The Critique of Pure Reason inaugurated Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Commentators commonly distinguish between Kant’s Positive Project (PP), that is, his epistemology as laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, from his Negative Project (NP), expressed in terms of the destructive implications his epistemology has on speculative metaphysics and rational theology. Against this tradition I will argue that the whole of the Critique is largely a negative-destructive enterprise. I will focus on what is commonly taken as the centerpiece of the PP, that is, the Transcendental Deduction, and demonstrate that even here the NP is given normative priority. Though, to be sure, certain passages tend to encourage an interpretation of the PP as primary, I contend that this view is myopic and fails to pay sufficient attention to Kant’s global concerns in the Critique. I will demonstrate that a clear exposition of Kant’s metaphilosophical aims, commitments, and convictions is in fact corrosive to any such reading. The objective of this thesis, then, is two-fold: 1) to provide an account of Kant’s metaphilosophy in the Critique, and 2) to argue for what I will here and elsewhere refer to as the Primacy of the Negative Thesis, that is, that Kant prioritized boundary-setting over principle-generating.

This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of the intuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, and by then proposing a theory that can legitimize what we already do believe. Chapter One sets out our intuitive understanding of morality: (1) that morality is cognitive, moral beliefs can be true or false; (2) that morality is real, we do not construct it; (3) that morality is rational, we can learn about it by rational investigation; and (4) that morality places us under an absolute constraint. The chapter ends by clarifying the nature of that absolute demand and by arguing that the critical idea within morality is the idea of duty. In Chapter Two Mackie’s sceptical attack on objectivism is examined. Four key arguments are identified: (1) that moral beliefs are relative to bfferent agents; (2) that morality is based upon on non-rational causes; (3) that the idea of moral properties or entities is too queer to be sustainable; and (4) that moral objectivism involves queer epistemological commitments. Essentially all of these arguments are shown to be ambiguous; however it is proposed that Mackie has an underlying epistemological and metaphysical theory, scientific empiricism, which is (a) hostile to objectivism and (b) a theory that many find attractive for reasons that are independent of morality. Chapter Three explores the nature of moral rationality and whether scientific empiricism can use the idea of reflective equilibrium to offer a reasonable account of moral rationality. It concludes that, while reflective equilibrium is a useful account of moral rationality, it cannot be effectively reconciled with scientific empiricism. In order to function effectively as a rational process, reflective equilibrium must be rationally constrained by our moral judgements and our moral principles. Chapter Four begins the process of exploring some alternative epistemologies and argues that the only account that remains true to objectivism and the needs of reflective equilibrium is the account of intuitionism proposed by Ross. However this account can be developed further by drawing upon number of Kantian ideas and using them to supplement Ross ’ s intuitionism. So Chapter Five draws upon a number of Kant's ideas, most notably some key notions from the Critique of Judgement. These ideas are: (1) that we possess a rational will that is subject to the Moral law and determined by practical reason; (2) that we possess a faculty of judgement which enables us to become aware of moral properties and (3) that these two faculties together with the third faculty of thought can function to constitute the moral understanding. Using these ideas the thesis explores whether they can serve to explain how intuitions can be rational and how objectivism can be justified.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:48:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Kleber de Oliveira Machado.pdf: 621007 bytes, checksum: 76a73a4baa22b12bbe95f429ceaed24e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-02-09 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / This essay analyses the most important thesis of the pluralist theologian John Hick. It gives special attention to the ground books: The metaphor of God incarnate, An interpretation of religion, Death and eternal life. In the first book, he reformulates the incarnation doctrine to turn the pluralist hypothesis possible. In the second, he introduces his pluralist hypothesis that all religions are valid responses to the Real or Ultimate Reality. And in the third, which is his global theological work, he searches to build up what would be a pareschatology embracing the pluralist hypothesis. Finally, the essay seeks to demonstrate the inconsistency of Hick‟s Kantian epistemological grounds. It also presents the strong consequences that the revisionist project and the global theology have to Christian theology. It shows that the revisionist task, which has been proposed by Hick, empties the meaning of Christian theology. Therefore, it does not consider it as an authentic response to the Real, what invalids Hick's pluralist hypothesis. / Esta dissertação analisa as principais teses do teólogo pluralista John Hick. Dá-se especial atenção aos livros que as fundamentam: A Metáfora do Deus Encarnado, An Interpretation of Religion e Death and Eternal Life. No primeiro livro, ele reformula a doutrina da encarnação para tornar a hipótese pluralista possível. No segundo, ele apresenta sua hipótese pluralista de que todas as religiões são respostas válidas ao Real ou Realidade Última. E no terceiro, o qual é seu trabalho de teologia global, ele busca construir o que seria uma parescatologia que mantenha a hipótese pluralista. Finalmente, a dissertação procura demonstrar a inconsistência da base epistemológica kantiana de Hick. Demonstra também as profundas conseqüências que o projeto revisionista e a teologia global têm sobre a teologia cristã. Apresenta que a tarefa revisionista que tem sido proposta por Hick, esvazia o significado da teologia cristã. Por conseguinte, não a considera como uma resposta autêntica ao Real, o que invalida a hipótese pluralista de Hick.