What are the impediments to and stimuluses for transitions from violent civil conflict to peace? This dissertation investigates factors that influence civil conflict resolution. There are four key findings. First, democratisation reforms are likely to prompt peace talks with rebel groups. There are costs associated with recognising internal armed challengers as legitimate bargaining partners that deter governments from initiating peace talks. Democratic reform periods provide a window of opportunity for peace negotiations because factors that make institutional reform more likely also encourage peaceful resolution of conflict. The emergence of democratic institu- tions changes the state preferences by increasing the influence of the median citizen vis-`a-vis the authoritarian elite. Second, fragmented conflicts are harder to resolve because they are likely to be over a multidimensional issue space. Multiparty decision making that involves two or more salient issues are likely to have cyclic collective preferences, which render armed conflict a viable instrument for pursuing political goals. Third, involvement of the United Nations (UN) mitigates the adverse impact of conflict fragmentation over peaceful resolution. UN involvement changes the incentives and opportunities of actors to founder a possible bargain. The UN fa- cilitates a path-dependent peace process and brings institutions that induce an equilibrium by overcoming the problems that arise due to cyclic collective preferences. Finally, the military manpower supply system of a state influences its civil conflict processes. How a state recruits rank-and-file members of the military forces is a central institutional arrangement that influences the incentives and opportunities of relevant actors. Compared to all-volunteer forces (AVFs), conscription is an impediment to conflict termination because the cost some individuals incur by being subject to conscription decreases the opportunity cost of rebellion, increases grievances and insulates influential sections of the population from the cost of conflict. As a result, conflict termination becomes less likely.

Given that autocrats can be challenged by insiders of their ruling coalition and/or by the citizens of the country they govern, what control strategies can they use in order to minimize the potential for conflict and violence? The current literature on authoritarian politics focuses on the use of co-optation and repression to explain how autocrats mitigate the hazardous conditions under which they rule. The former induce compliance and co-operation by providing social and material benefits, while the latter forces with the threat of physical punishment. While both control strategies received significant attention in the literature, they have been mostly examined separately from each other. Against this background, this thesis contributes to the literature on authoritarian politics and state repression by focusing on the connection between co-optation and repression, on how autocrats use these two control strategies to prevent challenges and how the use of one control strategy impacts the use of the other. This dissertation builds on some of the theoretical and empirical tensions in the current literature and brings several theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of authoritarian politics. Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to the literature by offering an actor-oriented theoretical explanation of autocratic repression against social campaigns, an alternative theoretical mechanism on the coup reducing effect of institutions and a transnational theoretical account of autocratic repression. The empirical contribution of this dissertation rests in showing that accounting for actors’ characteristics improves models’ predictive power, that we know very little about the factors that explain coups’ success in autocracies and demonstrates there is a transnational interdependence in autocratic repression. The findings of this dissertation have implications for dissidents mobilizing against autocrats, for professionals and policy makers interested in political (in)stability, and for organizations attempting to improve human rights practices worldwide.

When votes are cast in an election and a winner is declared, people can accept the result, they can challenge it or they can turn against democracy. This thesis seeks to understand why in some cases elections are accepted while in others they are challenged and their outcomes rejected. Conventional wisdom holds that when elections are held according to international standards, acceptance will follow. I challenge this notion. As experience shows, sometimes even elections classified as free and fair evoke protests, while less technically perfect elections are sometimes widely accepted. So, when, where and under what conditions are election results accepted? And what can we do to increase their credibility? There are many aspects than can influence this but I focus on three main areas that deserve especial attention. A first research phase relies on Qualitative Comparative Analysis. It shows that holding free and fair elections is necessary but not sufficient for the acceptance of election results. Two other factors are needed: a) political parties need to support electoral institutions and b) election results need to be transparent. A second research phase uses multilevel regression to explore the first of these factors in greater detail. Findings show that including political parties in the appointment of the members of the electoral management body has a positive impact on election credibility. A third research phase consisting of a small N structured comparison focuses on election results. It shows that having visible and inferable results contributes to preventing and mitigating post-election protests. In short, an election not only has to be “free and fair” but also needs the legitimacy and credibility obtained when political parties support the main election institution and when results are clear, widely available and completely beyond doubt.

