This thesis explores the advocacy strategies and influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy. It examines in particular the impact of institutional factors on the strategies and lobbying outcomes. Conceptually, it contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU and to the study of non-state actor participation in international organisations. Conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar, the study inquires into the relationship between policy regime (ranging from the Community method to the intergovernmental method, as these predominate in different areas of EU external relations) and the degree and type of interest group influence. To this end the thesis compares three examples of EU foreign policy: visa liberalisation towards the Eastern neighbours; sanctions towards Belarus; and CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine. The research reveals that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying even in those policy areas that are ruled by the intergovernmental method. Intergovernmentalism limits formal access to policymakers, but groups and policymakers build channels for informal access. To some extent contrary to the predications of established theories, this allows interest groups to exert some degree of influence even on policy dossiers in which intergovernmental arrangements prevail. In such policy domains, groups opposing change do not always succeed, despite the veto opportunities that intergovernmentalism provides. While this is a significant finding, the thesis also notes how interest group influence is most commonly exerted upon relatively technical issues and at later stages of the policy cycle. Moreover, the study emphasises that institutional structures are not the only relevant factor in explaining group influence. Group-level characteristics, including material resources, condition groups’ ability to adapt to complex decision-making in EU foreign policy. The thesis concludes that a combination of factors is required to capture the influence of interest groups over EU foreign policy.

This thesis investigates struggles for meanings and social understandings of Europe taking place through cultural institutions, festival sites, and art projects. I claim that culture is a social field where meanings of Europe are made. I argue that meanings of Europe that emerge in these cultural sites are not prior or given, but are a result of struggles between the actors involved. They These meanings are to different degrees particular and autonomous, depending on the proximity of a given cultural site to the political structures of the state and the EU. This research identifies that actors who construct Europe’s meaning do so according to common patterns. Europe’s meanings evoke notions of unity – it is a symbol of coming together. At the same time, what different actors mean by Europe is an articulation of their particular ideals circumstances and aspirations, rooted in their direct contexts. In other words, in culture, there is but one Europe. There is not one Europe. This is confirmed by how Europe is understood by the immediate audiences of these cultural sites. It is perceived as relevant only when translated through familiar contexts – specific, local or national – and only then it is embraced. The background of the analysis is the significance of aesthetic culture in modernity, its role in making the nation, and its social imagining. This thesis examines the ways in which culture today demonstrates a similar capacity in regard to Europe, albeit in a micro scale. The methods employed are discourse and audience reception analysis, as well as participant observation. The empirical investigation comprises of a microanalysis of sites of cultural production. The case studies selected for this analysis, drawing on studies of cultural nationalism, include an online cultural outlet, an independent film festival and a transnational cultural festival, as well as a series of state commissioned contemporary artworks, all of which claim to be European in one way or another.

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has become a prominent sender of international sanctions. Most of its sanctions regimes have been imposed to address human rights violations and democratic shortcomings in autocratic regimes. While these developments have attracted an increased attention by academics and practitioners alike, not much is known about the underlying factors that trigger the EU’s decision to impose sanctions in the very first place. Using a new database of EU democratic sanctions between 1989 and 2010, this thesis develops a theoretical model that shows that the imposition of sanctions is the result of a strategic bargaining process between a sender and a target country. I argue that sanctions are only one possible outcome of this process, and claim that the likelihood that sanctions are imposed depends, to a large extent, on the target country’s decision to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed or, alternatively, on its determination to ignore the sender’s threat of sanctions and resist its pressure. I show that the target’s decision to comply or resist is the result of an endogenous policy formation process, which is determined by the target regime’s domestic institutional setting. Different types of institutions (regime types) impose varying degrees of constraints on the ruler’s margin of manoeuvre and shape her policy choices vis-à-vis the threat and imposition of sanctions. I demonstrate that regimes that face no domestic constraints and rely on a small winning coalition of supporters are likely to be strong and willing to resist the sender’s pressure, thereby “self-selecting” themselves into sanctions. By the same token, regimes that face many domestic constraints are vulnerable to sanctions, and face incentives to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed. My thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides a theoretical explanation of how domestic institutions matter in the imposition of sanctions, and identifies a set of conditions under which sanctions are more likely (not) to be imposed. Second, it empirically demonstrates the presence of selection effects in the study of sanctions imposition, and shows that these are channelled through the target regime’s domestic institutions. Finally, my findings have relevant policy implications, as they suggest that sanctions are more likely to be effective against certain types of targets. I show that sanctions are more likely to succeed against politically constrained regimes at the threat stage or early during a sanctions episode, whilst they are likely to fail against highly authoritarian regimes which rule free of domestic constraints.

