Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T14:11:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_4256_.pdf: 622580 bytes, checksum: c5cc4b3aa32844f41b2f3a3aaf0081ba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-15 / O intertexto é o tema que conduz este trabalho. É feita uma proposta para a noção, distinguindo-a da de intertextualidade. Localiza algumas propostas de definição para as duas noções, mostrando que os conceitos não são tão solidamente delimitáveis. Lança mão da teoria freudiana da manifestação das lembranças para questionar o conceito da autoria de um texto e propõe a concepção do intertexto como memória da literatura. Num segundo momento, aborda historicamente os fundamentos do gênero literário policial, a sua gênese no século XIX de Edgar Allan Poe e das idéias positivistas, passando pela literatura noir americana e sua influência sobre a literatura policial brasileira. Faz uma análise com ênfase intertextual de Borges e os orangotangos eternos (2002) de Luis Fernando Verissimo, romance que traz o escritor argentino Jorge Luis Borges como personagem central e um cenário composto de temáticas borgianas, referências à literatura de modo geral, e ao gênero policial, de maneira específica, e ao tema do fazer literário. Propõe que os intertextos funcionam como forças a moldar os sujeitos e que é ali que podem ser enxergadas as intenções ideológicas de um texto.

The pine beetle is transforming BC's lush greenery into a sea of red death. Jorg Bohlmann looks to the conifer tree for clues on how to halt the beetle's rampant spread.

No description available.

History is descriptive. Epistemology is conceived as normative. It appears, then, that a historical approach to epistemology, like historical epistemology, might not be epistemically normative. In our context here, epistemology is not a systematic theory of knowledge, truth, or justification. In this thesis I approach epistemic justification through the vantage point of practice of science. Practice is about reasoning. Reasoning, conceived as the human propensity to order perceptions, beliefs, memories, etc., in ways that permit us to have understanding, is not only about thinking. Reasoning has to do with our actions, too: In the ordering of reasoning we take into account the desires of ourselves and others. Reasoning has to do with tinkering with stuff, physical or abstract. Practice is primarily about skills. Practices are not mere groping. They have a form. Performing according to a practice is an activity with a lot of plasticity. The skilled performer retains the form of the practice in many different situations. Finally, practices are not static in time. Practices develop. People try new things, some of which may work out, others not. The technology involved in how to go about doing things in a particular practice changes, and the concepts concerning understanding what one is doing also may change. This is the point where history enters the picture. In this thesis I explore the interactions between history, reasoning, and skills from the viewpoint of a particular type of epistemic justification: a priori justification. An a priori justified proposition is a proposition which is evident independent of experience. Such propositions are self-evident. We will make sense of a priori justification in a context of regarding science as practice, so that we will be able to demonstrate that the latter accommodates the normative character of science.