Using primary material, much of which has been overlooked up to now, this thesis argues that the Iskra newspaper and its organisational appendages were conceived by Lenin and his closest collaborators in a pragmatic attempt to strike a balance between the theoretically authoritative and revolutionary, yet inactive Osvobozhdenie Truda and the more active, but reformist and theoretically unclear Rabochee Delo grouping. As such, Iskra does not appear to have been the product of a detailed plan conceived in Siberian exile, as is often thought. Nor did it represent the extreme left wing of the Russian social-democratic movement of the time, a place occupied by Osvobozhdenie Truda. Iskra and its supporting organisations formed a faction of a broader party, the RSDLP, whose institutions it aimed to rebuild and to which it aimed to give ideological leadership broadly in sympathy with the basic views of Plekhanov, though differing with him in terms of tactics. Starting from a position of weakness both in the emigration and inside Russia, Lenin at first sought an alliance with the 'Economists' of Rabochee Delo rather than a policy of open factional struggle, which was at this stage (1900-01) advocated by Plekhanov. Only when serious vacillations in the Rabochee Delo line started to emerge in the spring of 1901 did Lenin break with this tactic, in despair of any useful co-operation with the politically unstable followers of the economist journal. From the end of 1901an open struggle for the support of the RSDLP local committees inside Russia began, in which the Economists were unable to martial support, whilst Iskra, owing to its network of full-time 'agents' and their assistance, eventually won a dominant position. On this basis, plans were laid for a Second Congress of the RSDLP that reveal a distinctly democratic and pluralist conception of party organisation on the part of Lenin, A conception which does not square with his dictatorial reputation. Accordingly, this thesis argues that the Second Congress was a credible, if not perfect representation of rank and file opinion within the RSDLP at the time and that the split within the Iskra faction that took place at this meeting owes more to pre-existing tensions with the Russian Iskra organisation rather than any unreasonable behaviour on the part of Lenin. Specifically, individual agents showed signs of weariness in relation to Lenin‘s policy of factional struggle prior to the Second Congress. For this reason they sought, but failed to find compromise at the congress with the Bund and the economists, and as such provoked a split with the supporters of Lenin within Iskra. As such, it was actually an inopportune search for compromise which appears to have provoked the split within Iskra, rather than dictatorial or intolerant practices on the part of Lenin. The supporters of Martov assumed that the Bund and the supporters of economism could be appeased, but this was not in fact the case.

This thesis analyses the impact of marginalised groups using coercive mechanisms as a strategy for deliberative inclusion. It engages the literature on deliberative democratic theory that makes a case for using non-communicative mechanisms to gain entry to exclusionary deliberative forums. This research explores its limits by examining an “extreme” case where marginalised political agents employed threats of force – the apparent antithesis of deliberation – in an attempt to secure inclusion. The case is that of a military mutiny in the Philippines in 2003, where a group of junior officers took over the central business district to publicly air their demands for reform to the military. This strategy opened up spaces for junior officers who did not have access to channels for grievance articulation to persuade government officials to launch reform programs that addressed their concerns in exchange for their peaceful return to barracks. The case highlights that the manner of gaining access to deliberative forums has an effect on the dynamic of the deliberative process. It is argued that while coercive mechanisms can be constructive in opening deliberative spaces, they also risk limiting the deliberative process and outcomes that secured through coercion.

The establishment of new provinces, as administrative divisions of central government, is based on the criteria and principles stated in the Constitution and the Provincial Administration Act numbered 5442. It is argued that the principles in the legislation are not sufficient and objective for establishing provinces. The number of the provinces began to increase after the multiparty period, dated 1946, and gained momentum after 1980s. The aim of this thesis is to explore the justification of the establishment of new provinces: Were they established in conformity with the legislation? Or established with political concerns? In this respect, the last 14 provinces, established after 1980s, are analyzed as a case study.

The research question that this thesis seeks to address is how contemporary liberal states, that are characterised by cultural diversity, should respond to cultural heritage. The argument of this thesis is that liberal states are fundamentally obliged to ensure that individuals have the greatest freedom possible to engage with their own cultural heritages. Cultural heritage and practices play a crucial role in the construction and maintenance of individual and group identity, and thus a response of non-intervention in cultural heritage provides the best means of respecting this significance. Although a government may not be sympathetic to certain ideas and ways of living, this does not give it a right to destroy or damage any cultural artifacts and objects, unless these objects or practices actively incite violence or harm to others, because doing so would necessarily violate the liberal proviso to abstain for interfering in conceptions of the good. Liberal states do not have an obligation to preserve a national heritage, nor do they have a duty to preserve a diversity of (minority) cultural heritages. However, contemporary nation-states – liberal and otherwise – will necessarily possess certain attributes of cultural heritage, such as a national flag, language, symbols etc., that are likely to reflect the experiences of a dominant, national group. While this acknowledgement entails a diversion from ideal liberal theory and poses problems for the cultural neutrality of the liberal state, I argue that it is in the liberal states’ interest to maintain some objects of cultural heritage as these have instrumental value in fostering an understanding of the shared political community and respect for liberal values. However, liberal governments are obliged to ensure that existing public heritage does not unduly discriminate against minority cultural groups; thus sustaining political neutrality. The liberal response that I have outlined thus attempts to sustain liberal values whilst remaining mindful of contextual issues such as power relations between and within groups, and the necessary constraints of contemporary statehood.

