Many accounts of epistemic justification are initially plausible as accounts of justifiably coming to believe a proposition, but fail as accounts of continuing to believe a proposition. In this essay, I examine candidate theories of ongoing justification, arguing that those along both coherentist and foundationalist lines are inadequate. First, I argue that coherentism doesn't work by dividing such accounts into negative and positive theories. Negative coherentism fails because of its dependence on the principle of epistemic conservatism, against which there are decisive objections. Positive coherentism is also rejected because one can be justified in continuing to believe a proposition even if one's doxastic corpus fails to entail or make probable or in any way evidentially support the belief. Foundationalism is then considered. According to one sort of foundationalist, an agent is justified in continuing to believe a proposition only if she remembers the original justificatory basis of her belief. This sort of foundationalism suffers a fate similar to that of positive coherentism; it entails that many beliefs, which clearly are justified, are unjustified. Another kind of foundationalism, one that treats memory as a justification conferring process, is considered. This version is inadequate as it fails to account for the historical nature of justification and fails to account for the justification of unactivated mnemonic beliefs. In the essay's final chapter, I argue that the failure of both foundationalism and coherentism indicates that internalistic accounts are hopeless. Finally, a theory of ongoing justification along reliabilist lines is suggested, elaborated, and defended.

The dissertation is a study of the connection between justification and truth. It presents and critically discusses various ways of construing the connection. A dilemma is argued for to the effect that any construal of the connection is defective, while any theory of epistemic justification that ignores the connection incurs an explanatory deficit. The objective construal of the connection between epistemic justification and truth views such justification as probabilistic. A currently popular version of this view is a theory called Reliabilism. This theory is discussed in terms of both intuitive and purely logical considerations. Another way to cast out the connection between justification and truth is subjectively. It might be claimed that a subject must have beliefs about the connection between his evidence and the truth of the proposition he believes. This approach is characteristic of coderence theories. These theories are assessed with respect to their psychological reality. Since objective and doxastic construals of the connection between epistemic justification and truth fail, theories which eschew a truth connection altogether are discussed. Such an approach is characteristic of foundations theories. It is argued that these theories fail to achieve a level of generality that provides very much insight into the nature of epistemic justification. The final section of the dissertation is a detailed discussion of naturalized epistemology. The stalking horse is Fred Dretske's information-theoretic approach which relies on a very strong truth connection. The lessons of the previous chapters are applied to Dretske's theory demonstrating its inability to account for the normative aspects of epistemic justification.

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In this paper I intend to argue for a position on the justification of memory beliefs. I call that position Mnemonic Phenomenal Conservatism (M-PC). My position is most similar to that set out by Huemer in The Problem of Memory Beliefs. M-PC is a dualist theory insofar as it endorses both a preservationist condition (PRES) and a conservative condition (PC). Mnemonic Phenomenal Conservatism can be stated as follows: M-PC: a) PC: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p; and b) PRES: For any subject, S, his memory belief p is justified all-things-considered at T2 iff p is justifiedly formed by S at an earlier time, T1. I motivate M-PC in three ways. The broad contours of my argument are as follows: i) Firstly, I argue for the dualistic nature of any satisfactory account. I do this in Section 2 by showing that our intuitions regarding the justification of memory beliefs are likely to be influenced by the perspective that we take. These are the 'historical' and the 'time-slice' perspectives. Since we consider memory beliefs from two distinct perspectives, a satisfactory theory of memory beliefs must account for the intuitions generated by looking at problem cases from each of these perspectives. ii) Secondly, I argue that PRES is a necessary part of a satisfactory account. I do this in Section 2 by a reductio on the denial of PRES. There, I also show that a similar preservationist condition is unable to account for our time-slice intuitions: our puzzle is missing a piece. Throughout the paper, the way that PRES operates in dealing with problematic examples should convince us the PRES does most of the heavy lifting in accounting for our historical intuitions. iii) Finally, I argue that PC is the missing piece of the puzzle. My argument to this effect is abductive. While evidentialism (two-types), coherentism and reliabilism fail to account for our time-slice intuitions, PC does so with very little fuss. Thus, PC provides the most plausible condition to add to PRES. Section 3 and 4 show that together these conditions handle mnemonic problem cases of every standard variety.