In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence. It was a highly controversial move that divided international opinion. While the United States and many EU members quickly recognised the new state, many other countries, including Russia and China and several EU members, did not. Even today, Kosovo remains a contested state. Although Germany recognised Kosovo quickly, it nevertheless expressed concerns over the failed international efforts to reach an agreement. This thesis analyses Germany’s decision to recognise Kosovo as independent despite the multilateral disagreement. It traces the position of Germany on Kosovo from the early 1990s until recognition in 2008. It pays particular attention to the final months of negotiations, when Germany represented the EU in the ‘Troika talks’ that also involved the US and Russia. In 2008 Germany was less committed to a Kosovan state than its close allies in the Quint – a five state group that also included the United States, Britain, France and Italy. Domestically the coalition parties had different approaches towards the status question. Also the international division on the status in the EU and the United Nations Security Council were a significant obstacle for the German leadership to accept a unilateral declaration of independence. The acceptance of this international divide came when domestic actors were persuaded that the Troika negotiations had exhausted all possibilities for a resolution. From a theoretical standpoint, Germany’s decision to recognise is examined in regards to its Civilian Power identity and specifically to intervention and multilateralism. It is argued that Germany recognised Kosovo due to its long-standing involvement in the intervention in the conflict and due to concerns that an unresolved status would bring greater instability to the Western Balkans. Germany’s recognition was therefore built on a rationale of conflict management and expectations of an increasing role of the European Union in this process.

The thesis analyses the evolution of Hong Kong as an autonomous international actor and how that has been sustained under Chinese sovereignty, in the context of the wider debate on paradiplomacy and the increasing international participation of Non-Central Governments (NCG). The opening chapter offers a review of the literature on non-state actors (NSA) and emphasises the limitations of the new literature on NCGs that emerged in the 1990s which fails to deal with the heterogeneity of NCGs, the specific characteristics that differentiate them from other NSA and their impact on the international system. The next two chapters examine the factors behind the process of HK’s emergence as an international player in the early 1960s: textile trade interests and reaction to proteccionism; HK elite bureaucracy legitimisation strategy; flexibility of the international system for what accounted the Dominions’ historical precedent and the pragmatic interests of influential states. HK’s emergence as an international financial centre, the development of a system of external representation in the 1970s and the creation of the new framework for external relations inserted in the 1984 Joint Declaration, further contributed to consolidate and expand HK’s autonomy into new areas, including political ones, at the same time they introduced a note of ambiguity in HK’s international status. Fresh insights into the negotiation of the JD international affairs chapter are offered. Chapter Four examines HK’s post-1997 implementation of the new external relations’ framework and how far external autonomy was preserved demonstrating that the level of external autonomy HK enjoys is determined not merely by the relation with the Central Government but by the interplay between this, HK’s own strategy and actions and the attitude of external players. The logic of “autonomy cum isolation” that prevails in HK-Beijing relations, deviant practices concerning “specific authorisations” and excessive govemmentalisation of external affairs are identified as the main risks for future autonomy in a context where the SAR has been able to preserve the core of its external autonomy in relation to China. Chapter Five deals with HK’s legitimacy basis and sources of influence as an international player looking at its participation in WTO. To assert its influence HK uses not one but a combination of sources of influence, namely technical expertise, economic power, and above all the performance of a systemic broker role associated with its dual identity. The final chapter discusses the research results and concludes that, unlike other NCG, HK has been able to have a direct impact on the international system, namely through the participation in the process of international rules-making in trade and financial matters. This capacity is determined by the triangle “external autonomy-legitimacy-influence” which conditions the ability of NCG to take advantage of the opportunities created by the globalisation-localisation process to enhance their international role and contribute to a better global governance.