This thesis investigates the creation, operation and impact of four industrial developments in the Highlands of Scotland in Corpach, Aviemore, Dounreay and Invergordon in the period 1945 to 1982. The thesis is structured as follows: the introduction details the development of economic policy towards the Highlands and Scotland more generally, encompassing a literature survey to provide the necessary background and context of the developments, followed by individual case study analysis of the four developments, followed by a conclusion that assesses the overall themes present in the preceding case studies and introduction. Within the conclusion is a discussion of the regional policy aspect of the four developments, the effect the developments had on the areas in which they were located in terms of population and unemployment change and the political economy and politics of Highland development. The argument developed in the thesis is that the motivations behind the four industrial projects detailed in the case studies were more complex than the publicly and privately stated justification for creating and establishing the developments that they would act as growth centres and attract further industries to the areas in which they were located. The thesis posits that developments in the Highlands only took place as a consequence of Scottish Office actions ‘winning’ large industrial projects for the area and only when Scottish Office policy aims converged with UK national economic and political interests. Consequently, short-term political goals usurped effective long-term economic development, resulting in a lack of infrastructural development that severely hindered the stated aims and justification of each development acting as a growth centre. Further, the argument is made that as a result of these short-term political goals, a policy of grand gestures of large-scale industrial developments that were inappropriate for the areas in which they were located was pursued, resulting in the eventual closure of all but the Aviemore complex. In short, the thesis is about the implementation failure of large-scale industry in the Highlands, post-1945.

In September 2001 several states launched a series of counter-terrorism policies under the banner of the 'War on Terror' that were unprecedented in their scope, intensity and cost. Extensive domestic legislative agendas and surveillance programmes at home were matched by increased military interventionism abroad, most significantly in Afghanistan and Iraq. This thesis is concerned with examining how this 'War on Terror' was possible: how it was conceivable for policy-makers and how it was 'sold' to domestic audiences. More specifically, this thesis considers three principal members of the 'Coalition of the Willing' in Iraq - the United States, Britain and Australia. Aside from adopting similar and overlapping policy responses in the context of a commitment to the 'War on Terror', these three states share a common language, intertwined histories and institutional similarities, underpinned by perceptions of cultural proximity and closely related identities. However, despite significant cultural, historical and political overlap, the 'War on Terror' was rendered possible in these contexts in different ways, drawing on different discourses and narratives of foreign policy and identity. In the US, President Bush employed highly reductive moral arguments within a language of frontier justice, which was increasingly channelled through the signifier of 'freedom'. In the UK, Prime Minister Blair framed every phase of the 'War on Terror' as rational, reasoned and proper, balancing moral imperatives with an emphasised logical pragmatism. In Australia, Prime Minister Howard relied upon particularly exclusionary framings mutually reinforced through repeated references to shared values. This thesis explores these differences and their origins, arguing that they have important implications for the way we understand foreign policy and political possibility. They demonstrate that foreign policy is both discursive and culturally embedded. And they illustrate that foreign policy discourse impacts on political possibility in rendering some policy responses conceivable while others unthinkable, and some policy responses acceptable while others illegitimate. This thesis thus contributes to our understanding of political possibility, in the process correcting a tendency to view the 'War on Terror' as a universal and monolithic political discourse.

Justifications for state interventions which seek to influence the consumption patterns of goods, services and activities are usually based on notions of equity or efficiency: the market either fails to offer a fair outcome in distributional terms or it fails to arrive at an efficient outcome in terms of aggregate welfare. But these justifications, implicitly and unintentionally, often incorporate elements which focus on the correction of another kind of failure: that of individual reasoning. They do this either because the concepts of equity and efficiency are invoked to justify state intervention beyond the analytic competence of these principles, or because support for specific public policies or institutions require additional principles to justify the particular form these institutions take. In short, justifications from equity and efficiency are underdetermined. But in order to support interventions which are at least partly correcting individual reasoning failure, we need a defensible theory of state paternalism. Existing discussions of paternalism fail to explain why the state should know better than the individual what is in his or her own best interests, even if it is acknowledged that individual reasoning can be sub-optimal. The thesis concludes with a discussion of criteria which do support the superior decision-making of the state in certain circumstances: where the benefits (or costs) of consumption are likely to occur a long period into the future; where direct experience of the particular form of consumption is problematic; and where technical complexities make judgement about appropriate consumption difficult. The thesis concludes with an analysis of some applications and implications of these proposals for state intervention in consumption.