Cette recherche a pour but d'interpréter la pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau en la voyant avant tout comme un mouvement dialectique entre l'idéal et le réel, le premier étant ce que Rousseau désire, le second ce qu'il constate au sujet du monde qui l'entoure. Nous présenterons cette dialectique en trois temps. Tout d'abord, Rousseau critique la société. Secondement, il propose des idéaux - nous en aborderons quatre - pour la réformer et, ce faisant, soulevant lui-même les obstacles qui s'opposent à ces idéaux, il pose des artifices pour les surmonter. Finalement, devant l'inadéquation définitive et nécessaire entre idéal et réel, Rousseau se rétracte dans des constats aussi ternes que conservateurs et, ultimement, fuit la réalité dans une solitude paranoïaque dont témoignent éloquemment ses écrits autobiographiques. Notre conclusion tentera de montrer comment ce parcours sinueux jonché d'artifices et de rétractations est d'une richesse et d'une rareté fort précieuses pour la philosophie.

No description available.

Univ., Diss.--Zürich, 1999.

Zugl.: Basel, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.

Is there a relationship between science and happiness and, if so, what is it? Clearly, since the Enlightenment, science has increased life expectancy and bodily comfort. Is this happiness, or do humans long for something more? To examine these questions, I investigate the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Specifically, I focus on the Discourses and the Emile, as he states in the Confessions that these works form a whole statement concerning the natural goodness of man. I agree with the literature that finds happiness, for Rousseau, is a sentiment one experiences when their faculties correspond to their desires, as this produces wholeness. In this dissertation, I find a form of modern science is necessary for humans to experience higher forms of happiness. This form of science is rooted in utility of the individual. To fully explain this finding, I begin with Rousseau's concept of being. By nature, our being experiences a low form of wholeness. I show Rousseau's investigation of being exposes a catch-22 situation for developing it to experience higher forms of wholeness. While freedom allows us to develop reason and judgment, we need reason and judgment to properly direct our freedom to perfect our individual being. I then show how three different types of tutors and educators, which include a scientific education, are directed by the single goal of maintaining wholeness in Emile's being so he can achieve the happiness of romantic love. Finally, I find that Emile's scientific education is an elaboration of the First Discourse and that his relationship with science, even from birth, plays a critical role for achieving romantic love in the future.

No description available.

published_or_final_version / abstract / Humanities / Master / Master of Philosophy

This dissertation offers a re-evaluation of the role of the imagination in Jean- Jacques Rousseau’s 'Emile: or On Education' (1762) and Christoph Martin Wieland’s 'Geschichte des Agathon' (1794). My central claim is that both novels develop a pedagogy of the imagination in order to overcome the dilemmas of Cartesian dualism, that is, to form a beautiful soul in whom sensuality and reason, the body and the spirit, coexist in harmony. I demonstrate that both texts highlight the important but potentially damaging role played by the imagination in the development of religious thought, moral sentiments, and sexuality. The texts suggest that while a malformed imagination results in materialism, egotism, libertinism, and despotism, a well-formed imagination provides the foundation for natural religion, cosmopolitan enthusiasm, sentimental love, and a just political constitution. Consequently, I argue that for Rousseau and Wieland, harnessing the power of the imagination becomes the key to reconciling human nature and civil society. In addition to elucidating the role of the imagination in 'Emile' and 'Agathon', this dissertation also contributes to an understanding of the intellectual affinities between Rousseau and Wieland more generally. In preparation for the comparative reading of 'Emile' and 'Agathon', I survey Wieland’s private and public responses to Rousseau and contend that although the two authors differ significantly in their narrative and philosophical approach, they nevertheless share similar moral and political ideals. Both authors acknowledge the ability of the imagination to drive a wedge between the individual’s natural inclinations and moral duties, causing fragmentation of the self and society in turn. Yet the imagination, the motor of cultural progress, is not only the source of man’s alienation, it is also the remedy for his dividedness. If properly harnessed, the imagination can cease to be the cause of human depravity and become the basis of peaceful human relations, both at the level of the individual and that of society as a whole. In conclusion, I propose that the role of the imagination in forming the beautiful soul has consequences for the collective, and that we can read the moral constitutions of Emile and Agathon as negotiating the possibilities of various political constitutions, including that of a democratic state. / Thesis (Ph.D, German) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-15 17:47:42.944

Uppsatsen behandlar gudserfarenhet och språkbruk hos Jean-Jacques Rousseau och dess likheter med pietismen. Både Rousseau och pietismen betonade människans känslor framför förnuftet, i en för övrigt förnuftsorienterad tid. De menade att människans känslor måste tillåtas komma till uttryck i trosfrågor och när de talar om hur människan erfar Gud och det gudomliga använder de liknande ord och begrepp. Studiens syfte är således att studera dessa likheter, med fokus på Rousseaus språkbruk och bildvärld.

Rousseau notoriously praises ignorance and censures learning for the moral corruption that it has inflicted upon his age, yet he admits that the arts and the sciences are good in themselves. I consider the effects of learning and knowledge on moral education, in an effort to answer the following question: What is the role of ignorance in moral education for Rousseau? While some interpreters have acknowledged his sensitivity to various groups in society with regard to moral education, none has properly systematized the different types of ignorance that Rousseau praises or identified the benefits of those types of ignorance to various individuals and societies. I distinguish the savage’s ignorance from that of Socrates and identify another important type of ignorance, the benefits of which stem from our natural sentiment and innate curiosity.