abstract: A substantial amount of research has been dedicated to understanding how and why innocent people confess to crimes that they did not commit. Unfortunately, false confessions occur even with the best possible interrogation practices. This study aimed to examine how different types of false confession (voluntary, compliance, and internalization) and the use of jury instructions specific to confessions influences jurors’ verdicts. A sample of 414 participants read a criminal trial case summary that presented one of four reasons why the defendant falsely confessed followed by either the standard jury instruction for confessions or a clarified version. Afterwards, participants completed several items assessing the perceived guilt of the defendant, their attitudes on confessions in general, and their opinions on jury instructions. Although the three confession reasons did not differ among one another, jurors who were given no explanation for the false confession tended to more harshly judge the defendant. Further, the clarified jury instructions did not influence the participants’ judgments. Future research should focus on how expert witness testimonies affect verdicts regarding each type of false confession reason and whether the media may influence a juror’s knowledge of factors that could provoke false confessions. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2017

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.

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The purpose of the study was to examine whether a potential juror would give harsher sentences to defendants based only on the manipulation of the defendant's personal hobby. This was investigated by manipulating the hobby through a hypothetical manslaughter scenario in a vignette. Participants were asked to answer questions pertaining to the defendant's guilt and potential sentencing. Results indicate that participants' sex, participants' authoritarianism, and defendant's hobby were significant factors. Significant interactions were found pertaining to whether the defendant should receive counseling across sex by violence and sex by avocation. These results are evidence that the use of jurors in the legal system is flawed and needs to be improved upon. Future research should examine an age distribution closer to the national mean, and the online setting should be replaced with an in person mock jury that will have more realistic group dynamic and higher ecological validity.

In a two-part study, dating sexual expectations will be evaluated and the sexual social exchange theory will be investigated in a date rape trial. In Part 1, participants (N = 100) will be presented with one of two fictional date scenarios that will differ only on the cost of the date (i.e., $30 or $175). Participants will then indicate what behaviors (sexual and not sexual) are appropriate at the end of a first date and then a fifth date. It is predicted that all participants will expect sexual intercourse more on the fifth date than the first, and that participants in the expensive date scenario will expect sexual intercourse more than participants in the inexpensive date condition. Part II will use the information gathered in Part I to investigate how sexual expectations in a dating scenario may manifest themselves as feelings of reciprocity in the sexual social exchange theory. In Part II participants (N = 160) will be presented with one of four trial summaries that differ depending on the cost of the date (i.e., $30 or $175) and the date number (i.e., first or fifth). Participants will render a verdict and then rate the defendant and alleged victim on various rating factors (e.g., credibility), in addition to completing the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale, short form. It is predicted that there will be fewer guilty verdicts and lower pro-victim judgments for both men and women when the cost of the date was high and when the couple was on their fifth date. It is also predicted that men will render fewer guilty verdicts and report lower pro-victim attitudes than women. Juror rating subscales (e.g., victim credibility) and rape myth acceptance scores are predicted to mediate the effects of the cost of date and date number on verdict. The results will be discussed in terms of how the sexual social exchange theory can explain juror perceptions in a date rape trial.

The present series of studies examine how jurors and public defenders evaluate different pieces of evidence and integrate them into a coherent conclusion within the context of a criminal case. Previous research has shown that in situations where both sides of the case are compelling, decision-makers nevertheless come to highly confident and polarized decisions, called coherence shifts (Simon, 2004). The present research sought to expand on coherence effects, improve upon the methodology of previous studies, and explore potential moderators of coherence. In Study 1, mock jurors (n = 306) read about a criminal case and evaluated multiple pieces of evidence at various points throughout the case. Results indicated that participants exhibited pronounced coherence shifts (i.e., their evaluations of the various pieces of evidence (a) became more consistent as the case progressed, and (b) were evaluated in line with their initial leanings) using an improved methodology that randomized evidence order and evidence valence. Furthermore, participants’ interim leanings of guilt or innocence biased their subsequent evaluations of ambiguous evidence. The direction and magnitude of participants’ coherence shifts were predicted by their pretrial dispositions towards prosecution and defense. Participants lacked awareness of how their perceptions of the evidence have shifted. Coherence shifts were not, however, moderated by asking mock jurors to justify their decisions, or by asking mock jurors to play devil’s advocate while considering each piece of evidence, underscoring the pervasiveness of this cognitive bias. Study 2 examined whether actual public defenders experience coherence shifts and how those shifts relate to the plea bargaining process; however, no coherence shifts were observed. Study 3 examined whether the timing of the defense’s presentation of their case could reduce coherence effects; results indicated that reading about the defense’s case immediately after the prosecution’s case (c.f. following a delay) marginally (p = .09) reduced coherence effects among jurors who acquitted the defendant, suggesting one potential strategy to mitigate this bias.