Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [31-34] (5th group)). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang zhong wen da xue. / Chapter 第一部 --- 孟子的道德哲學̐ưج從心性學看孟子道德學說的性格 / Chapter （一） --- 概述 --- p.1 / Chapter （二） --- 具有先騐性與普遍性的幾希之性即為人之真性所在 --- p.7 / Chapter （三） --- 性善說 --- p.10 / Chapter （四） --- 性善即是心善說　 --- p.17 / Chapter （五） --- 從堯舜與人同下的問題̐ưج大人、小人之別 --- p.21 / Chapter （六） --- 修養之道 --- p.31 / Chapter （七） --- 盡心知性知天：性、命、天道之貫通 --- p.37 / Chapter 第二部： --- 康德的道德哲學 / Chapter （一） --- 序言 --- p.45 / Chapter （二） --- 從康德的「道德底形而上學的基礎及實踐理性批判見康德道德學說的大畧 --- p.58 / Chapter （甲） --- 從道德的普遍的理性知識中建立道德行為底律則 --- p.65 / Chapter （乙） --- 從道德底形而上學的範圍建立道德实踐的最高原則 --- p.78 / Chapter （丙） --- 從道德底形而上學轉呈實踐理性之批判（道德律則超越的推述） --- p.115 / Chapter （丁） --- 純粹實踐理性的设準 --- p.140 / Chapter （三） --- 道德的神學─康德的道德觀與宗教觀之關係 --- p.154 / Chapter 第三部 --- 孟子与康德道德¯إ¡學之比較 / Chapter （一） --- 義利之辨 --- p.157 / Chapter （二） --- 從孟子學說理性與人性之通貫處，見康德說理性与人性分立並不足以說明道德行為的根據 --- p.175 / Chapter （三） --- 道德行為的當然与道德行為的當然之自然化間的系統差別 --- p.211 / Chapter （四） --- 樂德一致問題下之同異　 --- p.229 / Chapter （五） --- 盡心知性知天之形而上學的道路 --- p.239 / Chapter （六） --- 結識　 --- p.243 / 註釋 --- p.248 / 第一部注釋 --- p.250 / 第二部注釋 --- p.254 / 第三部注釋 --- p.275 / 參考書目 --- p.278

