The doctrine of justification tells how the saving grace of God in Christ can be actualized in the believers. Because of the very importance of this doctrine, disputes broke out between Augustine and Pelagius, later in the medieval period, and most importantly during the Reformation period - which led to mutual condemnations and the division of the Western church. The church still does not have a unified voice in interpreting the doctrine despite recent ecumenical dialogues, which culminated in the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification in 1999. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Theology / PhD; / Dissertation;

The thesis poses the question of how one can stabilize a state through external intervention without destabilizing sovereignty. The study critically examines the justifications for international and regional interventions in the cases of Liberia and Burundi through a social constructivist framework. The main objective of the thesis is to enhance the understanding of how sovereignty is interpreted during non-aggressive interventions, both from a theoretical perspective through analysis of official discourses and from a practical perspective through interviews with external and internal actors in the field. The thesis argues that it may be more fruitful for future studies to question the aim of these interventions, rather than ask how to improve them. The study finds that rather than reinforce the sovereignty, these interventions neutralize states subject to external intervention in the sense that they become dependent on external capacity to maintain their stability, thereby maintaining peace and order in the international arena. The conclusion is that these interventions remain both controversial and paradoxical and the stated aim of reinforcing the state's sovereignty is questionable at best.

A revision of the author's thesis, Salzburg, 1965. / Bibliography: p. 112-119.

A revision of the author's thesis, Salzburg, 1965. / Bibliography: p. 112-119.

Thesis--Helsingfors. / Errata slip tipped in. Summary in German. Bibliography: p. [xii]-xxii.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Legal punishment is frequently regarded as a cornerstone of both the legal system and of society more broadly yet (surely to its detriment) it is a practice which lacks a firm philosophical foundation. In spite of exercising many extremely capable legal and philosophical minds (particularly during the twentieth century) no generally agreed upon justification of punishment has been found. The nub of the problem has however been acknowledged as the inability of either of the major candidate theories (utilitarianism or retributivism) to provide an account able to address all the relevant parties. Whilst utilitarianism is often regarded as competent to the task of justifying punishment to society in terms of the attainment of some greater good, it seems entirely inadequate when it comes to formulating a justification to the criminal to explain why he has been singled out for punishment. And in the case of retributivism the situation is reversed. To the criminal it can be put that through punishment he is treated in accordance with what has done, but in the matter of justifying punishment to society, the key principle of desert is unable to be properly grounded. Thus the central motivation of this thesis is to attempt to redress this shortcoming in the philosophical literature and to formulate a viable justification of legal punishment. Ultimately it will be argued that the accounts of both Kant and Hegel offer a way of resolving the dilemma of punishment, and in particular their idealist orientation over and above their more widely acknowledged characterization as retributivists. In Kant’s case his contribution is derived from a reworked and more sophisticated version of his retributivism than is generally found in the literature, inspired by the work of Susan Meld Shell. Following Shell’s lead Kant’s construction of justice is explored and found to both enhance and support the traditional justification of punishment he can offer to the criminal, and to furnish an otherwise elusive justification of punishment to society more broadly. A reading of Hegel on punishment is also developed by taking seriously his theory of recognition and aspects of his logic, particularly regarding negation and contradiction. His account then addresses quite neatly and straightforwardly the three audiences for whom a justification of punishment is sought – the criminal, the victim and society itself. Not only does the thesis address the problem of punishment but it has further implications for Kant and Hegel scholarship as well as philosophy more broadly. One of the key points to come out of this thesis is that Kant and Hegel (if given adequate intellectual consideration) seem potentially able to offer up significant contributions to contemporary problems and issues beyond just the one argued for here regarding punishment. Their work is not merely of historical interest but has real and wide ranging possibilities which provide a rich resource for future research.

George Bull was a key figure in the vanguard of the High Church party who was a staunch defender of trinitarian orthodoxy within the Restoration Church of England; yet, the doctrine of justification described in his earliest scholarly works has met with substantial criticism. Scholars continue to question the orthodoxy of Bishop Bull's views on justification and to condemn the moralism that allegedly pervades his theology. Bull argued for a forensic understanding of justification from within a covenantal context. His description of the relationship between faith and works restored earlier Augustinian emphases within the Church of England. In the process, he sought to purge the church of error by rejecting excesses intrinsic to both the Roman Catholic and Reformed traditions. His insistence that justification can never be considered sola fide sine operibus, his undisguised anti-Calvinism, and his unrelenting repudiation of the imputation of Christ's alien righteousness in justification made him a lightning rod for controversy, but this project contends that Bishop Bull's rejection of justification by faith is one of nuance and emphasis when examined within the context of the English Reformation. Chapter 1 provides a brief biographical sketch of Bishop Bull's life and ministry and outlines the methodology of the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides an exegesis and analysis of Bull's earliest scholarly publications. Chapter 3 sheds light on the content and character of the theological debates that shaped Anglican views on justification antecedent to the Restoration era. In addition to the formularies of the Church of England, this chapter contrasts Bull's thought with the teachings of a representative group of sixteenth-century English divines including Thomas Cranmer, William Tyndale, Robert Barnes, Hugh Latimer, John Hooper, and John Jewel. Chapter 4 examines Bull's teachings in contrast with those of a representative group of seventeenth-century divines who remained within the established Church of England. That group includes Richard Hooker, John Davenant, William Forbes, William Hammond, and Jeremy Taylor. Chapter 5 concludes the study and evaluates the strength of allegations that Bull was a theological innovator whose doctrine of justification deviated from the teachings of earlier English Protestants.

This paper tries to search for a moral justification for the compensation of the imprudent. It argues that it is not necessary for individuals to be prudent to have access to wealth and incomes.  It argues that as far as individuals are participating in common social venture, this in itself should be considered as a criterion for allowing them from having access to wealth and incomes.  It argues, basically, against luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism argues that effort should be the central criterion for having access to goods and services. But this will exclude individuals from having access to goods and services, if they are imprudent and this is unfair. The paper argues that since access to goods and services are central to live a meaningful life other criterion has to be introducing as criterion for distributing of goods and services. I propose that some kind of independent agreement among the participant of a common social venture could be used as a criterion for compensating if anyone fails in his option luck.  The content of the agreement could be that some percent of (say 25%) of the initial capital has to be compensated for individuals if he fails in his effort. Having proposed this I have argued that the flower farmers should be compensated even if they fail in the flower industry.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Theologische Fakultät--Erlangen-Nürnberg--Friedrich-Alexander-Universität, 1994.

Texte remanié de: Th. D.--New Testament studies--Theological seminary--Dallas (Tex.), 2001. / Bibliogr. p. 331-362. Index.