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In chapters two and three of this thesis, the distinction between the subject and object of knowledge and perception in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is examined in terms of what Kant calls, "representations." These representations are not, in general, as the name might suggest, pictures in the mind, or copies of objects. They are isolated bits of information which the mind has about the world; or, in other words, elementary ways in which the subject is related to the objects which it knows or perceives. The subject is constituted by the grouping of representations into different kinds of representations, mainly on the basis of similarities, so that we have the same sorts of information about different objects. The object is that which representations relate to when select representations of many different kinds are combined, mainly on the basis of coherence, so that we have different sorts of information about the same object. Chapter one is devoted to Kant's doctrine of the object in itself, which is discussed in terms of the distinction between knowledge and belief. Objects in themselves are objects apart from our representations of them. In spite of the fact that they cannot be known, objects in themselves are significant insofar as the false belief that we can know them is an inevitable result of the capacity of the subject to combine representations in different ways, including the combination of representations in the concept of an unknowable object. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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Chapter 3 further investigates the role of intuition in the application of concepts to intuitions. Kant introduces schema as a medium between intuitions and concepts and focuses on the schemata of pure concepts, suggesting that the transcendental schema is a procedure by which pure concepts apply to intuitions. Kant has emphasized inner sense and I complement his seemingly internal account by stressing the role of homogeneous intuitions, in the guise of domesticated intuitions, in schematic procedures. The normativity of inference derives from normative indifference of steps, based on cognitive indifference that exploits homogeneous and domesticated intuitions. / Chapter 4 examines the concept of causality in relation to intuitions. Causality is a concept of relation; while cause is a power to produce its effect. I understand causality as a relation between two series of events or occurrences that are quantitatively synchronizable covariant, which can be tested and modified through empirical intuitions. / In Chapter 2, I examine how intuitions function in mathematical and scientific inferences as well as in cognition in general. Intuitions and concepts in mathematics are the paradigm of concepts and intuitions in other kinds of cognition. In natural sciences, intuitions are concentrated on a homogeneous quality that scientific concepts postulate. Scientific inferences having these intuitions as the base of computability can be uniformly performed by all cognizers. Ordinary concepts can be considered as exhibited in the intuitions that belong to diverse but respectively homogeneous qualities. All of us have an inferential ability to achieve universally valid judgments acknowledged and recognized by each other. I understand this ability of inferential universality as the essence of Kant's transcendental idealism about cognitive subject and I call it cognitive machinery. / The fifth and last chapter examines the concept of purposiveness in relation to mechanical causality. Unlike transcendental causality that is a constitutive principle of cognition, purposiveness is only a regulative principle for the power of judgment. Mechanical causality is a kind of causality through the mechanism of nature. It cannot adequately explain organized beings as we judge them. Then Kant envisages an intentional causality; with its constitutive character deprived, we have the concept of purposiveness. Intuition underlies such a conceptualization of purposiveness in contrast with mechanical causality. A mechanical cause can be given in intuition since we can locate it in a time-series powered by fundamental forces. But purposiveness cannot be given in intuition in Kant's times. Thus Kant asserts that organized beings as natural ends are inexplicable by mechanical causes alone and introduces the purposiveness into our account of organized beings. / The subject of this study is the role of intuition in Kant's conceptualization of causality and purposiveness. In Chapter 1, I interpret Kant's Copernican revolution as a strategy to reverse cognitive procedure, not from object to cognition, but from cognition to object. So Kant starts from the products of human reason, such as mathematics and sciences. Kant bases the foundation of knowledge on an inferential procedure open to all cognizers. Intuition plays a pivotal role in such a procedure. / Chen, Huping. / "March 2008." / Adviser: Tze-wan Kwan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-03, Section: A, page: 0894. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 261-266). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

張鳳麟. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 395-403. / Zhang Fenglin. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue xue bu. / 導言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 康德對於時空問題之陳構模式 / Chapter 1 --- 在“Disserttation´ح中所提出的時空觀不同於《批判》的意義 --- p.12 / Chapter 2 --- 時空納入《批判》之〈超越感性論〉中討論 --- p.24 / Chapter 3 --- 康德對立於傳統形而上學之主客關係模式 --- p.32 / Chapter 4 --- 分析與綜合，先驗與後驗的分別和知識之可能模式 --- p.39 / Chapter 5 --- “ 知識´ح、´ح對象´ح及´ح直覺´ح之關係及其各層意義 --- p.46 / Chapter 6 --- 知識關聯於對象的最直接方式是直覺 --- p.59 / Chapter 7 --- 感性的意義為接受性之能力，可為純粹的或經驗的 --- p.66 / Chapter 8 --- 空間是純粹直覺以及直覺之形式的二重性意義 --- p.76 / 註釋 / Chapter 第二章 --- 〈超越感性論〉中時空的論證 / Chapter 1 --- 歷代哲學家對時空本質的各種看法 --- p.99 / Chapter 2 --- 時空的關係說與時空的絶對說 --- p.109 / Chapter 3 --- 康德對時空問題的陳構方式有別於牛頓及萊布尼茲 --- p.112 / Chapter 4 --- 空間為外感形式與時間為內感形式之分別 --- p.122 / Chapter 5 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第一論證 --- p.135 / Chapter 6 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第二論證 --- p.144 / Chapter 7 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第三論證 --- p.149 / Chapter 8 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第四論證 --- p.161 / Chapter 9 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之分別 --- p.171 / 註釋 / 附錄 --- p.181 / 註釋 / Chapter 第三章 --- 從時空看人的有限性 / Chapter 1 --- “超越的觀念性´ح與“經驗的實在性´ح --- p.201 / Chapter 2 --- 對象、表象和現象之分別意義及其關係 --- p.227 / Chapter 3 --- 感性直覺與智的直覺之超越區別 --- p.242 / 註釋 / Chapter 第四章 --- 空間之超越的應用──幾何學的問題 / Chapter 1 --- 空間之“超越的解釋´ح以及超越的決定 --- p.264 / Chapter 2 --- 幾何學之客觀的實在性 --- p.283 / Chapter 3 --- 歐氏空間為直覺唯一空間 --- p.295 / 註釋 / Chapter 第五章 --- 康德哲學對近代哲學挑戰之回應 / Chapter 1 --- 攻擊康德哲學之兩個代表人物 ──羅素和賴欣巴哈 --- p.304 / Chapter 2 --- 羅素對四個空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之駁難 --- p.306 / Chapter 3 --- 以眼鏡比喻時空這種主體提供之直覺形式之錯誤 --- p.322 / Chapter 4 --- 康德之幾何學意義不同於羅素之幾何學 --- p.329 / Chapter 5 --- 非歐氏幾何學的出現不能推翻康德空間說 --- p.345 / Chapter 6 --- 賴欣巴哈之幾何學意義不同於康德之幾何學 --- p.367 / Chapter 7 --- 幾何學視覺化之問題 --- p.372 / Chapter 8 --- 賴欣巴哈理解之時間不同於康德之時間意義 --- p.385 / 註釋 / 結論 --- p.392 / 參考書目 --- p.395-403