楊德立. / "2007年11月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2007. / 參考文獻(leaves 110-113). / "2007 nian 11 yue". / Abstract also in English. / Yang Deli. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2007. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 110-113). / 楔子 --- p.1 / 本文目的 --- p.5 / 文章結構 --- p.5 / Chapter 第一章´Ø --- 引論´Ø論「希望」在康德哲學中的重要性 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.1 --- 被忽略的槪念與問題：「希望」和「我可以希望甚麼？」 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- 從外緣因素看希望問題被忽略原因 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- 從內部因素看希望問題被忽略原因 --- p.12 / Chapter 1.2. --- 從哲學的區分看希望問題的特殊地位 --- p.13 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 在一種最高統合的要求下，「希望」能作爲連繫理論與實踐 的橋樑 --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- 希望問題不僅屬於宗教哲學的原因一「我可以希望甚麼？」可引申出怎樣的論域？ --- p.16 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 康德哲學的核心關懷與希望的關係 --- p.18 / Chapter 1.4 --- 康德的希望哲學 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- 簡介希望槪念的歷史，以及康德的承先與啓後 --- p.22 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- 「康德的希望哲學」的意思，與及相關的文本範圍 --- p.25 / Chapter 第二章´Ø --- 希望作爲德福一致的渴望 --- p.27 / Chapter 2.1 --- 希望與最高善的關係：談最高善問題的哲學史根源及康德的突破 --- p.28 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 最高善問題的哲學史根源槪覽 --- p.28 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 希望問題的進入點´ؤ思辨與實踐理性的區分，與及實 踐理性的優先性 --- p.31 / Chapter 2.1.2.1 --- 「法規」的目的與意義 --- p.31 / Chapter 2.1.2.2 --- 實踐理性的應用相對思辨理性的應用在旨趣上的優 先性 --- p.33 / Chapter 2.2 --- 解釋希望即是「對德福一致（最高善）的渴望」之意 --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 希望是主體與對象的一種意向性關係，及「我可以希望 甚麼？」引申了「希望作爲對最高善的渴求」和「希望作爲對道 德進步的渴望」兩個命題 --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 康德討論「希望即對最高善的渴望」這命題的大體流程 --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.2.1 --- 最高善與道德世界之意 --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.2.2 --- 最高善預設道德世界 --- p.41 / Chapter 2.2.2.3 --- 道德世界預設了上帝存在和靈魂不朽兩個命題 --- p.42 / Chapter 2.2.2.4 --- 道德神學和上帝存在之道德論證 --- p.43 / Chapter 2.2.2.5 --- 目的論世界觀與目的論判斷力 --- p.44 / Chapter 2.3 --- 「希望作爲最高善」的細節一相關的槪念分析 --- p.46 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- 何謂「德行」？ --- p.47 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- 何謂「幸福」？ --- p.48 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- 作爲偏好的滿足之「感性的幸福」 --- p.48 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- 作爲道德情感一種的「智性的幸福」 --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- 「配享」作爲連繫希望、德行與幸福的關鍵槪念 --- p.54 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- 道德必然引致對最高善渴求´ؤ最高善的實現在於吾人 實踐理性上有其必然性， --- p.56 / Chapter 2.4 --- 第二章總結´Ø希望問題作爲應然與實然的聯繫，導致目的論判斷力的批判 --- p.59 / Chapter 第三章´Ø --- 目的論判斷力作爲連繋「批判」與「學說」的橋樑，以及作爲希望的根據 --- p.60 / Chapter 3.1 --- 論目的論判斷力的特性 --- p.61 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 兩種因果的區分留下了關於兩界如何統一運作的問題 --- p.61 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 境、界、域：實踐與理論哲學的區分，說明一個更高的統 含基礎的需要 --- p.62 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- 判斷力細分爲決定性判斷力和反省性判斷力 --- p.64 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- 理性之根本目的在於建立系統´ة反省性判斷力的特性幫助 成就此目的 --- p.66 / Chapter 3.1.5 --- 反省性判斷力的兩種發用´ة美感的與邏輯的面向 --- p.68 / Chapter 3.2 --- 從康徳哲學最宏觀的關懷去看目的論判斷力的在重要性 --- p.71 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 目的論判斷力延續至學說的基點：人作爲最後目的和終極 目的 --- p.72 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 由自然目的論轉向道德目的論、再從道德目的論轉向道德 神學 --- p.74 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- 目的論判斷力作爲康德哲學旨趣的樞紐，以及連繫「批判」 與「學說」的橋樑 --- p.76 / Chapter 3.3 --- 目的論判斷力與希望的關係 --- p.77 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 將希望能力理解成目的論判斷力的理由 --- p.78 / Chapter 3.4 --- 第三章總結´Ø目的論判斷力提供了康德哲學問題轉向的基礎 --- p.80 / Chapter 第四章´Ø --- 在目的論的基礎上發展出來的宗教、歷史、政治面向´ؤ希望的多向度發展 --- p.81 / Chapter 4.1 --- 目的論判斷力與學說的關係 --- p.81 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 「學說」與「批判」的意思和關係 --- p.83 / Chapter 4.2 --- 「學說」中的「人類道德進步問題」的兩個面向一「人類道 德的進步是否可能？」和「人類道德如何得以進步？」 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 人類道德進步論´Ø主題一：「人類道德的進步是否可 能？」一道德軟弱如何可能和如何克服？ --- p.86 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 人類道德進步論´Ø主題二：「人類道德如何得以進步？」´ؤ 道德如何才能實際地得到改進？從動物性進至人性 --- p.89 / Chapter 4.3 --- 「人類道德進步問題」揭示康德對「最高善能於這個世界中實 現嗎？」的關懷 --- p.94 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 最高善能在塵世上實現嗎？ --- p.95 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 如若最高善不能在這個世上實現，那又怎樣？ --- p.98 / Chapter 4-3.3 --- 即使最高善有其現實的可能性，我們又有何理由認爲「最 高善能實現」是一個合理的推測？ --- p.99 / Chapter 第五章´Ø --- 結論：以希望作爲閱讀線索的重要性：再次學習康德的哲學 精神 --- p.102 / Chapter 5.1 --- 從希望看「作爲有限者的我們，如何能有尊嚴地嚮往無限？」 --- p.102 / Chapter 5.2 --- 從希望看「康德哲學的開放精神」 --- p.105 / Chapter 5.3 --- 結語´Ø康德哲學的關懷的轉向與升進 --- p.107 / 康德原著於文中的書目與文章的統一譯名 --- p.109 / 參考書目 --- p.110

