For most of its existence South African administrative law has been shaped by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty – the heart of the constitutional order from 1910 to 1994 – and a racist political system that favoured the white minority at the expense of the black majority. In these circumstances, the rules of administrative law were of limited use in protecting the individual from exercises of administrative power that infringed fundamental human rights, often on a grand scale. On 27 April 1994, however, a new political and constitutional order came into existence that swept away the very foundations of the old order: parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by constitutional supremacy and the racial exclusivity of the old order was replaced by a commitment to equality, freedom and dignity in a democratic state. A justiciable Bill of Rights was at centre stage in this new order. That Bill of Rights includes a fundamental right to just administrative action. It is both the new constitutional order and this rather unusual fundamental right that have changed the nature of South African administrative law. This thesis examines the effect of the fundamental right to just administrative action on the law and practice of the judicial review of administrative action. It does so principally by examining the legal position before and after 27 April 1994 with particular reference to: what is meant by administrative action; the exercise of administrative power by private bodies regulated by the rules of administrative law, on the one hand, and exercises of private power regulated by rules of private law, on the other; the rules of standing, the notion of justiciability and the constitutionality of rules that seek to limit the right of the individual to approach a court to review administrative action; the meaning and scope of the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action, in terms of the common law, the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000; the meaning, scope and efficacy of the rights to reasons for administrative actions and of access to information; the procedure of judicial review and remedies that may be granted for the infringement of a person’s right to just administrative action; and conclusions and recommendations with regard to progress made in the construction of South Africa’s new, democratically based, administrative law.

Principles of administrative proceedings, abstract Focus of this diploma thesis is the issue of basic principles of administrative proceedings, but not in terms of basic procedure principles of administrative authorities as they are set out in § 2 to 8 of the Administrative Procedure Code, but in terms of procedural principles of administrative proceedings, as rules of procedure before administrative authorities. These principles represent a key element for understanding and interpretation of the procedural process in an administrative proceeding, but Administrative Procedure Code does not contain an express codification of these principles in its text. Goal of this thesis is to perform a detailed analysis of individual principles both individually and in context. The aforementioned principles of administrative proceedings usually occur in the form of mutually ambivalent pairs and their application during administrative proceedings presents many conflicting issues which stems from their implicitly general nature. The methodological basis of this thesis is the method of textual hermeneutics and general empirical-analytical paradigm based on the source material, which consists mainly of judgments and resolutions of the Supreme Administrative Court and is supplemented by relevant literature. The text of this...

Principles of administrative proceedings, abstract Focus of this diploma thesis is the issue of basic principles of administrative proceedings, but not in terms of basic procedure principles of administrative authorities as they are set out in § 2 to 8 of the Administrative Procedure Code, but in terms of procedural principles of administrative proceedings, as rules of procedure before administrative authorities. These principles represent a key element for understanding and interpretation of the procedural process in an administrative proceeding, but Administrative Procedure Code does not contain an express codification of these principles in its text. Goal of this thesis is to perform a detailed analysis of individual principles both individually and in context. The aforementioned principles of administrative proceedings usually occur in the form of mutually ambivalent pairs and their application during administrative proceedings presents many conflicting issues which stems from their implicitly general nature. The methodological basis of this thesis is the method of textual hermeneutics and general empirical-analytical paradigm based on the source material, which consists mainly of judgments and resolutions of the Supreme Administrative Court and is supplemented by relevant literature. The text of this...

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Master of Laws

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Frankfurt am Main, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [xxi]-xliv).

This work examines the legal effects of a declaration of a state of emergency under the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 and the exercise of legislative and administrative powers pursuant thereto. The general basis of judicial control over executive action and the various devices used to limit or oust the court's jurisdiction are set out and explained. Against this background, the courts' performance of their supervisory role under the special circumstances of emergency rule is critically surveyed and assessed. The legal issues raised by the exercise of emergency powers is examined at the various levels of their deployment: first, the declaration of a state of emergency; second, the making of emergency regulations; third, their execution by means of administrative action, including detention, banning, censorship and the use of force. The major cases concerning emergency issues, both reported and unreported, are analysed in their appropriate contexts, and an overview provided of the effects of emergency regulations and orders on such freedoms as South Africans enjoy under the 'ordinary' law. Finally, an attempt is made to assess how these decisions have affected the prospect of judicial review of executive action, both in the emergency context and in the field of administrative law generally. The conclusion is that, however far the Appellate Division may appear to have gone towards eliminating the role of the law in the emergency regime, grounds remain for the courts to exercise a more vigorous supervisory role should they choose to do so in future.

Since the incorporation of the separation of powers doctrine into the South African Constitution, the problem has arisen that, each of the three tiers of government, the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature, has sought to protect exclusive jurisdiction over matters that fall within what constitutes that tier's own realm of authority. The effects of this are especially apparent in the field of dispute resolution in administrative law. The administration is predominantly the province of the Executive, and to a lesser extent, the Legislature. Thus, the acceptability of judicial review in dispute resolution and generally, the intrusion by the Judiciary in matters of the administration is perennially questioned and challenged by both the Executive and the Legislature. In this context, the duty to exhaust internal remedies assumes a pivotal role. It offers a compromise, by prescribing qualified exclusion of judicial review as a first port of call for dispute resolution while simultaneously entrusting initial dispute resolution to the administration. Often, this approach yields tangible results, but from a constitutional and fundamental rights perspective, the duty to exhaust internal remedies is problematic. Its exclusion of judicial review goes against, not only the right of access to court in section 34 of the Constitution, but also the rule of law, to the extent that the rule of law allows for the challenging, in court, of illegal administrative action as soon as it is taken. This thesis analyses the constitutionality of the duty to exhaust internal remedies in section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act by assessing the consistency of section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act with the right of access to court in section 34 of the Constitution. The thesis initially examines the origins and historical development of the duty to exhaust internal remedies in the English law, and the subsequent adoption of the duty to exhaust internal remedies into the South African common law for the purpose of interpreting and comprehending the duty to exhaust internal remedies as it is appears in section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. Ultimately, the study focuses on and identifies the deficiencies in the current approach to the question of the constitutionality of section 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, and offers suggestions on how the law might be developed.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.