Book Summary: This work is the fourth Small Wars Journal anthology focusing on radical Sunni Islamic terrorists and insurgent groups. It covers this professional journals writings for 2016 and is a compliment to the earlier Global Radical Islamist Insurgency anthologies that were produced as Vol. I: 2007-2011 (published in 2015) and Vol. II: 2012-2014 (published in 2016) and Jihadi Terrorism, Insurgency, and the Islamic State spanning 2015 (published in 2017). This anthology, which offers well over 900 pages of focused analysis, follows the same general conceptual breakdown as the earlier works and is divided into two major thematic sectionsone focusing on Al Qaeda and Islamic state activities in 2016 and the other focusing on US-Allied policies and counterinsurgent strategies.

Book Summary: This work is the fourth Small Wars Journal anthology focusing on radical Sunni Islamic terrorists and insurgent groups. It covers this professional journals writings for 2016 and is a compliment to the earlier Global Radical Islamist Insurgency anthologies that were produced as Vol. I: 2007-2011 (published in 2015) and Vol. II: 2012-2014 (published in 2016) and Jihadi Terrorism, Insurgency, and the Islamic State spanning 2015 (published in 2017). This anthology, which offers well over 900 pages of focused analysis, follows the same general conceptual breakdown as the earlier works and is divided into two major thematic sectionsone focusing on Al Qaeda and Islamic state activities in 2016 and the other focusing on US-Allied policies and counterinsurgent strategies.

The al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) are transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam. It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy them. The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of strategically-relevant differences between these two transnational terrorist entities. In it, one shall find a careful comparative analysis across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and specific implications and recommendations for current USG policy and strategy. Key questions that are addressed include: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni “jihadism”? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to USG strategists and professional military educators? / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1127/thumbnail.jpg

Excerpt: For a mere Muslim mortal, Allah’s granting of martyrdom (Shahada) is the pinnacle of spiritual achievement. The martyr (Shahid) is granted unique privileges among which are the right to bypass the moral interrogation meted out to determine after death whether one is spiritually fit; the complete freedom from all anguish, pain, and suffering caused by one’s wounds as one immediately traverses into the highest of seven heavens; the right to intercede and request divine favors on behalf of seventy of one’s loved one’s; the enjoyment of exclusive sexual privileges with seventy-two virgins; and finally, the right to exist within the proximity of the All Mighty Allah and an eternity spent in enjoyment of the sumptuous delights of a blessed paradise.

A specific branch of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-jihad) regulates the waging of the jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif). In this article, a detailed exposition is presented of the Egyptian Islamic Group’s (IG; Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya) use of fiqh al jihad against Al-Qaeda. The present author’s ‘jihad-realist’ approach is first briefly described; the IG’s critique of AQ systematically outlined; and in conclusion, implications are derived for counter-radicalisation strategies.

Excerpt: On December 26, 2015 a 24-minute audio message was released by the Islamic State Organization’s (ISO) official media arm al-Furqan.

Excerpt: On May 21, 2016 a 31-minute audio file by Islamic State Organization (ISO) chief spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (real name: Taha Sobhi Falaha) was uploaded by the ISO’s Al Furqan Media outlet onto the internet.

Excerpt: On May 14, 2015 a 34-minute audio message was released by the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s media arm al-Furqan.