Lowe, Chun Yip. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-95). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract / Notes on sources and translations / Intorduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- From Subjectivity of Individuals to Inter-Subjectivity: Moral Law and Social Contract in Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace --- p.8 / Chapter I. --- "Right as ""mine and yours"" and the level of inter-subjectivity" --- p.10 / Chapter II. --- Moral law as the universal principle of right --- p.12 / Chapter III. --- Freedom in public sphere: the distinction between Wille and Willkur --- p.22 / Chapter IV. --- Original Contract and a transcendental principle of public right --- p.27 / Chapter 2. --- Nature's guarantee of perpetual peace and the notion of purposiveness p --- p.36 / Chapter I. --- The preliminary argument of the guarantee: war as a means of nature --- p.37 / Chapter II. --- The objection against the guarantee --- p.40 / Chapter III. --- "The technique of nature, purposiveness and the final end" --- p.44 / Chapter IV. --- Reflective judgment as a directive force --- p.58 / Chapter 3. --- Appraising the project of perpetual peace --- p.61 / Chapter I. --- The definition of perpetual peace and the six preliminary articles --- p.61 / Chapter II. --- The division of public right and the three definitive articles --- p.66 / Chapter III. --- Remark --- p.82 / Conclusion --- p.85 / Bibliography --- p.93

Wong, Po Lam. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-83). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Table of Contents / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter I. --- Preliminary Analysis --- p.3 / Chapter a) --- The Importance of the Problem of Practical Primacy --- p.3 / Chapter b) --- "“Reason,´ح “Speculative，´ح “Theoretical´ح and “Practical´ح" --- p.5 / Chapter i) --- The Concept “Reason´ح --- p.5 / Chapter ii) --- “Speculative，´ح “Theoretical´ح and “Practical´ح --- p.7 / Chapter c) --- Reason´ةs Interest --- p.13 / Chapter d) --- Two Perspectives of the Problem of the Primacy --- p.17 / Chapter II. --- Unity and Teleology of Reason as a whole --- p.21 / Chapter a) --- Preliminary --- p.21 / Chapter i) --- Unity of Reason and Moral Theology --- p.21 / Chapter ii) --- An Inconsistency presented in Groundwork and the Second Critique --- p.23 / Chapter b) --- Arguments for the Unity of Reason in the First and Second Critiques --- p.25 / Chapter i) --- Argument from Similarity --- p.25 / Chapter ii) --- Primacy of the Practical in the First and Second Critiques --- p.28 / Chapter iii) --- Other Considerations for the Unity of Reason --- p.32 / Chapter c) --- New Approach to the Unity of Reason --- p.36 / Chapter i) --- Failure in the Argument from Similarity --- p.37 / Chapter ii) --- Idea of a Fundamental Power as a Key to the Problem of the Unity of Reason --- p.38 / Chapter d) --- Unification of Reason --- p.42 / Chapter i) --- Unification of Reason in the First and Second Critiques --- p.42 / Chapter ii) --- Theoretical Reason: From Empirical Laws to Teleological Order of Nature --- p.46 / Chapter iii) --- The Ideas of a Moral World and a Wise Creator --- p.54 / Chapter iv) --- Primacy of the Practical Reconsidered --- p.60 / Chapter III. --- The Superiority of the Practical on Moral Theology --- p.62 / Chapter a) --- The Moral Proof for the Existence of God --- p.62 / Chapter b) --- The Distinction of Knowledge and Faith --- p.68 / Chapter c) --- The Postulate of the Existence of God --- p.73 / Conclusion --- p.80 / References --- p.81

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosof?a / En los cap?tulos que proceden, se ofrece una interpretaci?n de c?mo es posible el conocimiento te?rico especulativo de la experiencia para as? llegar a la concepci?n de un sistema de experiencia siguiendo especialmente la lectura de la Cr?tica de la Raz?n Pura. Patentizar? c?mo es posible un sistema de regularidades que no admiten excepci?n e indicaremos cu?l es el camino para alcanzar, junto con Kant, la idea de una experiencia que lleva consigo misma su determinaci?n y regularidad intr?nseca.

No description available.

