In chapters two and three of this thesis, the distinction between the subject and object of knowledge and perception in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is examined in terms of what Kant calls, "representations." These representations are not, in general, as the name might suggest, pictures in the mind, or copies of objects. They are isolated bits of information which the mind has about the world; or, in other words, elementary ways in which the subject is related to the objects which it knows or perceives. The subject is constituted by the grouping of representations into different kinds of representations, mainly on the basis of similarities, so that we have the same sorts of information about different objects. The object is that which representations relate to when select representations of many different kinds are combined, mainly on the basis of coherence, so that we have different sorts of information about the same object. Chapter one is devoted to Kant's doctrine of the object in itself, which is discussed in terms of the distinction between knowledge and belief. Objects in themselves are objects apart from our representations of them. In spite of the fact that they cannot be known, objects in themselves are significant insofar as the false belief that we can know them is an inevitable result of the capacity of the subject to combine representations in different ways, including the combination of representations in the concept of an unknowable object. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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Chapter 3 further investigates the role of intuition in the application of concepts to intuitions. Kant introduces schema as a medium between intuitions and concepts and focuses on the schemata of pure concepts, suggesting that the transcendental schema is a procedure by which pure concepts apply to intuitions. Kant has emphasized inner sense and I complement his seemingly internal account by stressing the role of homogeneous intuitions, in the guise of domesticated intuitions, in schematic procedures. The normativity of inference derives from normative indifference of steps, based on cognitive indifference that exploits homogeneous and domesticated intuitions. / Chapter 4 examines the concept of causality in relation to intuitions. Causality is a concept of relation; while cause is a power to produce its effect. I understand causality as a relation between two series of events or occurrences that are quantitatively synchronizable covariant, which can be tested and modified through empirical intuitions. / In Chapter 2, I examine how intuitions function in mathematical and scientific inferences as well as in cognition in general. Intuitions and concepts in mathematics are the paradigm of concepts and intuitions in other kinds of cognition. In natural sciences, intuitions are concentrated on a homogeneous quality that scientific concepts postulate. Scientific inferences having these intuitions as the base of computability can be uniformly performed by all cognizers. Ordinary concepts can be considered as exhibited in the intuitions that belong to diverse but respectively homogeneous qualities. All of us have an inferential ability to achieve universally valid judgments acknowledged and recognized by each other. I understand this ability of inferential universality as the essence of Kant's transcendental idealism about