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Thesis (M.A.B.S.)--International School of Theology, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-57).

Thesis (S.T.D.)--Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 277-292).

The narrative structure and formal style of the director Shinoda Masahiro's films reveal his ethical objective to encourage his viewer to engage with works of cinematic representation as the creative products of human agency that they are. Within his period films, Shinoda hopes to stimulate recognition of cinema's genealogical inheritance and reproduction of the absolutist propositions underlying traditional Japanese cultural forms. He posits that these have redirected essential human drives into masochistic self-effacement in tribute to a divine ideal imaged in the Imperial polity. By disrupting the illusion of cinematic realism which simply serves to reinforce Japanese culture's existent intertextual networks, Shinoda seeks to reground cultural expressions in their material and human origins. This acts as the first step to imagining a Japanese subject outside of the limited definitions posed by nostalgic absolutism and its reactionary antithesis in the equally self-destructive mode of global capitalism.

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Cette thèse porte sur le rôle du raisonnement fondé sur des croyances religieuses dans la discussion politique, et plus précisément sur la compatibilité des arguments religieux publics avec les postulats libéraux et démocratiques concernant la justification de décisions politiques, c’est-à-dire prises au nom de l’État. La justification publique est gage de légitimité en démocratie libérale : mais dans quelles conditions une décision est-elle publiquement justifiée ? Tous les arguments sont-ils valables ? Les arguments religieux sont souvent considérés avec méfiance : ils sont particuliers, ne sont convaincants que pour certains citoyens et sont rejetés par d’autres. Il semblerait donc injuste, pour ceux qui ne partagent pas ces croyances religieuses, de les utiliser pour justifier des décisions politiques. La même chose, cependant, vaut pour de nombreux autres arguments, non religieux, comme les arguments utilitaristes et les arguments libéraux eux-mêmes. L’objectif de la thèse est d’examiner différentes stratégies visant à justifier l’exclusion de certains arguments, puis de proposer un nouveau modèle de discussion politique. La thèse défendue est que les arguments absolutistes, c’est-à-dire les arguments fondés sur la reconnaissance de l’existence d’une source extra-sociale de validité normative, ne respectent pas les exigences de la justification publique et doivent donc être exclus de la discussion politique. Mais la distinction entre arguments absolutistes et non absolutistes ne recoupe pas celle entre arguments religieux et séculiers : on ne peut donc pas dire que tous les arguments religieux doivent être exclus, ni qu’ils peuvent toujours être inclus. / This dissertation focuses on the role of faith-based reasoning in political discussion, and more specifically on the compatibility of public religious arguments with liberal and democratic premises regarding the justification of political decisions, i.e. decisions made in the name of the state. Public justification is a requirement of legitimacy in liberal democracy: but under which conditions is a decision publicly justified? Are all arguments valid? Religious arguments are often considered with suspicion: they are particular, therefore convincing for only some citizens and rejected by others. It seems unfair, for those who do not share religious beliefs, to use these arguments to justify political decisions. The same objection, however, is also true for many other non-religious arguments, like utilitarian arguments or liberal arguments themselves.The purpose of the dissertation is to examine different strategies aiming to justify the exclusion of certain arguments, and then to offer a new model of political discussion. The claim defended is that absolutist arguments, meaning arguments that are based on the recognition of the existence of an extra-social source of normative validity, do not respect the requirements of public justification and consequently should be excluded from political discussion. The distinction between absolutist and non-absolutist arguments does not overlap with the distinction between religious and secular arguments: it thus cannot be argued that all religious arguments should always be excluded, or that they could always be included.

This thesis is a study of Plato as an absolutist and his influence on modern education.

Keywords: democracy, humanity, violence, absolutism, discussion, decision Thomas G. Masaryk was a supporter of humanism and humanist democracy. Carl Schmitt criticized such conceptions. In this thesis I would like to show that their different attitudes are an effect of different foundational concepts in their political thought. Masaryk believed that political philosophy wasn't nothing else than zoology, if it hadn't morality in her foundations. Schmitt saw the starting point of every true political theory in violent characteristic of human being. For Masaryk the democracy is in the end a moral ideal, the humanity, by which human beings abandon all the violence and they resolve all their potential conflicts by the discussion. I will show in this thesis, that moral equality of human beings cannot be proper foundation of democracy and that Masaryk demands too much to make possible to realize his democratic vision. The democracy in Schmitt's view is an authoritative violent regime where the individuality should be totally suppressed and a political relevance of the morality too.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2019-03-13T16:37:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jezreel Antonio Mello_.pdf: 883244 bytes, checksum: 0f99a54fe4e85f9d0bf75f62a017c95e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2019-03-13T16:37:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jezreel Antonio Mello_.pdf: 883244 bytes, checksum: 0f99a54fe4e85f9d0bf75f62a017c95e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-10-30 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação se propõe a analisar se, na teoria da soberania de Jean Bodin, é possível identificar a existência de limitações à ação daquele que exerce a soberania em uma República. A partir da resposta a essa questão, procura-se investigar se há ou não coerência no conceito de soberania apresentado por Bodin, fundamentando-se na análise de perspectivas divergentes a esse respeito. Nesse sentido, três posicionamentos podem ser destacados entre os comentadores de Bodin. O primeiro inclui os defensores da tese que aponta uma contradição no pensamento de Bodin, uma vez que este defende uma soberania absoluta, porém não ilimitada. Numa segunda perspectiva se encontram os defensores da tese conciliadora, que sustenta a coerência da concepção de soberania bodiniana. Há também uma terceira via, composta por aqueles comentadores que defendem uma posição mista, no sentido de uma coerência parcial do conceito de soberania de Bodin. Para empreender essa pesquisa, proceder-se-á, inicialmente, a uma análise dos limites da soberania na teoria da soberania de Bodin, partindo-se de alguns conceitos-chave para a compreensão do conceito de soberania do autor, até a exposição e análise dos limites estabelecidos por Bodin ao exercício do poder soberano. Por fim, será feita uma exposição crítica desses limites, abordando os posicionamentos opostos dos comentadores que defendem a coerência ou a contradição no pensamento de Bodin, e expondo alguns elementos que poderiam indicar uma leitura conciliatória das ideias apresentadas. / The present dissertation aims to analyze if, in Jean Bodin’s theory of sovereignty, it is possible to identify the existence of limitations to the acts of that who holds the sovereignty in a Republic. As of the answer to this question, we will try to establish whether or not the concept of sovereignty presented by Bodin is coherent, based on the analysis of divergent perspectives in this regard. In this sense, three perspectives can be highlighted among Bodin's commentators. The first includes proponents of the thesis that points to a contradiction in Bodin's thinking, since he advocates for an absolute but not unlimited concept of sovereignty. In a second perspective are the proponents of the conciliatory thesis, which asserts the coherence of Bodin’s concept of sovereignty. There is also a third way, comprised by those commentators who defend a mixed position, which affirms the partial coherence of Bodin's concept of sovereignty. To undertake this research, we will initially analyze the limits of sovereignty in Bodin's theory of sovereignty, starting with some key concepts for the understanding of the author’s concept of sovereignty, then proceeding to the exposition and review of the limits established by Bodin to the exercise of sovereign power. Finally, a critical exposition of these limits will be made, addressing the opposing positions of the commentators who defend the coherence and the contradiction in Bodin's thought, and exposing some elements that could lead to a conciliatory reading of the presented ideas.