The thesis analyses Dag Hammarskjöld’s political role as UN Secretary-General and the efforts he made to justify such a role. It is the first attempt to give a comprehensive account of the political role Hammarskjöld played from “both sides”, based on the now available sources from both national and UN archives. The thesis also deals with the problems of a political role for the UN Secretary-General. The conventional picture of Hammarskjöld as a “neutral and impartial” international civil servant is challenged and the figure that emerges is the one of an astute politician – a ”Machiavelli of Peace”. As a civil servant in Sweden, Hammarskjöld played a political role although he viewed himself as an expert and civil servant and not a politician. He argued that he could play a political role based on ”neutrality and impartiality” and he transferred this concept to the international arena as Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld managed to play an important political role because he offered a solution to the American dilemma of how to deal with the Cold War in the ThirdWorld without choosing between their Western European allies and the newly independent countries. This at the precise time when the Americans were losing control of the General Assembly due to the influx of newly independent countries that put decolonisation on the agenda. In the Congo Crisis the political role of the Secretary-General reached its zenith during the initial period where Hammarskjöld played an interventionist role. Hammarskjöld’s policies were based on clearly defined Cold War objectives – shared by the Western permanent members of the Security Council – and on a wish to enlarge the political role of the Secretary-General. The weak base for Hammarskjöld’s political role forced him to radically change his policies in the Congo to shore up his position when he was criticised for his interventionist policies.

The basic tenets of International Relations have become subject to uncertainty and debate. The academic consensus that dominated the field has cracked with further questions arising on the conventional assumptions’ claim to universality. Post-modernist thinkers, who have challenged its foundation on structured thinking, affirm that normalising discourses within traditional foreign policy position restricts academic advancement in the area. They challenge the notion that geopolitics and national politics are mutually exclusive. They argue for an interpretive approach of IR, which could show that some principles and understanding that shape domestic policymaking may affect foreign policy positions. Their interpretation of politics, including IR, is that, its fundamentals require an interpretive review of actions and their consequences. These reveal the socio-political and environmental influences that help shape policy, which traditional approaches to foreign relations fail to reveal. In over a century, the political situation in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe tilted towards the ideological position of the party in Britain. A debate about the nature of government, human rights, economics and Britain’s role in these, has characterised the foreign policy debate between the two states. The definition of these concepts has depended on the party running Downing Street. The emphasis on similar issues in the 1970s and 1980s differed to that of the late 1990s, indicating divergent interpretations of national interests, which most scholars regard as causal of the apolitical nature of IR. The high levels of public interest Rhodesian/Zimbabwean interests pushed foreign policy into the ideological field of domestic politics. This challenges the IR premises established by convention IR approaches. Thus, using the case study it is clear that dominated views of foreign relations are unable to verify the whole picture of what transpires in a political field.

The rise of international criminal law and the proliferation of international criminal tribunals is one of the most striking developments in international law and international politics over the last two decades. Given the pending closure of the ad hoc tribunals, the question of their legacies has become increasingly topical. This thesis examines the institutional creation of legacies at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Drawing on extensive field research, including over 230 interviews with key personnel, the thesis examines how each of the tribunals responded to the spectre of organisational decline. It finds an array of actors and institutions actively involved in the perpetuation of their international organisations and in the manufacturing of legacies. Incorporating insights from multiple disciplines, the analysis traces, and explains, variation across these processes of social construction. In theoretical terms, the thesis conceives of ‘legacy building’ as an unexamined yet central coping strategy vis-à-vis organisational demise that is aimed, first and foremost, at meaning making. Challenging the common depiction of legacies as objectively measurable end results, the study demonstrates that legacies are actively produced, not passively acquired. This is shown to be so because the impending closure of international organisations raises existential questions –– at both the institutional and individual level –– about their ownership, legitimacy and raison d’être. Accordingly, the comparative analysis of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ECCC reveals a hectic ‘legacy turn’ in the work of the tribunals that resulted in heightened, though not always effective, organisational reflexivity. The analysis contributes to filling an evident research gap in the study of international law. By showing where legacies come from, it challenges conventional, descriptive portrayals of the development of the international criminal tribunals. It unpacks what conventional accounts take as a given: the existence of legacies. But the research findings are relevant beyond international criminal law. They speak to the broader question of how international organisations portray––and perpetuate––themselves upon the completion of their mandate.

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