Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Deerfield, Ill., 1999. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 161-172).

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Concordia Seminary, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-163).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Detroit Baptist Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-111).

Diss.-- Franeker (J. Coyter, defendant).

Thesis (M.A.)--Reformed Theological Seminary, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-81).

Diss.--Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät--Bonn--Rheinische-Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 277-288. Index.

Le visa est traditionnellement présenté comme le fondement logique de l’arrêt de cassation, en ce qu’il désigne la règle de droit qui a été violée par la juridiction du fond. Cependant, aussi importante que soit la logique dans le raisonnement juridique, certaines étapes de celui-ci sont irréductibles à une simple déduction. La présentation du visa comme fondement de l’arrêt a alors l’inconvénient de travestir la réalité. Elle passe en effet sous silence les opérations que sont l’interprétation et la qualification, pourtant centrales dans le raisonnement juridique, et laisse de côté certains arrêts qui ne peuvent pas être expliqués sous ce prisme. Il apparaît alors plus juste de voir dans le visa un élément de justification de la cassation. Cette justification opère de multiples façons selon la nature du lien unissant le visa et la solution, mais aussi selon la fonction du visa dans la justification. En effet, lorsque les visas sont multiples, tous n’ont pas le même rôle. La fonction justificative du visa étant établie dans toute sa complexité, reste à savoir si le visa atteint vraiment son objectif, à savoir convaincre ses destinataires. Il apparaît que les commentateurs se saisissent largement du visa pour tenter de déceler la règle appliquée et les raisons ayant mené à son choix, déterminer la portée de l’arrêt, voire pour déterminer quelles sont les sources du droit. Cependant, le message véhiculé par le visa n’est pas toujours bien reçu. La cour de cassation, confrontée à de tels problèmes, a traditionnellement tendance à multiplier les moyens de communication sur l’arrêt plutôt que de modifier sa pratique du visa, mais cette attitude évolue actuellement / The reference to the law in the French supreme court of appeal decisions is traditionally presented as their logical basis, in that it refers to the rule of law which has been violated by the court. However important logic in legal reasoning, certain stages of it are irreducible to deduction. The presentation of the reference to the law as the basis of the judgment has the disadvantage of disguising reality. It ignores the operations of interpretation and qualification, which are nevertheless central to legal reasoning and leaves aside certain judgments which can’t be explained under this prism. It seems more accurate to see in the reference to the law an element of justification for the cassation. This justification operates in many ways depending on the nature of the link between the reference to the law and the solution, but also according to the function of the reference to the law in the justification. Indeed, when references to the law are multiple, not all have the same role. As the justification action of the reference to the law is revealed in all its complexity, it remains to be seen whether it really achieves its objective, namely to convince its recipients. It appears that commentators are largely aware of the reference to the law in an attempt to identify the rule applied and the reasons for its choice, determine the scope of the judgment, and even determine the sources of the law. However, the message conveyed by the visa is not always well received. The court of cassation, confronted with such problems, has traditionally tended to multiply the means of communication on the judgment rather than modifying its practice, but this attitude is currently changing

No description available.

Epistemologists often debate whether we ought to be internalists or externalists about epistemic justification. Internalists say that whether an agent's belief is justified depends on facts internally accessible to the agent, and externalists deny this. But what if internalists and externalists could both be right? This would be a pluralist view of epistemic justification. You might think that a pluralist view would be plausible because it would allow us to explain why we have different intuitions in different cases, and it would allow us to use different concepts for different purposes. In this paper, I argue the pluralist view has several serious flaws that make it much less plausible than it might initially seem. I show that pluralists run into even worse problems than monists when trying to vindicate intuitions about cases. They also run into problems when trying to specify a singular concept of epistemic justification to use for a certain purpose. It is therefore unclear what reason we would have to adopt a pluralist stance. I conclude that we ought to be monists about epistemic justification. / Master of Arts / Epistemologists often debate what it is that makes a belief justified. The view that the criteria for justification are internal to an agent is called "internalism" and the view that the criteria include factors external to an agent is callee "externalism." But what if internalists and externalists could both be right? This would be a pluralist view of epistemic justification. You might think that a pluralist view would be plausible because it would allow us to explain why we have different intuitions in different cases, and it would allow us to use different concepts for different purposes. In this paper, I argue the pluralist view has several serious flaws that make it much less plausible than it might initially seem.

Cette thèse porte sur le rôle du raisonnement fondé sur des croyances religieuses dans la discussion politique, et plus précisément sur la compatibilité des arguments religieux publics avec les postulats libéraux et démocratiques concernant la justification de décisions politiques, c’est-à-dire prises au nom de l’État. La justification publique est gage de légitimité en démocratie libérale : mais dans quelles conditions une décision est-elle publiquement justifiée ? Tous les arguments sont-ils valables ? Les arguments religieux sont souvent considérés avec méfiance : ils sont particuliers, ne sont convaincants que pour certains citoyens et sont rejetés par d’autres. Il semblerait donc injuste, pour ceux qui ne partagent pas ces croyances religieuses, de les utiliser pour justifier des décisions politiques. La même chose, cependant, vaut pour de nombreux autres arguments, non religieux, comme les arguments utilitaristes et les arguments libéraux eux-mêmes. L’objectif de la thèse est d’examiner différentes stratégies visant à justifier l’exclusion de certains arguments, puis de proposer un nouveau modèle de discussion politique. La thèse défendue est que les arguments absolutistes, c’est-à-dire les arguments fondés sur la reconnaissance de l’existence d’une source extra-sociale de validité normative, ne respectent pas les exigences de la justification publique et doivent donc être exclus de la discussion politique. Mais la distinction entre arguments absolutistes et non absolutistes ne recoupe pas celle entre arguments religieux et séculiers : on ne peut donc pas dire que tous les arguments religieux doivent être exclus, ni qu’ils peuvent toujours être inclus. / This dissertation focuses on the role of faith-based reasoning in political discussion, and more specifically on the compatibility of public religious arguments with liberal and democratic premises regarding the justification of political decisions, i.e. decisions made in the name of the state. Public justification is a requirement of legitimacy in liberal democracy: but under which conditions is a decision publicly justified? Are all arguments valid? Religious arguments are often considered with suspicion: they are particular, therefore convincing for only some citizens and rejected by others. It seems unfair, for those who do not share religious beliefs, to use these arguments to justify political decisions. The same objection, however, is also true for many other non-religious arguments, like utilitarian arguments or liberal arguments themselves.The purpose of the dissertation is to examine different strategies aiming to justify the exclusion of certain arguments, and then to offer a new model of political discussion. The claim defended is that absolutist arguments, meaning arguments that are based on the recognition of the existence of an extra-social source of normative validity, do not respect the requirements of public justification and consequently should be excluded from political discussion. The distinction between absolutist and non-absolutist arguments does not overlap with the distinction between religious and secular arguments: it thus cannot be argued that all religious arguments should always be excluded, or that they could always be included.