cognitive subject and I call it cognitive machinery. / The fifth and last chapter examines the concept of purposiveness in relation to mechanical causality. Unlike transcendental causality that is a constitutive principle of cognition, purposiveness is only a regulative principle for the power of judgment. Mechanical causality is a kind of causality through the mechanism of nature. It cannot adequately explain organized beings as we judge them. Then Kant envisages an intentional causality; with its constitutive character deprived, we have the concept of purposiveness. Intuition underlies such a conceptualization of purposiveness in contrast with mechanical causality. A mechanical cause can be given in intuition since we can locate it in a time-series powered by fundamental forces. But purposiveness cannot be given in intuition in Kant's times. Thus Kant asserts that organized beings as natural ends are inexplicable by mechanical causes alone and introduces the purposiveness into our account of organized beings. / The subject of this study is the role of intuition in Kant's conceptualization of causality and purposiveness. In Chapter 1, I interpret Kant's Copernican revolution as a strategy to reverse cognitive procedure, not from object to cognition, but from cognition to object. So Kant starts from the products of human reason, such as mathematics and sciences. Kant bases the foundation of knowledge on an inferential procedure open to all cognizers. Intuition plays a pivotal role in such a procedure. / Chen, Huping. / "March 2008." / Adviser: Tze-wan Kwan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-03, Section: A, page: 0894. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 261-266). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

張鳳麟. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 395-403. / Zhang Fenglin. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue xue bu. / 導言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 康德對於時空問題之陳構模式 / Chapter 1 --- 在“Disserttation´ح中所提出的時空觀不同於《批判》的意義 --- p.12 / Chapter 2 --- 時空納入《批判》之〈超越感性論〉中討論 --- p.24 / Chapter 3 --- 康德對立於傳統形而上學之主客關係模式 --- p.32 / Chapter 4 --- 分析與綜合，先驗與後驗的分別和知識之可能模式 --- p.39 / Chapter 5 --- “ 知識´ح、´ح對象´ح及´ح直覺´ح之關係及其各層意義 --- p.46 / Chapter 6 --- 知識關聯於對象的最直接方式是直覺 --- p.59 / Chapter 7 --- 感性的意義為接受性之能力，可為純粹的或經驗的 --- p.66 / Chapter 8 --- 空間是純粹直覺以及直覺之形式的二重性意義 --- p.76 / 註釋 / Chapter 第二章 --- 〈超越感性論〉中時空的論證 / Chapter 1 --- 歷代哲學家對時空本質的各種看法 --- p.99 / Chapter 2 --- 時空的關係說與時空的絶對說 --- p.109 / Chapter 3 --- 康德對時空問題的陳構方式有別於牛頓及萊布尼茲 --- p.112 / Chapter 4 --- 空間為外感形式與時間為內感形式之分別 --- p.122 / Chapter 5 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第一論證 --- p.135 / Chapter 6 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第二論證 --- p.144 / Chapter 7 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第三論證 --- p.149 / Chapter 8 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之第四論證 --- p.161 / Chapter 9 --- 空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之分別 --- p.171 / 註釋 / 附錄 --- p.181 / 註釋 / Chapter 第三章 --- 從時空看人的有限性 / Chapter 1 --- “超越的觀念性´ح與“經驗的實在性´ح --- p.201 / Chapter 2 --- 對象、表象和現象之分別意義及其關係 --- p.227 / Chapter 3 --- 感性直覺與智的直覺之超越區別 --- p.242 / 註釋 / Chapter 第四章 --- 空間之超越的應用──幾何學的問題 / Chapter 1 --- 空間之“超越的解釋´ح以及超越的決定 --- p.264 / Chapter 2 --- 幾何學之客觀的實在性 --- p.283 / Chapter 3 --- 歐氏空間為直覺唯一空間 --- p.295 / 註釋 / Chapter 第五章 --- 康德哲學對近代哲學挑戰之回應 / Chapter 1 --- 攻擊康德哲學之兩個代表人物 ──羅素和賴欣巴哈 --- p.304 / Chapter 2 --- 羅素對四個空間之“形而上的解釋´ح之駁難 --- p.306 / Chapter 3 --- 以眼鏡比喻時空這種主體提供之直覺形式之錯誤 --- p.322 / Chapter 4 --- 康德之幾何學意義不同於羅素之幾何學 --- p.329 / Chapter 5 --- 非歐氏幾何學的出現不能推翻康德空間說 --- p.345 / Chapter 6 --- 賴欣巴哈之幾何學意義不同於康德之幾何學 --- p.367 / Chapter 7 --- 幾何學視覺化之問題 --- p.372 / Chapter 8 --- 賴欣巴哈理解之時間不同於康德之時間意義 --- p.385 / 註釋 / 結論 --- p.392 / 參考書目 --- p.395-403

