Work plays a dominant role in modern society. It is through work that the economic well being of any society is sustained. Workers who perform various tasks contribute to the well being of society as well as to their betterment as individuals. Thus paid employment has assumed a prominent role in modern society. It is an incentive on individuals to contribute to socio-economic welfare, while their needs and aspirations as individuals are also satisfied. But for an orderly society to exist, there has to be a subjection of some members of society by others, a division between those who have the social mandate (express or tacit) to exercise power for and on behalf of others. Thus work relations comprise those who exercise managerial power(employers) and those subject to managerial power (employees). In broader political relations, the task of social management is performed by the state. However those exercising managerial functions do not have unfettered discretion. Power should be exercised within acceptable social limits and be used to achieve realistic social goals. Thus it has been felt that the laws should always ensure that the incumbents of governmental power do not exceed the scope of their power or abuse it. Hence the process of judicial review. This gives the courts the power to review the decisions of administrative authorities in order to protect individual citizens who might be adversely affected by bad administrative decisions. This analogy has been applied in employment relations in order to protect individual employees against arbitrary dismissal by employers. It has been held that an employee cannot be dismissed without a valid reason and in compliance with a fair procedure. The question asked here is whether this is sufficient to ensure substantive employment protection. Is judicial review really effective in employment relations? It is observed that judicial review in labour law has many limitations as compared to the administrative law context. First, it comes face to face with the problem of the public/private law distinction, which holds the employment relationship to be fundamentally a private relationship between the employer and employee. This complicates the application of public law remedies in supposedly private relations, where the parties are assumed to have freedom of contract. The second problem involves the debate as to whether the state should impose many restrictions on the modern corporation or there should be minimal state intervention to allow the corporation to function in accordance with the labour market demands and economic necessity. It is concluded that the law of unfair dismissal has consequently been put in a dilemma. While the need has been perceived to curb the arbitrary use of managerial power by employers, substantive employment protection can hardly be guaranteed. The problem seems to be that of striking the balance between the interests of employees, employers and society at large. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1995.

No description available.

The primary purpose of this treatise is to revisit and reconsider the development of the review test set out in the Constitutional Court judgment of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) and consequently ascertain the correct approach to be adopted by our Labour Courts in the application of such test. The secondary purpose, entail the determination of the extent to which Labour Court judges interfere with the merits of awards and the resulting impact on the distinction between appeal and review. In order to establish whether the test for review was correctly developed and to determine whether our review proceedings deter recurrent interference by our judges, an edifying consideration of judicial review in South Africa, an extensive analysis of various judgements pertaining to such development, followed by a comprehensive comparison with the United Kingdom`s application of review proceedings and judicial composition are made. The research methodology is based on a contour of Sidumo, commencing with the Sidumo judgment, followed by three contentious Labour Appeal Court judgments and concluding with a Supreme Court of Appeal judgement, which clarifies the operation of the review test. The contour is interlinked with the notion of reasonableness. The primary research findings are identified in the judgment of Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA). The judgment, concluding the Sidumo contour, underlines the current position in our law and consequent narrower approach. A comparison made with the United Kingdom, differentiate between such approach implemented by our courts and the strict gross unreasonableness approach applied by Employment Appeal Tribunals, recognising the finding, that our Labour Court judges ardently interfere with the merits of awards. In the conclusion it is submitted that our labour law jurisprudence will constantly evolve, dictated by our courts interpretation of lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness.

Thesis (LLM.) -- University of Limpopo, 2007 / Refer to document

Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament has dominated the constitutional law of South Africa for a very long time. In the pre-constitutional era, the judiciary had no power to question the deeds of Parliament. Despite the need for the judiciary to be independent from the two other governmental branches to execute its function effectively, it was surely dependent on them. However, the creation of the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) as a separate governmental department by the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, read together with Superior Court Act, mandated by the requirements of a supreme Constitution (and not Parliament), changed things so that the judiciary is no longer dependent on government for its day-to-day administration. This thesis examines the independence of the OCJ and its role in promoting judicial transformation in the new South Africa. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. M. (Human Rights Law)

In the interplay between protection of rights and majoritarianism, the court is the arena. This research focuses on the conflicting role of the court within a constitutional democracy and a contestation of the counter-majoritarian dilemma that emerges from such a role. The counter-majoritarian dilemma centres on the idea that judges overturning decisions of the legislature through judicial review undermines democracy by thwarting the will of the majority through a subjective reading of abstract constitutional principles. As a point of departure, the counter-majoritarian dilemma is contested by revealing that the court can be seen as a democratically consistent institution if democracy can be reconceptualised. The examination of the South African jurisprudential climate and the adjudicative guidelines followed by the court suggests a rejection of such anti-democratic contention. The court upholds the commitments consented to at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and adjudication is reflective of the values undertaken by the country in reaction to its past. Within these values, minority rights can find a lifeline. Thus minority rights can exist through the implications of majoritarian consent. This research further identifies, in response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma, a constraining self-consciousness on the part of the court and an acute awareness of the court’s precarious role within a democratic infancy. The core of the counter-majoritarian dilemma is the view that interpretative indeterminacy of the Constitution means that the will of the people could be substituted for judicial preference. Through the examination of the court’s interpretative strategies and judicial subjectivity, this research suggests that within judicial subjectivity, adjudication continues to be reflective of the will of the people. Far from a constraining and mechanistic interpretation to avoid judicial subjectivity, the research reveals that open and non-formalist interpretative strategies are necessary to effectuate democratic conciliation within the judicial mandate. The results of this research suggest that, far from being a democratically deviant institution, the court in the current South African jurisprudential context, is the most suited to uphold the concept of democracy. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.