This thesis is concerned with the power of ideas in political philosophy and practice. It argues firstly that Kant???s ideas of reason, as he originally defines them as regulative in the First Critique, play an important role in his political philosophy and his dynamic approach to politics. Secondly, because it is fundamentally concerned with political transition and improvement, Kant???s approach to politics is therefore one that has continuing relevance. Evidence for this is provided via an examination of Rawls??? political liberalism and the manner in which the idea of the reasonable fulfils the role of an idea of reason. The thesis begins with an examination of the regulative use of ideas of reason in the Dialectic of the First Critique: the ideas of soul, world and God become guides for practice, insofar as they are not bearers of truth but instead create essential conditions necessary for human life and meaning. Chapter Two then demonstrates how ideas of reason figure in Kant???s political texts. They condition politics by inspiring the practice of their objects, for example, the establishment of a rightful condition, the security of private property, the perpetuation of peace. That they look to the status quo in order to effect politics, demonstrates their concern with social progress. Chapter Three argues that publicity forms the primary political idea of reason as it enables the polity to use ideas of reason. Because publicity provides the test of efficient and rightful politics, we can say that it is through publicity that Kant???s politics is grounded. Chapter Four investigates Rawls??? political liberalism and observes that the primacy of the idea of the reasonable in his theory works according to a system of ideas of reason as proposed by Kant. Chapter Five then makes a final comparison between Kant and Rawls to demonstrate that ideas of reason, in particular the pre-eminent political idea of public reason, is central to both their conceptions of the political condition.

This thesis is concerned with the power of ideas in political philosophy and practice. It argues firstly that Kant???s ideas of reason, as he originally defines them as regulative in the First Critique, play an important role in his political philosophy and his dynamic approach to politics. Secondly, because it is fundamentally concerned with political transition and improvement, Kant???s approach to politics is therefore one that has continuing relevance. Evidence for this is provided via an examination of Rawls??? political liberalism and the manner in which the idea of the reasonable fulfils the role of an idea of reason. The thesis begins with an examination of the regulative use of ideas of reason in the Dialectic of the First Critique: the ideas of soul, world and God become guides for practice, insofar as they are not bearers of truth but instead create essential conditions necessary for human life and meaning. Chapter Two then demonstrates how ideas of reason figure in Kant???s political texts. They condition politics by inspiring the practice of their objects, for example, the establishment of a rightful condition, the security of private property, the perpetuation of peace. That they look to the status quo in order to effect politics, demonstrates their concern with social progress. Chapter Three argues that publicity forms the primary political idea of reason as it enables the polity to use ideas of reason. Because publicity provides the test of efficient and rightful politics, we can say that it is through publicity that Kant???s politics is grounded. Chapter Four investigates Rawls??? political liberalism and observes that the primacy of the idea of the reasonable in his theory works according to a system of ideas of reason as proposed by Kant. Chapter Five then makes a final comparison between Kant and Rawls to demonstrate that ideas of reason, in particular the pre-eminent political idea of public reason, is central to both their conceptions of the political condition.

This thesis is concerned with the power of ideas in political philosophy and practice. It argues firstly that Kant???s ideas of reason, as he originally defines them as regulative in the First Critique, play an important role in his political philosophy and his dynamic approach to politics. Secondly, because it is fundamentally concerned with political transition and improvement, Kant???s approach to politics is therefore one that has continuing relevance. Evidence for this is provided via an examination of Rawls??? political liberalism and the manner in which the idea of the reasonable fulfils the role of an idea of reason. The thesis begins with an examination of the regulative use of ideas of reason in the Dialectic of the First Critique: the ideas of soul, world and God become guides for practice, insofar as they are not bearers of truth but instead create essential conditions necessary for human life and meaning. Chapter Two then demonstrates how ideas of reason figure in Kant???s political texts. They condition politics by inspiring the practice of their objects, for example, the establishment of a rightful condition, the security of private property, the perpetuation of peace. That they look to the status quo in order to effect politics, demonstrates their concern with social progress. Chapter Three argues that publicity forms the primary political idea of reason as it enables the polity to use ideas of reason. Because publicity provides the test of efficient and rightful politics, we can say that it is through publicity that Kant???s politics is grounded. Chapter Four investigates Rawls??? political liberalism and observes that the primacy of the idea of the reasonable in his theory works according to a system of ideas of reason as proposed by Kant. Chapter Five then makes a final comparison between Kant and Rawls to demonstrate that ideas of reason, in particular the pre-eminent political idea of public reason, is central to both their conceptions of the political condition.

No description available.