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [31-34] (5th group)). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang zhong wen da xue. / Chapter 第一部 --- 孟子的道德哲學̐ưج從心性學看孟子道德學說的性格 / Chapter （一） --- 概述 --- p.1 / Chapter （二） --- 具有先騐性與普遍性的幾希之性即為人之真性所在 --- p.7 / Chapter （三） --- 性善說 --- p.10 / Chapter （四） --- 性善即是心善說　 --- p.17 / Chapter （五） --- 從堯舜與人同下的問題̐ưج大人、小人之別 --- p.21 / Chapter （六） --- 修養之道 --- p.31 / Chapter （七） --- 盡心知性知天：性、命、天道之貫通 --- p.37 / Chapter 第二部： --- 康德的道德哲學 / Chapter （一） --- 序言 --- p.45 / Chapter （二） --- 從康德的「道德底形而上學的基礎及實踐理性批判見康德道德學說的大畧 --- p.58 / Chapter （甲） --- 從道德的普遍的理性知識中建立道德行為底律則 --- p.65 / Chapter （乙） --- 從道德底形而上學的範圍建立道德实踐的最高原則 --- p.78 / Chapter （丙） --- 從道德底形而上學轉呈實踐理性之批判（道德律則超越的推述） --- p.115 / Chapter （丁） --- 純粹實踐理性的设準 --- p.140 / Chapter （三） --- 道德的神學─康德的道德觀與宗教觀之關係 --- p.154 / Chapter 第三部 --- 孟子与康德道德¯إ¡學之比較 / Chapter （一） --- 義利之辨 --- p.157 / Chapter （二） --- 從孟子學說理性與人性之通貫處，見康德說理性与人性分立並不足以說明道德行為的根據 --- p.175 / Chapter （三） --- 道德行為的當然与道德行為的當然之自然化間的系統差別 --- p.211 / Chapter （四） --- 樂德一致問題下之同異　 --- p.229 / Chapter （五） --- 盡心知性知天之形而上學的道路 --- p.239 / Chapter （六） --- 結識　 --- p.243 / 註釋 --- p.248 / 第一部注釋 --- p.250 / 第二部注釋 --- p.254 / 第三部注釋 --- p.275 / 參考書目 --- p.278

楊德立. / "2007年11月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2007. / 參考文獻(leaves 110-113). / "2007 nian 11 yue". / Abstract also in English. / Yang Deli. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2007. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 110-113). / 楔子 --- p.1 / 本文目的 --- p.5 / 文章結構 --- p.5 / Chapter 第一章´Ø --- 引論´Ø論「希望」在康德哲學中的重要性 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.1 --- 被忽略的槪念與問題：「希望」和「我可以希望甚麼？」 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- 從外緣因素看希望問題被忽略原因 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- 從內部因素看希望問題被忽略原因 --- p.12 / Chapter 1.2. --- 從哲學的區分看希望問題的特殊地位 --- p.13 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 在一種最高統合的要求下，「希望」能作爲連繫理論與實踐 的橋樑 --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- 希望問題不僅屬於宗教哲學的原因一「我可以希望甚麼？」可引申出怎樣的論域？ --- p.16 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 康德哲學的核心關懷與希望的關係 --- p.18 / Chapter 1.4 --- 康德的希望哲學 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- 簡介希望槪念的歷史，以及康德的承先與啓後 --- p.22 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- 「康德的希望哲學」的意思，與及相關的文本範圍 --- p.25 / Chapter 第二章´Ø --- 希望作爲德福一致的渴望 --- p.27 / Chapter 2.1 --- 希望與最高善的關係：談最高善問題的哲學史根源及康德的突破 --- p.28 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 最高善問題的哲學史根源槪覽 --- p.28 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 希望問題的進入點´ؤ思辨與實踐理性的區分，與及實 踐理性的優先性 --- p.31 / Chapter 2.1.2.1 --- 「法規」的目的與意義 --- p.31 / Chapter 2.1.2.2 --- 實踐理性的應用相對思辨理性的應用在旨趣上的優 先性 --- p.33 / Chapter 2.2 --- 解釋希望即是「對德福一致（最高善）的渴望」之意 --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 希望是主體與對象的一種意向性關係，及「我可以希望 甚麼？」引申了「希望作爲對最高善的渴求」和「希望作爲對道 德進步的渴望」兩個命題 --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 康德討論「希望即對最高善的渴望」這命題的大體流程 --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.2.1 --- 最高善與道德世界之意 --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.2.2 --- 最高善預設道德世界 --- p.41 / Chapter 2.2.2.3 --- 道德世界預設了上帝存在和靈魂不朽兩個命題 --- p.42 / Chapter 2.2.2.4 --- 道德神學和上帝存在之道德論證 --- p.43 / Chapter 2.2.2.5 --- 目的論世界觀與目的論判斷力 --- p.44 / Chapter 2.3 --- 「希望作爲最高善」的細節一相關的槪念分析 --- p.46 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- 何謂「德行」？ --- p.47 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- 何謂「幸福」？ --- p.48 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- 作爲偏好的滿足之「感性的幸福」 --- p.48 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- 作爲道德情感一種的「智性的幸福」 --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- 「配享」作爲連繫希望、德行與幸福的關鍵槪念 --- p.54 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- 道德必然引致對最高善渴求´ؤ最高善的實現在於吾人 實踐理性上有其必然性， --- p.56 / Chapter 2.4 --- 第二章總結´Ø希望問題作爲應然與實然的聯繫，導致目的論判斷力的批判 --- p.59 / Chapter 第三章´Ø --- 目的論判斷力作爲連繋「批判」與「學說」的橋樑，以及作爲希望的根據 --- p.60 / Chapter 3.1 --- 論目的論判斷力的特性 --- p.61 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 兩種因果的區分留下了關於兩界如何統一運作的問題 --- p.61 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 境、界、域：實踐與理論哲學的區分，說明一個更高的統 含基礎的需要 --- p.62 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- 判斷力細分爲決定性判斷力和反省性判斷力 --- p.64 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- 理性之根本目的在於建立系統´ة反省性判斷力的特性幫助 成就此目的 --- p.66 / Chapter 3.1.5 --- 反省性判斷力的兩種發用´ة美感的與邏輯的面向 --- p.68 / Chapter 3.2 --- 從康徳哲學最宏觀的關懷去看目的論判斷力的在重要性 --- p.71 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 目的論判斷力延續至學說的基點：人作爲最後目的和終極 目的 --- p.72 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 由自然目的論轉向道德目的論、再從道德目的論轉向道德 神學 --- p.74 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- 目的論判斷力作爲康德哲學旨趣的樞紐，以及連繫「批判」 與「學說」的橋樑 --- p.76 / Chapter 3.3 --- 目的論判斷力與希望的關係 --- p.77 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 將希望能力理解成目的論判斷力的理由 --- p.78 / Chapter 3.4 --- 第三章總結´Ø目的論判斷力提供了康德哲學問題轉向的基礎 --- p.80 / Chapter 第四章´Ø --- 在目的論的基礎上發展出來的宗教、歷史、政治面向´ؤ希望的多向度發展 --- p.81 / Chapter 4.1 --- 目的論判斷力與學說的關係 --- p.81 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 「學說」與「批判」的意思和關係 --- p.83 / Chapter 4.2 --- 「學說」中的「人類道德進步問題」的兩個面向一「人類道 德的進步是否可能？」和「人類道德如何得以進步？」 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 人類道德進步論´Ø主題一：「人類道德的進步是否可 能？」一道德軟弱如何可能和如何克服？ --- p.86 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 人類道德進步論´Ø主題二：「人類道德如何得以進步？」´ؤ 道德如何才能實際地得到改進？從動物性進至人性 --- p.89 / Chapter 4.3 --- 「人類道德進步問題」揭示康德對「最高善能於這個世界中實 現嗎？」的關懷 --- p.94 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 最高善能在塵世上實現嗎？ --- p.95 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 如若最高善不能在這個世上實現，那又怎樣？ --- p.98 / Chapter 4-3.3 --- 即使最高善有其現實的可能性，我們又有何理由認爲「最 高善能實現」是一個合理的推測？ --- p.99 / Chapter 第五章´Ø --- 結論：以希望作爲閱讀線索的重要性：再次學習康德的哲學 精神 --- p.102 / Chapter 5.1 --- 從希望看「作爲有限者的我們，如何能有尊嚴地嚮往無限？」 --- p.102 / Chapter 5.2 --- 從希望看「康德哲學的開放精神」 --- p.105 / Chapter 5.3 --- 結語´Ø康德哲學的關懷的轉向與升進 --- p.107 / 康德原著於文中的書目與文章的統一譯名 --- p.109 / 參考書目 --- p.110

Lowe, Chun Yip. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-95). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract / Notes on sources and translations / Intorduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- From Subjectivity of Individuals to Inter-Subjectivity: Moral Law and Social Contract in Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace --- p.8 / Chapter I. --- "Right as ""mine and yours"" and the level of inter-subjectivity" --- p.10 / Chapter II. --- Moral law as the universal principle of right --- p.12 / Chapter III. --- Freedom in public sphere: the distinction between Wille and Willkur --- p.22 / Chapter IV. --- Original Contract and a transcendental