In 2002, the North Carolina General Assembly made several changes to the system of popular elections for the state\'s appellate courts, including the removal of partisan labels from the ballot, starting with the 2004 elections. This particular change presents an opportunity for a natural experiment in which to observe any differences that may have appeared between how the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled before and after the reform, contributing to a line of literature on the impact of institutional arrangements (including selection systems) on judicial decision-making. The thesis examines whether any detectable differences appeared between judicial behavior and the decisional output of the North Carolina Supreme Court in its partisan era (1995-2004) and in its nonpartisan era (2005-2011). Based on analysis of several different characteristics of the Court\'s decisions and individual justices\' votes in these eras, I find no evidence to suggest that the nonpartisan system was associated with justices behaving in more "nonpartisan" ways. If there was any change, it was that during the nonpartisan era, the behavior of the justices was more in line with what would be expected of partisans than it had been in the partisan era. At least in North Carolina, changing the selection method of state supreme court justices from partisan to nonpartisan elections was not followed by less partisan behavior. / Master of Arts

This paper is a study on the effect of caste on bench assignments on the Indian Supreme Court. The objective was to determine whether the Chief Justices have historically assigned associate justices to benches based on their individual castes – Brahmin or Non-Brahmin – in order to tilt the bias of the Court in either an elitist (Brahmin) direction or a non-elitist (Non-Brahmin) direction. Based on a probability analysis of panel assignments, I created a new model to determine the extant of castebased judicial selection bias on the Indian Supreme Court. Using a random sample of cases from 1950 to 2000, a two-sample test of proportionality was employed to test whether any bias was present in the Chief Justice’s bench assignments. No caste bias was discovered in either the fifty-year period of the Court or in a smaller data set of cases between 1977 and 2000 (a period after the emergency between 1975 and 1977).

The three branches of American government---judicial, legislative, and executive---serve important governmental roles, and present their own interesting political questions. We answer three here. First, what are the differences between judges and politicians, and how does this inform the formers' selection? Second, how do senators behave to satisfy their political preferences and the electorate's? Third, what is the optimal strategy for a candidate in the Electoral College? American states select judges in various ways. In Chapter 1, we analyze "merit selection." Typically, a nonpartisan commission culls applicants for judgeships, and an appointee is selected by the governor. Then, periodically, this judge undergoes a retention election: an up-or-down vote by the state's electorate. We contribute a microeconomic model to analyze these elections. We compare this institution, in welfare terms, to others used to appoint and retain judges. Finally, we analyze a recent and ongoing phenomenon: these elections are transforming from historically rubber stamp formalities into contested, politicized contests. The politicization of issues brought before courts increases the likelihood of judges being ousted. In Chapter 2, we explore the behavior of legislators in the U.S. Senate, and of the voters who elect them. We examine shifts in incumbent senators' espoused political positions over time, as the reelection campaign approaches. We introduce novel game theoretic models of incumbent-challenger interaction. We find, through empirical analysis of senators' roll call votes, that senators moderate their positions over time, as potential reelection approaches. Moreover, this moderation accelerates. This is explained by the behavior of voters: the moderation is mirrored by the attention paid by voters. Also, the identity of an incumbent's challenger plays an important role in the amount of moderation exhibited by the incumbent. In Chapter 3, we consider a highly adaptable game theoretic model of competition in the Electoral College. It takes the form of a repeated game. Candidates make allocation decisions to persuade voters. Candidates get utility from winning office, and disutility from expending resources. We characterize optimal campaign strategy, and present comparative statics. We show, inter alia, that a candidate with an inherent advantage may prefer a longer campaign. / text

[pt] A tese apresentada propõe a investigação do problema da baixa presença de mulheres nos tribunais superiores brasileiros. A hipótese levantada é a de que a pequena diversidade de gênero nos altos postos do Judiciário brasileiro ocorre em detrimento do objetivo de imparcialidade sustentado por essa função estatal em sociedades democráticas. A metodologia adotada no desenvolvimento do trabalho pode ser dividida em três partes. Em um primeiro momento, é empreendida uma investigação dogmática das normas constitucionais, leis e regulamentos internos dos órgãos responsáveis pelo processo de seleção de magistrados no Brasil. Na segunda etapa, passou-se ao exame, inspirado na análise do discurso, de textos do processo de escolha dos magistrados para o Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ambos os métodos conduziram à verificação do problema da baixa presença de mulheres e dos constrangimentos de gênero existentes para se chegar até os tribunais superiores brasileiros. Permitiram, também, a compreensão da importância atual do gênero como critério de diferenciação social e, consequentemente, da validade desse parâmetro para a investigação proposta. Na terceira parte, empreendeu-se revisão teórico-bibliográfica interdisciplinar sobre o tema e, de forma mais ampla, sobre a desigual inclusão de grupos sociais subalternos às esferas de poder. A análise permitiu a identificação das contribuições já trazidas à discussão e das lacunas que permanecem sem ser apuradas, tornando útil o seu desenvolvimento no trabalho. O exame também conduziu à identificação de categorias analíticas válidas para a análise a ser empreendida, por informarem a necessidade de que os sujeitos ocupem iguais posições de poder na sociedade. Segue-se daí a proposição do marco teórico da standpoint theory e a elaboração do argumento da tese. O argumento proposto é o de que a diversidade, em especial, a inclusão das mulheres no Judiciário é requisito para a imparcialidade judicial, instituto que será analisado a partir do direito processual. Em outras palavras, propõe-se que a imparcialidade judicial depende da diversidade do Poder Judiciário. O reconhecimento, ditado pela standpoint theory, da existência de perspectivas fundadas na posição social dos indivíduos e da necessidade de que elas, quando socialmente relevantes, sejam veiculadas para a construção de objetividades mais fortes vai, ao mesmo tempo, ao encontro dos postulados democráticos, porque amplia a participação e a inclusão social em sociedades plurais, e ao encontro da garantia de imparcialidade, porque favorece a construção plural do conhecimento. Apresento, ao final, o conceito de imparcialidade forte, que é a consequência da aplicação da standpoint theory a um Poder Judiciário democrático e que justifica a necessidade de políticas públicas para a composição paritária de gênero nos tribunais superiores brasileiros. / [en] The presented thesis investigates the problem of the under-representation of women in Brazilian superior courts. The hypothesis is that the absence of gender diversity damages judicial impartiality. The research methodology used has three stages. Firstly, a rigorous investigation of constitutional norms, laws and internal regulations of the judicial selection process of Brazil. Secondly, with inspiration on discourse analysis, an exam of texts on the selection process for electing Superior Court judges. Both methods verify the low presence of women and the gender constraints to reach Brazilian superior courts. The methodologies also demonstrate the current importance of gender as a social differentiation criterion and hence, the current importance of this parameter for the proposed research. The third stage is an interdisciplinary theoretical review on the subject and, more broadly, on the unequal representation of subaltern social groups in positions of power. The analysis identify the contributions already brought to discussion and the gaps that remained, validating the work development. The review also discerns analytical categories valid for the analysis, demonstrating the need for subjects to occupy equal positions in society. The proposed argument is that diversity, in particular women s inclusion in the Judiciary, is prerequisite for judicial impartiality, in the light of procedural law. In other words, the argument is that judicial impartiality depends on the diversity of the Judiciary. The recognition of standpoints based on the social position of individuals and the need for them, when socially relevant, to be conveyed to build stronger objectivities meet democratic postulates. This expands participation and social inclusion in plural societies and it is essential to assure judicial impartiality and the favoring of the plural construction of knowledge. Conclusions present the concept of strong impartiality, which is the result of the application of standpoint theory to a democratic Judiciary and justifies equal gender representation in public policies in Brazilian superior courts.