This dissertation explores the relation between literature and legal culture in Argentina. It asks why Argentinean literature repeatedly engages with problems of justice and criminality, and what social meanings and social effects this produces. The recurrence of judicial scenes in Argentinean literature expresses a frustration for the way in which the state and society try to solve their conflicts, and reveals what demands and ideas of justice are conceivable in a society that, like Argentina’s, is prone to unlawfulness. My argument is that given Argentineans resistance to the law, literature configures an alternative legality that contests state definitions and juridical principles, and displaces the symbolic place of criminality within society, revealing the jurisgenetic potentials of literature, its ability to create legal meaning. In Chapter 1, I analyze literary contestations of state definitions of criminality and justice during the simultaneous development of juridical and literary discourses at the end of the nineteenth century, specifically in Esteban Echeverría’s El matadero (1871), José Hernández’s Martin Fierro (1872, 1879), and Eduardo Gutiérrez’s Juan Moreira (1879). Chapter 2 examines how Jorge Luis Borges questions the philosophical possibility of political and juridical representation and appeals to a Hispanic affectivity to argue for a personal, individual, and affect-driven justice that ignores the state. Finally, Chapter 3 shows the alternative legality produced by literature at work by surveying cases of litigation in the cultural sphere between 1959 and 2004. The study of the legal opinions written by the judges in the cases against Ricardo Piglia’s Plata quemada (1997) and against the exhibition entitled León Ferrari. Retrospectiva. Obras 1954-2004 demonstrates that the notions and mechanisms regulating artistic practices are capable of refracting juridical principles. / 2018-08-11T00:00:00Z

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-05-10T14:32:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Maurício Pedroso Flores_.pdf: 1452373 bytes, checksum: b3eefd002f5203610f3f86784a7b5ce5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-10T14:32:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maurício Pedroso Flores_.pdf: 1452373 bytes, checksum: b3eefd002f5203610f3f86784a7b5ce5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-28 / Nenhuma / O jurista norte-americano Robert Cover desenvolveu importante reflexões sobre aspectos fundamentais para a teoria do direito, como a genêse da normatividade social e a legitimidade dos tribunais. Uma vez que não conseguiu sistematizar seus escritos de uma forma relativamente coerente, o autor deixou a comentadores e críticos muitas reflexões, mas também muitos questionamentos sobre a sua obra. As diferentes interpretações e apropriações de seu pensamento demonstram que seu pensamento ainda é, em grande parte, um livro aberto. O objetivo do presente trabalho é, apresentando as principais concepções do autor, demonstrar que seu pensamento permanece atual e relevante como fonte de insights sobre o direito contemporêneo. Para tanto, nossa exposição se baseia em dois movimentos. Primeiro, procura reconstituir o pensamento de Cover a partir de seus principais textos e ideias. Em um segundo momento, propõe uma especulação sobre possíveis caminhos teóricos apontados por sua obra. A reconstrução de suas principais ideias é centrada em dois grandes marcos de sua obra: os ensaios Nomos e Narrativa (1983) – onde Cover elabora seus conceitos mais influentes, como nomos e jurisgenesis – e Violência e a Palavra (1986) – em que Cover sugere que a interpretação jurídica se estabelece em um “campo de dor e morte” e é indissociável da violência. As mensagens centrais desses dois ensaios têm sido interpretadas por comentadores e críticos como parcial ou totalmente contrárias. Considerando-os como igualmente fundamentais para compreender o pensamento de Cover, o trabalho recorre a alguns desses debates à procura de uma interpretação que possa conciliar as duas abordagens. Por fim, com base nessa interpretação, sugere que a obra de Cover pode ser lida a partir da ideia de um pluralismo normativo, acepção que compreende aqui dois significados: tanto a adoção de uma pluralidade de fontes normativas como a presença de critérios normativos para avaliar criticamente o direito. / The American jurist Robert Cover developed important reflections on fundamental aspects of the theory of law, such as the genesis of social normativity and the legitimacy of the courts. Since he could not systematize his writings in a relatively coherent way, Cover’s work stood as a source of many reflections, but also many questions, for his commentators and critics. The different interpretations and appropriations of his thought show that his thinking is still largely an open book. The aim of this thesis is to present Cover’s main ideas and to demonstrate that his thinking remains current and relevant as a source of insights into contemporary law. To do so, our exposition takes up two tasks. First, it seeks to reconstruct Cover's thinking from his main texts and ideas. In a second moment, it proposes a speculation on possible theoretical paths pointed by his work. Our reconstruction of is centered on two major milestones of his work: the essays Nomos and Narrative (1983) – where Cover elaborates his most influential concepts, like nomos and jurisgenesis – and Violence and the Word (1986) – in which Cover suggests that legal interpretation is established in a "field of pain and death" and is inseparable from violence. The central messages of these two essays have been interpreted by commentators and critics as partially or totally contrary. Considering them as equally fundamental to understanding Cover's thinking, the paper resorts to some of these debates in search of an interpretation that can reconcile the two approaches. Finally, based on this interpretation, it suggests that Cover's work could be read as containing the idea of a normative pluralism, an expression that has two meanings here: it connotates not only the adoption of a plurality of normative sources but also the presence of normative criteria to evaluate law critically.