高基存. / "2001年7月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2001. / 參考文獻 (leaves 120-123) / 附中英文摘要. / "2001 nian 7 yue" / Gao Jicun. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2001. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 120-123) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 序言 --- p.iii / Chapter 第一章 --- 何謂基礎論？何謂融貫論？ --- p.1 / Chapter 第一節 --- 故事 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二節 --- 基礎論與融貫論的主要分別 --- p.4 / Chapter 第三節 --- 避免混淆 --- p.6 / Chapter 第四節 --- 倒退論證 --- p.8 / Chapter 第五節 --- 融貫論者的回應 --- p.11 / Chapter 第六節 --- 不可錯性 --- p.12 / Chapter 第七節 --- 何謂「融貫」？ --- p.17 / Chapter 第八節 --- 各種類型的基礎論與融貫論 --- p.17 / Chapter 第二章 --- 戈德曼的可靠主義 --- p.21 / Chapter 第一節 --- 可靠主義者戈德曼 --- p.21 / Chapter 第二節 --- 知識論詞 --- p.23 / Chapter 第三節 --- 嘗試錯誤的進路 --- p.25 / Chapter 第四節 --- 原因要求 --- p.34 / Chapter 第五節 --- 提出可靠主義 --- p.35 / Chapter 第六節 --- 可靠主義的精確表達´ؤ´ؤ一種基礎論 --- p.38 / Chapter 第七節 --- 關於反事實情況的要求 --- p.41 / Chapter 第八節 --- 強與弱的證成 --- p.44 / Chapter 第九節 --- 對四種合理信念的要求 --- p.47 / Chapter 第十節 --- 笛卡兒的魔鬼世界 --- p.50 / Chapter 十一節 --- 訴諸客觀可靠性的錯謬 --- p.52 / Chapter 十二節 --- 基礎論中的融貫要求 --- p.55 / Chapter 十三節 --- 本章結論 --- p.64 / Chapter 第三章 --- 博朱爾的融貫論 --- p.66 / Chapter 第一節 --- 融貫論者博朱爾 --- p.66 / Chapter 第二節 --- 整體主義的證成結構 --- p.67 / Chapter 第三節 --- 融貫論四步曲 --- p.68 / Chapter 第四節 --- 「融貫」的意思 --- p.71 / Chapter 第五節 --- 三個質疑 --- p.76 / Chapter 第六節 --- 信念系統假定 --- p.78 / Chapter 第七節 --- 觀察信念的證成 --- p.81 / Chapter 第八節 --- 內省信念的證成 --- p.89 / Chapter 第九節 --- 輸入質疑 --- p.93 / Chapter 第十節 --- 可選擇的其他融貫系統 --- p.95 / Chapter 十一節 --- 真理問題的質疑 --- p.96 / Chapter 十二節 --- 信念系統假定的兩難困境 --- p.106 / Chapter 十三節 --- 倒戈相向的觀察要求 --- p.109 / Chapter 十四節 --- 融貫論中的基礎原則 --- p.112 / Chapter 十五節 --- 本章結論 --- p.114 / 結論 --- p.115 / 參考書目 --- p.120

This dissertation argues that Luke has a conscious and detectable theology of justification which can be seen explicitly in Luke 18:9-14 but subtly permeates the narrative. After a brief history of research, the dissertation includes two exegetical chapters dealing with Luke 18:9-14 and its immediate context. Next, the theme of justification is traced throughout Luke in connection with two other significant Lukan themes - the Kingdom of God and eschatological reversal. A brief conclusion brings the strands of argument together. Paul's sermon at Pisidian Antioch (Acts 13), significant because of the appearance of justification, is thoroughly exegeted in an appendix.

The present research demonstrates a novel institutional-level contributor--that is, gendered wording used in job recruitment materials--that serves to perpetuate the status quo, keeping women underrepresented in traditionally male-dominated occupations. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the literature on barriers to women’s inclusion in traditionally male-dominated fields. Chapter 2 demonstrates the existence of subtle but systematic wording differences within a randomly sampled set of job advertisements. Results indicated that job advertisements for male-dominated areas employed greater "masculine" (e.g., challenge, analyze, lead) than “feminine” wording (e.g., support, understand, interpersonal; Studies 1 and 2). In Chapter 3, I tested the consequences of these wording differences across four experimental studies. When job ads were constructed to include more masculine than feminine wording, people perceived fewer women within these occupations (Study 3) and, importantly, women found these jobs less appealing (Studies 4-6). Men showed the opposite pattern, preferring jobs with masculinely-worded ads to the femininely-worded jobs (Study 4-5). Results confirmed that perceptions of belongingness (but not perceived skills) mediated the effect of gendered wording on job appeal (Studies 4 and 6). The system-justifying function of gendered wording and implications for gender parity and theoretical models of inequality are discussed in Chapter 4.

Tesis de doctorado--Roma--Pontificio istituto biblico, 1999. / Bibliogr. p. 275-286.

Diss.--Katholische Theologie--Frankfurt am Main--Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen, 2004. / Bibliogr. p. 209-229.