The thesis examines the constitutional position of the Court of Session's supervisory jurisdiction. It begins by emphasising the methodological and substantive importance of the historicality and traditionality of law. It then provides a detailed historical account of the emergence of the Court's supervisory jurisdiction, from its inheritance of supervisory functions from emanations of the King's Council to the present-day law of judicial review. Throughout, emphasis is placed on the Court's strong sense of self-orientation in the wider legal and constitutional order, and the extent to which it defined its own supervisory jurisdiction. The court was a powerful constitutional actor and played a strong role in the increasing centralisation and systematisation of the legal order, expanding its supervisory purview through a powerful triumvirate of remedies (advocation, suspension and reduction) and a comprehensive approach to the supervision of a wide range of bodies. The thesis then frames tensions between Parliament and the Court in the context of judicial review of ouster clauses, chosen as a point of heightened inter-institutional tension. This is demonstrated to be an area in which divergent visions of the constitution are evident – Parliament regarding itself as entitled to oust the jurisdiction of the Court to judicially review, and the Court regarding itself as entitled to examine and pronounce on the extent of ouster, including its limitation or exclusion. In attempting to conciliate these divergent constitutional worldviews, the thesis rejects a “last word” approach which prevails in the English judicial review literature. It considers (and rejects), as alternatives, dialogue theories and functional departmentalism. The thesis then advances constitutional narratology as its preferred analytical framework for the accommodation of those inter-institutional tensions, and conciliation of their divergent worldviews. The Court's performance of a constitutional-narratological function facilitates the integration, conciliation and synthesis of legal norms with an existing law and legal system; weaves and coagulates multifarious legal norms into a unified and univocal body of norms; and executes a chronicling, expository and explanatory storytelling function which sets a legally-authoritative narrative to the law. In doing so, the Court performs a distinctive and indispensable constitutional function incapable of fulfilment by Parliament. It is argued that traditionality and functional necessity provide the legal-systemic legitimation for the Court's performance of the constitutional-narratological function. Finally, the thesis considers the institutional specificity of the function, concluding that it is the function, rather than the institution, that is indispensable. However, neither the advent of the Upper Tribunal nor the U.K. Supreme Court suggest at this stage that the Court's performance of that function is waning.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Syracuse University, 2008. / "Publication number: AAT 3323050."

« Lorsque, à l’occasion d’une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu’une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d’Etat ou de la Cour de cassation… ». Le nouvel article 61-1 de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 a ouvert un champ contentieux inconnu en France : celui de la constitutionnalité de la loi en vigueur. Le pouvoir de révision constitutionnelle a renforcé et étendu la compétence d’une institution à caractère juridictionnel, le Conseil constitutionnel, bénéficiant d’une qualité spécifique d’attribution tirée de la source constitutionnelle. Dans un vocabulaire juridique largement admis, le juge constitutionnel est distinct d’autres catégories de juges : « juges ordinaires », ou « internationaux ». La question initiale est alors la suivante : pourquoi peut-il être fondé juridiquement de penser et de promouvoir le postulat, selon lequel le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois doit s’exercer de façon concentrée ? Parce qu’il apparaît qu’en France, le discours sur le juge constitutionnel et la justice constitutionnelle procède non d’un discours interne au système juridique (discours du droit) mais sur un discours externe (discours sur le droit), celui des juristes savants et de la prétention à connaître de façon scientifique l’objet juridique.Faisant le choix d’un paradigme herméneutique pour la connaissance juridique, le présent travail propose de traiter la question de la spécificité de l’office juridictionnel dans l’opération d’application du droit qui s’y rattache. La spécificité de la norme constitutionnelle fonde celle d’une fonction constitutionnelle au sein de l’ordre juridique, permettant de modéliser la voie d’un espace processuel de résolution éthique des conflits d’interprétation constitutionnelle. / “If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a legislative provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil d’État or by the Cour de Cassation to the Constitutional Council…”The new article 61-1 of the Constitution of October 4th, 1958, strengthens the constitutional review of laws in France. For that purpose, the jurisdictional remit of the Constitutional Council has been extended. By its constitutional habilitation, this institution would be in a position to benefit from the recognition of a special authority. In the prevailing legal vocabulary, to describe a legal system such as the French one, the constitutional judge is singled out from other judges (“ordinary” judges for example, etc.).Therefore, the first question to be asked is: why should it be legally founded to think and promote the basic premise which is that the constitutional review of laws shall be exercised by a single body? In France indeed, developments about the constitutional judge or constitutional justice don’t stem from an internal perspective of the juridical system but originates from the external discourse of learned lawyers who ambition to scientifically approach law.With a hermeneutical paradigm for legal knowledge, this study tries to deal with the question of a judicial office through a process of normative concretization. In this view, the characteristics of the constitutional norm found a constitutional function into the legal order. Then, it seems to be possible to imagine a processual space allowing the ethical resolution of interpretative conflicts.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thiago Buschinelli Sorrentino.pdf: 3995173 bytes, checksum: bd95b32c746e3b64c8723cdce5cd1d48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-06 / This paper examines the judicial review of how tax liability is ascribed to non-taxpayers, upon the Brazil Supreme Court point of view (Supremo Tribunal Federal). Studies, at first, the role of language, logic and Systems Theory as tools which will be used throughout the investigation. Then, rebuilds the syntactic and dynamic structures of the norms that ascribe tax liability. Searches for the constitutional and non-constitutional (National Tax Code) parameters of control. Emphasizes proportionality, reasonableness and the role of general taxation norms within the system. Scrutinizes some of the instruments available to the Brazil Supreme Court (the ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, the recurso extraordinário and the reclamação constitucional). At last, reckons scenarios in order to test some of the conclusions / Esta dissertação de mestrado examina o controle da atribuição de responsabilidade tributária, tomando por parâmetro os instrumentos disponíveis ao Supremo Tribunal Federal. Estuda, inicialmente, o papel da linguagem, da lógica e da Teoria dos Sistemas na formação do quadro. Reconstrói, então, as estruturas sintáticas e dinâmicas das normas de responsabilidade tributária. Procura pelos parâmetros de controle, constitucionais e infraconstitucionais (Código Tributário Nacional). Em especial, dá ênfase à proporcionalidade e a razoabilidade e ao papel das normas gerais em matéria tributária. Escrutiniza alguns dos instrumentos disponíveis ao Supremo Tribunal Federal para o controle da responsabilidade tributária (a ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, o recurso extraordinário e a reclamação constitucional). Por fim, elege cenários para testar alguns pontos das conclusões