concluded by his state of residence and another Member State (C), when this tax treaty provides better treatment in terms of avoiding double taxa-tion in the state of residence than the tax treaty applicable to the source of income (B).</p><p>The ECJ has held that discrimination arises only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situa-tions. The current state of EC law prohibits unequal treatment of residents and non-residents as well as residents who have exercised their rights to free movement in comparison to residents who have not. The condition is that they must be considered to be in comparable situations and that there is no objective difference to justify the difference in treatment. The ECJ has so far not ruled on the MFN issue. It is there-fore uncertain as to whether Member States are obligated to treat; 1) different non-resident taxpayers equally and, 2) whether Member States are prohibited from treat-ing their own residents differently when they exercise their rights to free movement in different Member States.</p><p>This thesis identifies the requirements for the application of MFN treatment and ex-amines in which tax treaty provisions it is possible to apply MFN treatment. The ECJ, has in its case law, concluded that the application of tax treaties must be exer-cised in accordance EC law. It can be argued that a well-functioning internal market cannot allow bilateral tax treaties to provide preferential tax treatment to residents of one Member State, while denying it to residents of the remaining Member States. However, the application of MFN treatment could have far-reaching ramifications on the Member States’ existing tax treaty network. It is therefore fair to assume, as has been stated in other doctrinal opinions, that the ECJ will approach this issue care-fully when providing its interpretation on the matter.</p>

The introduction and signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements (hereafter EPA’s) have been received with mixed feelings legally, politically and economically. African Caribbean and Pacific countries have taken different positions with regards to their signing, ratification and implementation. A lot has been written about the legal effect of EPA’ The Southern Africa Customs Union (hereafter SACU) has not been spared either. SACU is made up of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Article 31 (3) of the 2002 SACU Agreement prohibits any of the SACU member states to negotiate and enter into new preferential agreements with third parties or amend existing agreements without the consent of other member states. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland signed Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union in direct violation of article 31 (3) of the 2002 SACU Agreement. The actions of these three countries have exposed the vulnerabilities and short-comings of the 2002 Agreement. The key findings of this study are that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have violated the 2002 Agreement. Namibia and South Africa have openly castigated the actions of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. SACU institutions that are mandated to monitor and implement the 2002 Agreement such as the Council of Ministers, Customs Union Commission, Secretariat, Tariff Board, Technical Liaison Committees and ad hoc Tribunal appear to have not taken sufficient action to penalise the actions of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. This has led some critics to argue that the SACU 2002 Agreement has to be reviewed or suspended or that it has lost its legal force. / Thesis (LLM (Import and Export Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

The introduction and signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements (hereafter EPA’s) have been received with mixed feelings legally, politically and economically. African Caribbean and Pacific countries have taken different positions with regards to their signing, ratification and implementation. A lot has been written about the legal effect of EPA’ The Southern Africa Customs Union (hereafter SACU) has not been spared either. SACU is made up of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Article 31 (3) of the 2002 SACU Agreement prohibits any of the SACU member states to negotiate and enter into new preferential agreements with third parties or amend existing agreements without the consent of other member states. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland signed Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union in direct violation of article 31 (3) of the 2002 SACU Agreement. The actions of these three countries have exposed the vulnerabilities and short-comings of the 2002 Agreement. The key findings of this study are that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have violated the 2002 Agreement. Namibia and South Africa have openly castigated the actions of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. SACU institutions that are mandated to monitor and implement the 2002 Agreement such as the Council of Ministers, Customs Union Commission, Secretariat, Tariff Board, Technical Liaison Committees and ad hoc Tribunal appear to have not taken sufficient action to penalise the actions of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. This has led some critics to argue that the SACU 2002 Agreement has to be reviewed or suspended or that it has lost its legal force. / Thesis (LLM (Import and Export Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

The Multifibre Agreement ("MFA") regulated textile trade until 1 January 2005. It was predominantly focused on curtailing textile exports from developing countries, like South Africa and China. With the end of the MFA, a textile crisis occurred in South Africa due to the domination of the domestic market by more affordable Chinese textile products. This case study is applied to illustrate the inadequacy of domestic legislation to provide for the resolution of an international trade dispute that affects an industry. No legislation refers to the resolution of the trade dispute by entering into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"), or recourse to the neutral dispute settlement body of the World Trade Organisation ("WTO"). Due to the absence of legislation that directly addresses either forum, all the power is vested• in the government to determine the appropriate course of action. Applications brought by textile industry representative bodies like TEXFED, CLOTRADE and SACTWU were inadequately investigated due to the limited powers of the independent investigative body, ITAC, and were ultimately abandoned. The government entered into a MOU with the Chinese government and in doing so violated international agreements, rights and obligations. An analysis of the inadequacy of the MOU that was entered into and the suitability of the WTO as dispute settlement body is conducted. It is concluded that the current legislation is inadequate in that it doesn't provide for recourse to the WTO and in that it doesn't clearly set out the obligations on government and the independent powers of an independent body. / LLM (Import and Export Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

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