principle of public right --- p.27 / Chapter 2. --- Nature's guarantee of perpetual peace and the notion of purposiveness p --- p.36 / Chapter I. --- The preliminary argument of the guarantee: war as a means of nature --- p.37 / Chapter II. --- The objection against the guarantee --- p.40 / Chapter III. --- "The technique of nature, purposiveness and the final end" --- p.44 / Chapter IV. --- Reflective judgment as a directive force --- p.58 / Chapter 3. --- Appraising the project of perpetual peace --- p.61 / Chapter I. --- The definition of perpetual peace and the six preliminary articles --- p.61 / Chapter II. --- The division of public right and the three definitive articles --- p.66 / Chapter III. --- Remark --- p.82 / Conclusion --- p.85 / Bibliography --- p.93

Wong, Po Lam. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-83). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Table of Contents / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter I. --- Preliminary Analysis --- p.3 / Chapter a) --- The Importance of the Problem of Practical Primacy --- p.3 / Chapter b) --- "“Reason,´ح “Speculative，´ح “Theoretical´ح and “Practical´ح" --- p.5 / Chapter i) --- The Concept “Reason´ح --- p.5 / Chapter ii) --- “Speculative，´ح “Theoretical´ح and “Practical´ح --- p.7 / Chapter c) --- Reason´ةs Interest --- p.13 / Chapter d) --- Two Perspectives of the Problem of the Primacy --- p.17 / Chapter II. --- Unity and Teleology of Reason as a whole --- p.21 / Chapter a) --- Preliminary --- p.21 / Chapter i) --- Unity of Reason and Moral Theology --- p.21 / Chapter ii) --- An Inconsistency presented in Groundwork and the Second Critique --- p.23 / Chapter b) --- Arguments for the Unity of Reason in the First and Second Critiques --- p.25 / Chapter i) --- Argument from Similarity --- p.25 / Chapter ii) --- Primacy of the Practical in the First and Second Critiques --- p.28 / Chapter iii) --- Other Considerations for the Unity of Reason --- p.32 / Chapter c) --- New Approach to the Unity of Reason --- p.36 / Chapter i) --- Failure in the Argument from Similarity --- p.37 / Chapter ii) --- Idea of a Fundamental Power as a Key to the Problem of the Unity of Reason --- p.38 / Chapter d) --- Unification of Reason --- p.42 / Chapter i) --- Unification of Reason in the First and Second Critiques --- p.42 / Chapter ii) --- Theoretical Reason: From Empirical Laws to Teleological Order of Nature --- p.46 / Chapter iii) --- The Ideas of a Moral World and a Wise Creator --- p.54 / Chapter iv) --- Primacy of the Practical Reconsidered --- p.60 / Chapter III. --- The Superiority of the Practical on Moral Theology --- p.62 / Chapter a) --- The Moral Proof for the Existence of God --- p.62 / Chapter b) --- The Distinction of Knowledge and Faith --- p.68 / Chapter c) --- The Postulate of the Existence of God --- p.73 / Conclusion --- p.80 / References --- p.81

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosof?a / En los cap?tulos que proceden, se ofrece una interpretaci?n de c?mo es posible el conocimiento te?rico especulativo de la experiencia para as? llegar a la concepci?n de un sistema de experiencia siguiendo especialmente la lectura de la Cr?tica de la Raz?n Pura. Patentizar? c?mo es posible un sistema de regularidades que no admiten excepci?n e indicaremos cu?l es el camino para alcanzar, junto con Kant, la idea de una experiencia que lleva consigo misma su determinaci?n y regularidad intr?nseca.