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Thesis (M.A. (International Relations))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, 2016 / The Six Party Talks is a multilateral forum created to facilitate the DPRK’s (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or North Korea) denuclearisation, between 2003 and 2007. This paper will look at how the character of the relationship that North Korea had with other states allowed the North to manipulate the Talks in such a way that it managed to continue with its nuclear weapons programme. The content of these Talks makes them unique and shows how power perception (heightened in negotiations that involve a focus on deterrence, state survival and regional stability) dictates outcomes. The intent of the study is to explore how ‘power’ can be manipulated because it has to be mediated by perception. In essence, ‘perception’ creates a space for North Korea to manipulate the ‘reality’ within which all the states involved function. This study aims to show that it can build on currently existing assumptions that relate to negotiation and power, specifically Zartman’s explanation of power as a perceived relation. The paper argues that within the context of denuclearisation, the understanding of power perception needs to be qualified. It explores whether, in the context of the Six Party Talks in particular, ‘power’ can be analysed with a purely realist paradigm. Constructed meanings for resources that seem to exist purely within an objective reality (for realists) can alter the value of these resources. The argument therefore builds onto the realist foundation of Zartman’s approach to the analysis of negotiations, by showing how a state like North Korea can change the value of an objective reality by creating certain meanings for the elements that comprise this reality. It is interested in building on certain assumptions made by realists (including Hans Morgenthau (1993)), as well as certain assumptions concerning a structural approach to the analysis of negotiations (Zartman 2008: 100); in order to provide a more nuanced perspective regarding North Korea’s behaviour during the Six Party Talks, in relation to its interactions towards the other parties in the Talks (specifically the US, China and South Korea), as well as their reactions to the North’s provocations. To create this nuance, it uses constructivist elements to show how North Korea, during the time in which the Six Party Talks took place, manipulated reality to such an extent that it dictated the options that the other states had in relation to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme. / MT2017

The subject of this dissertation is the impact of Canada's position within the international capitalist system on foreign policy as manifested towards Korea from 1947 to 1955. Canada is characterized as an "advanced dependent-developed" country, exhibiting both "dependent" and "independent" directions in its economic development. The dissertation argues that a similar combination could be distinguished in foreign policy. A scale is elaborated identifying four hypothetical categorizations of policy: Independent; Limited-Independent; Active-Dependent; and, Dependent; and the scale is applied to critical points in Canada-Korea relations. The dissertation concludes that "Active-Dependence" is the most consistent conceptualization of Canadian policy and that the movement in this direction involved the gradual erosion of Canadian independence. This is directly related to the development of "continental economic integration" and Canadian "advanced dependent-developed" status.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 1963. / Cover title: The problem of Korean unification. Bibliography: p. 169-181.

This study is an attempt to combine the disciplines of Asian history and United States diplomatic history in analyzing the 1871 Korean-American Incident. The Incident revolves around the Low-Rodgers expedition to Korea, and the subsequent breakdown of peaceful negotiations into a military clash of arms. To describe the Incident as merely another example of American "imperialism,'' or as a result of narrow-minded Korean isolationism, is to oversimplify its causes and miss the larger implications that can be learned from it. A basic premise of this paper is that the 1871 Incident is an example of East-West cultural conflict. As such, the forces that helped to determine the attitudes and behavior of both the Americans and Koreans were of a broad nature reflecting their respective cultural differences. At times, these differences were so basic and general that the specialist in history can easily overlook them. To better understand this conflict of cultures, Chapters II and III discuss elements of Korean and American diplomacy before the 1860’s, and how their unique experiences led to widely different attitudes toward foreign relations. Chapter II concentrates on traditional Chinese-Korean relations, and their effect upon Korea's approach to diplomacy; Chapter III emphasizes the nature of America's first contacts with East Asia and the important influence of the activities of the United States in the Mediterranean region. Chapters IV and V deal with domestic politics in Korea and the United States, and how these internal conditions affected each nation's attitude toward the other. Chapter VI is a detailed description of the immediate events that culminated in the 1871 Incident. Chapters I and VII are the introduction and conclusion. In researching this paper, government documents, memoirs, diaries, personal accounts, contemporary newspapers, books, and articles were all used. When writing the chapters that deal primarily with Korea, Korean sources have been used as much as possible. The Korean and American officials, though communicating in the same language (Chinese characters), were negotiating from completely different cultural norms. Both sides felt that their positions and actions were morally justified. In studying the official documents concerning the Incident, the reader is indeed impressed by the sincerity and honesty of all parties involved. In this sense, it is difficult to label one group "guilty" and the other group "innocent." It must be remembered, however, that the Americans were carrying out naval activities in Korean waters, and not the Koreans in American waters. The student of history is reminded that American-East Asian relations, unlike most American-European relations, must constantly confront and overcome wide cultural differences. To ignore these differences, or to impose one's own cultural views on another society, is to invite misunderstanding, raise suspicions, and increase the possibility of conflict.

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The EU’s notable transformation over the past five decades is obviously an event of modern state concepts. However, the EU’s matter of concern has placed too much emphasis on economic and trade issues, while its capability and power have achieved remarkable growth with far-reaching ramifications in both economic and political affairs. This also means that studies of the EU foreign policy have hardly reached North East Asia because of geographical limit between them, the EU’s weak institutional capacity and vestige of the Cold War. Therefore the EU and the Korean Peninsula did not have chance to build a critical relationship. This time could be defined as ‘standstill’ between Europe and the Korean Peninsula or ‘quiet diplomacy’. 1993 marked a turning-point in relations between the EU and the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, European countries have launched the Maastricht Treaty since they had signed in 1992. The Treaty implies the EU’s more strengthened international role in the political and economic area in accordance with its increased capability and reinforced power. Secondly, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 and then the Korean Peninsula was compelled to face a political crisis. Since the EU took unofficial Humanitarian Aids for North Korea in 1994-1995, KEDO and the EU in 1997 agreed to the terms and conditions of the accession to KEDO of its nuclear regulatory body. This was the first challenge of the EU political engagement of the Korean Peninsula question. In the context, this research seeks to answer the question of “What are the EU priorities in its strategy for Korean Peninsula?” that includes broadly the EU’s regional strategy for North East Asia in line with its foreign policy agenda. To tell the conclusion, the EU’s intervention to North Korea was firstly encouraged in dimension of economic interests through vitalization of international trade after the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. The EU considered that Asian nuclear market is an important factor in order to build nuclear technical standard as well as to obtain commercial interests although the European nuclear firms did not obtain chance enough to construct for North Korea nuclear facilities construction. The EU’s political incentives for political change-seeking in North East Asia must also be considered. Actually, the EU diplomatically opened the door of Pyongyang and led the isolated regime to a channel that communicates with international community although the EU did not take a seat at Six-Party Talks to engage itself in the Korean Peninsula question. As a result, the EU could increase the image of a ‘peaceful mediator’ or an ‘honest blocker’ in the term of ‘reputation’ through engagement continued for the Korean Peninsula Crisis. The EU’s foreign policy has been partly successful in context that Europe succeeds in promoting its existence as a global actor. Therefore, its foreign policy would gradually be reinforced to bolster the EU’s credibility and influence in the Korean Peninsula. The EU’s role is surely reduced in the Korean Peninsula issues with the termination of the KEDO project. However, the EU’s role is expected to be performed in different ways under its confidence and capability. The EU’s next engagement depends on where its new incentives will be, and then its question will be how to realize them in accordance with its institutional conditions and actual capacity. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished